causation standard in Massachusetts

1994The magistrate, accordingly, committed legal error in concluding that DiDonato had satisfied “the strict causation standard imposed by the controlling statute,” Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 485 (1985), since she neglected to consider significant factors that might have relegated the original 1977 fall to a mere “contributing cause,” rather than the requisite “natural and proximate” cause, of DiDonato’s disability.

1992“Proof of either hypothesis ha[s] to satisfy the strict causation standard imposed by the controlling statute: that the [applicant’s] employment was ‘a natural and proximate cause of the incapacity.’ ” Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 485 (1985).

2012L. c. 32, § 7 (1), can yield harsh results for employees who have suffered disabling injuries.” Richard v. Retirement Bd. of Worcester, supra at 167.

2007See id. (employee who was injured when she slipped and fell on her employer’s premises while returning to her office from lunch did not qualify for disability retirement benefits under the statute as the injury did not occur as a result of, and while in the performance of, her duties); see also Richard v. Contributory Ret Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 163, 164 (2000) (employee who was injured in an automobile accident while driving from her home to her first school assignment of the workday did not qualify for benefits under the strict causation requirement).

2020See id. at 834-835 , quoting Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997) (scope of restitution limited to "loss or damage [that] is causally connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense").

2014These include a causation test to ensure that the restitution award is connected to the crime, Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002); a limitation to economic losses, Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001); a requirement of evidentiary support for the order, id. at 221-222 , and Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985); and a requirement that the procedure be fair and reasonable, afforded through a hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut with other evidence, id.

2008L. c. 32, § 7(1)]: that [Fender’s] employment was ‘a natural and proximate cause of the incapacity.’ Campbell v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1018 (1984).” Blanchette v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 485 .

1985Proof of either hypothesis had to satisfy the strict causation standard imposed by the controlling statute: that the plaintiff’s employment was “a natural and proximate cause of the incapacity.” Campbell v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1018 (1984).

2020See id. at 834-835 , quoting Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997) (scope of restitution limited to "loss or damage [that] is causally connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense").

2020See also Parker, 935 F.3d at 15 ("isolated instances of a subordinate's constitutional violations . . . will not clear the causation bar" [quotation and citation omitted]).

2019See, e.g., Gourdeau v. Newton , 238 F. Supp. 3d 179 , 194 (D.

2018See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum , 452 Mass. 1 , 30 (2008).

2014These include a causation test to ensure that the restitution award is connected to the crime, Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002); a limitation to economic losses, Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001); a requirement of evidentiary support for the order, id. at 221-222 , and Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985); and a requirement that the procedure be fair and reasonable, afforded through a hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut with other evidence, id.

2014These include a causation test to ensure that the restitution award is connected to the crime, Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002); a limitation to economic losses, Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001); a requirement of evidentiary support for the order, id. at 221-222 , and Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985); and a requirement that the procedure be fair and reasonable, afforded through a hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut with other evidence, id.

2014These include a causation test to ensure that the restitution award is connected to the crime, Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002); a limitation to economic losses, Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001); a requirement of evidentiary support for the order, id. at 221-222 , and Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985); and a requirement that the procedure be fair and reasonable, afforded through a hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut with other evidence, id.

2014These include a causation test to ensure that the restitution award is connected to the crime, Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002); a limitation to economic losses, Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001); a requirement of evidentiary support for the order, id. at 221-222 , and Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985); and a requirement that the procedure be fair and reasonable, afforded through a hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut with other evidence, id.

2014In Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012), the United States Supreme Court concluded that criminal fines, like other statutorily prescribed sentences, require jury determination of the facts that inform the punishment.

2009See e.g., G.L.c. 186, §19 (imposing reasonable care obligations on landlord’s duty to repair rented premises); Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency LLC, 454 Mass. 611, 615 (2009) (c. 93A action requires “casual connection between the injury suffered and the defendant’s unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice”); Doe v. New Bedford Hous.

2007See id. (employee who was injured when she slipped and fell on her employer’s premises while returning to her office from lunch did not qualify for disability retirement benefits under the statute as the injury did not occur as a result of, and while in the performance of, her duties); see also Richard v. Contributory Ret Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 163, 164 (2000) (employee who was injured in an automobile accident while driving from her home to her first school assignment of the workday did not qualify for benefits under the strict causation requirement).

2004For this claim, the causation analysis focuses on whether the adverse action “was motivated in substantial part by the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected activity.” Sowards v. Loudon County, supra, citing Mattox v. Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 520-521 (6th Cir. 1999).

2003“To prevail on a claim for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the attorney’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of the damage or loss she sustained.” Meyer v. Wagner, 429 Mass. 410, 424 (1999).

2002Some courts only allow restitution for injury resulting from “the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990); State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 870 (1991); Polen v. State, 578 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

2002Some courts only allow restitution for injury resulting from “the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990); State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 870 (1991); Polen v. State, 578 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

2002“Unforeseeability and Related Limitations of Damages. (1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. (2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.” If breach of fiduciary duty were viewed as a tort even though “the gist” of the claim was contractual, cf. Houle v. Low, 40

2002Some courts only allow restitution for injury resulting from “the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990); State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 870 (1991); Polen v. State, 578 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

2002“Unforeseeability and Related Limitations of Damages. (1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. (2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.” If breach of fiduciary duty were viewed as a tort even though “the gist” of the claim was contractual, cf. Houle v. Low, 40

1999“The usual meaning ascribed to the phrase ‘arising out of is much broader than ‘caused by'; the former phrase is considered synonymous with ‘originate’ or ‘come into being.’ ” New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 722, 726 (1996) (citations omitted).

1998See Commonwealth v. Williams, 399 Mass. 60, 64 (1987).

1998In instructing the jury on the evaluation of the medical testimony on causation, the judge listed several factors' articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993), to be considered in assessing the evidence. 3 Higgins asserts that this instruction was a fundamental and improper invasion of the jury’s exclusive province to evaluate expert witness testimony.

1996Co., 414 Mass. 747, 763-764 (1993); see also Hailey, supra at 18 (stating that the 1989 amendment did not remove the causation requirement and that the damages flowing from the defendant’s wrongful conduct are subject to multiplication).

1996The existence of such an affirmative certification is not in itself a basis for concluding that an applicant has satisfied his burden of proving the causal connection between his disability and a work-related accident or incident, see id. at 614 ; Wakefield Contributory Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 352 Mass. 499, 502-503 (1967); Shrewsbury Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 379, 381 (1977), particularly in light of “the strict causation standard imposed by [G.