causation standard in Missouri

2015In addition, as recognized in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999), several of the cases cited in this opinion rely on a causation standard which was abrogated by 1993 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law.

2015In addition, as recognized in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999), several of the cases cited in this opinion rely on a causation standard which was abrogated by 1993 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law.

2014Id. at 73 .

2010Judge White describes the exclusive causation standard as "plucked out of thin air” by Hansome , noting that none of the cases relied on by this Court or the statute used the word "exclusive.” Id. at 74. 11 .

2014Not only did it expressly abrogate other prior cases of this Court and the court of appeals by name and citation, see, e.g., Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1999); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Mo. banc 1999); Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524, 531-32 (Mo. App. 2002), the 2005 amendments took affirmative steps to abrogate a different causation standard, while leaving this Court's decisions in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.

2014Not only did it expressly abrogate other prior cases of this Court and the court of appeals by name and citation, see, e.g., Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1999); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Mo. banc 1999); Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524, 531-32 (Mo. App. 2002), the 2005 amendments took affirmative steps to abrogate a different causation standard, while leaving this Court's decisions in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.

2014Not only did it expressly abrogate other prior cases of this Court and the court of appeals by name and citation, see, e.g., Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1999); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Mo. banc 1999); Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524, 531-32 (Mo. App. 2002), the 2005 amendments took affirmative steps to abrogate a different causation standard, while leaving this Court's decisions in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.

2014Not only did it expressly abrogate other prior cases of this Court and the court of appeals by name and citation, see, e.g., Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1999); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Mo. banc 1999); Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524, 531-32 (Mo. App. 2002), the 2005 amendments took affirmative steps to abrogate a different causation standard, while leaving this Court's decisions in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.

2014Even if this Court strictly construed the statute as it must do pursuant to section 287.800, “[a] strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed.” Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

2014Even if this Court strictly construed the statute as it must do pursuant to section 287.800, “[a] strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed.” Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

2014Moreover, in Reed v. Sale Memorial Hosp. and Clinic, 698 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. App. S.D. 1985), the court explained that section 287.780 is an exception to Missouri’s employment at-will doctrine and that the statute declared “public policy” by addressing “the evil to be remedied,” which was “want of an effective remedy for retaliatory discharge arising out of the exercise of rights” under the workers’ compensation law.

2014Moreover, in Reed v. Sale Memorial Hosp. and Clinic, 698 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. App. S.D. 1985), the court explained that section 287.780 is an exception to Missouri’s employment at-will doctrine and that the statute declared “public policy” by addressing “the evil to be remedied,” which was “want of an effective remedy for retaliatory discharge arising out of the exercise of rights” under the workers’ compensation law.

2014This Court further explained, “Causality does not exist if the basis for discharge is valid and nonpretextual.” Id. at 277, n.2 .

2014This Court further explained, “Causality does not exist if the basis for discharge is valid and nonpretextual.” Id. at 277, n.2 .

2022More generally, we note that in Callahan, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the causation standard on a claim that a nurse failed to inform a treating physician of a patient’s condition. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993).

2010Perhaps seeing the weakness in its argument for an exclusive causation standard, PVI alternatively argues that this Court should adopt the but-for standard articulated in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993), and require trial courts to instruct the jury using the causal standard in MAI 19.01, "directly caused or directly contributed to cause.” PVI did not preserve the issue for appeal by submitting it as a proposed jury instruction.

2019We merely instruct the jury that the defendant’s conduct must ‘directly cause’ or ‘directly contribute to cause’ plaintiffs injury.” Sanders v. Ahined, 364 8.W.3d 195, 208 n.11 (Mo.bane 2012) (citing Sundermeyer v. SSM Reg’l Health Servs., 271 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Mo.bane 2008)).

2012We merely instruct the jury that the defendant’s conduct must “directly cause” or “directly contribute to cause” plaintiffs injury. 271 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863 ).

2018Not only must statutes on the same subject be read together, Lane v. Lensmeyer , 158 S.W.3d 218 , 226 (Mo. banc 2005), but it would be absurd to conclude the General Assembly intended to impose a causation requirement for restitution under Section 559.105.1, while allowing for restitution unrestrained by "but for" causation under Sections 559.021 and 559.100.

2017Not only must statutes on the same subject be read together, Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 226 (Mo. banc 2005), but it would be absurd to conclude the General Assembly intended to impose a causation requirement for restitution under section 559.105.1, while allowing for restitution unrestrained by “but for” causation under sections 559.021 and 559.100.

2021Soto, 502 S.W.3d at 48 ; § 213.101.4; Donathan v. Oakley Grain, Inc., 861 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2017).

2020Peterson v. Progressive Contractors, Inc., 399 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Heshion Motors, Inc. v. W.

2020Inc., 388 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012), overruled on other grounds by S.B.

2019Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. banc 2009). “‘The prevailing factor’ is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.” § 287.020.3(1) (emphasis omitted).

2019Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 769 (Mo. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 See Bram, 564 S.W.3d at 794–96 (holding that the 2017 modification of the causation standard required to establish a discrimination claim was a substantive change which applied prospectively only); Gilberg v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. 6:15- CV-03365, 2018 WL 3614982 , at *8–9 (W.D.

2019State v. Fleming, 541 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Mo. App. 2018).

2018Bowman at 369.

2017See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 , 969 N.E.2d 672, 688 (2012) (“Proximate cause is a cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added); State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 , 695 N.W.2d 425, 430 (2005) (“Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct [....] ”); Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 2000) (“A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct [.... ]”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 , 969 N.E.2d 672, 688 (2012) (“Proximate cause is a cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added); State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 , 695 N.W.2d 425, 430 (2005) (“Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct [....] ”); Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 2000) (“A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct [.... ]”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 , 969 N.E.2d 672, 688 (2012) (“Proximate cause is a cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added); State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 , 695 N.W.2d 425, 430 (2005) (“Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct [....] ”); Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 2000) (“A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct [.... ]”).

2017In interpreting section 559.105.1, as with any statute, this Court’s “primary goal is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.” Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. banc 2016).

2017See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 , 969 N.E.2d 672, 688 (2012) (“Proximate cause is a cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added); State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 , 695 N.W.2d 425, 430 (2005) (“Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct [....] ”); Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 2000) (“A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct [.... ]”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 , 969 N.E.2d 672, 688 (2012) (“Proximate cause is a cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added); State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 , 695 N.W.2d 425, 430 (2005) (“Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct [....] ”); Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 2000) (“A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct [.... ]”).

2016Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 383 (Mo. banc 2014).