causation standard in Utah

2019Comm’n, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948) (“The distinction being that in order for an accident to arise out of the employment a more definite and closer causal relationship is required than is necessary for an accident to arise in the course of the employment but in the latter a closer relationship must exist as to time and place and as to the nature and type of work being performed.”). 10 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 11 Id. at 25 . 12 Id. (citing LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 38.83 (1986)). 13 Id. 14 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 IHG v. LABOR COMM’N

2019Comm’n, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948) (“The distinction being that in order for an accident to arise out of the employment a more definite and closer causal relationship is required than is necessary for an accident to arise in the course of the employment but in the latter a closer relationship must exist as to time and place and as to the nature and type of work being performed.”). 10 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 11 Id. at 25 . 12 Id. (citing LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 38.83 (1986)). 13 Id. 14 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 IHG v. LABOR COMM’N

2012We review the Commission's application of the causation test "for an abuse of discretion, applying a test of reasonableness and rationality." See Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 27 , 271 P.3d 192 ; see also Smith's Food & Drug, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 67, ¶ 6 , 250 P.3d 1008 (stating that the Commission's determination will be upheld unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality").

2012We review the Commission's application of the causation test "for an abuse of discretion, applying a test of reasonableness and rationality." See Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 27 , 271 P.3d 192 ; see also Smith's Food & Drug, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 67, ¶ 6 , 250 P.3d 1008 (stating that the Commission's determination will be upheld unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality").

2026“Because this causation requirement is a crucial and distinct element to any malpractice claim, an abundance of evidence as to breach of duty cannot make up for a deficiency of evidence as to causation.” USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 113 , 372 P.3d 629 .

2026“Because this causation requirement is a crucial and distinct element to any malpractice claim, an abundance of evidence as to breach of duty cannot make up for a deficiency of evidence as to causation.” USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 113 , 372 P.3d 629 .

2016This means that the client must prove not only that its attorney caused the client to lose the chance to litigate a case or negotiate certain terms in a business deal, but also that the client would have won the case if it was litigated211 or that _____________________________________________________________ 207 See Proctor, 2013 UT App 226 , ¶¶ 10–11 (―In other words, ‗[p]roximate cause refers to the basic requirement that before recovery is allowed in tort, there must be some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,‘ i.e., ‗it limits liability at some po

2015Kuhn relies on tort cases, including Raab v. Utah Railway Co., 2009 UT 61 , 221 P.3d 219 , and Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226 , 311 P.3d 564 , to support this position.

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2024But TNE did not raise this distinction below and, as a result, did not identify the applicable 16 Cite as: 2024 UT 23 Opinion of the Court causation standard or the basis for its assertion that the Muir Partnership received the loan funds when Nick, acting without actual or apparent authority, exercised control over them.

2022See Utah Code Ann. § 77 -38b-205(1)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (“In determining the amount of pecuniary damages . . . , the court shall consider all relevant facts to establish an amount that fully compensates a victim for all pecuniary damages proximately caused by the criminal conduct of the defendant.”). 20200675-CA 4 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (“When a defendant enters into a plea disposition or is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution . . . .

2022See Utah Code Ann. § 77 -38b-205(1)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (“In determining the amount of pecuniary damages . . . , the court shall consider all relevant facts to establish an amount that fully compensates a victim for all pecuniary damages proximately caused by the criminal conduct of the defendant.”). 20200675-CA 4 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (“When a defendant enters into a plea disposition or is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution . . . .

2022While it is true that we do not “judge an attorney’s performance based only on settled law,” Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 19 , we agree with the State that without a clear basis in the statutory language and given the lack of legal precedent, defense counsel’s performance here did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, see Jones, 2020 UT App 31 , ¶¶ 46–47 (explaining that counsel could reasonably conclude there was no legal problem to correct and that “such a conclusion is particularly reasonable given that no Utah appellate court has squarely addressed” the relevant legal issue). ¶34

2022While it is true that we do not “judge an attorney’s performance based only on settled law,” Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 19 , we agree with the State that without a clear basis in the statutory language and given the lack of legal precedent, defense counsel’s performance here did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, see Jones, 2020 UT App 31 , ¶¶ 46–47 (explaining that counsel could reasonably conclude there was no legal problem to correct and that “such a conclusion is particularly reasonable given that no Utah appellate court has squarely addressed” the relevant legal issue). ¶34

2022Id. ¶ 39. ¶26 From this analysis, Calata extrapolates that “[u]nder the language and structure of the Restitution Act, ‘caused by’ and ‘resulted in’ also requires apportionment.” While he concedes that “Laycock and Ogden did not decide the question of whether apportionment applies in restitution proceedings,” Calata contends that “the analysis in these cases dictates that the same apportionment standards that would apply in a parallel civil action apply in restitution proceedings, just as the same causation standard that applies in a parallel civil action applies to restitution proceedings.” ¶

2022Id. ¶ 39. ¶26 From this analysis, Calata extrapolates that “[u]nder the language and structure of the Restitution Act, ‘caused by’ and ‘resulted in’ also requires apportionment.” While he concedes that “Laycock and Ogden did not decide the question of whether apportionment applies in restitution proceedings,” Calata contends that “the analysis in these cases dictates that the same apportionment standards that would apply in a parallel civil action apply in restitution proceedings, just as the same causation standard that applies in a parallel civil action applies to restitution proceedings.” ¶

2022Calata argues that “Utah’s appellate courts have long recognized the legislature’s intent to incorporate civil standards into the Restitution Act.” ¶25 Specifically, Calata points to State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53 , 214 P.3d 104 , in which the Utah Supreme Court held “that issues 5.

2022Calata argues that “Utah’s appellate courts have long recognized the legislature’s intent to incorporate civil standards into the Restitution Act.” ¶25 Specifically, Calata points to State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53 , 214 P.3d 104 , in which the Utah Supreme Court held “that issues 5.

2022While it is true that we do not “judge an attorney’s performance based only on settled law,” Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 19 , we agree with the State that without a clear basis in the statutory language and given the lack of legal precedent, defense counsel’s performance here did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, see Jones, 2020 UT App 31 , ¶¶ 46–47 (explaining that counsel could reasonably conclude there was no legal problem to correct and that “such a conclusion is particularly reasonable given that no Utah appellate court has squarely addressed” the relevant legal issue). ¶34

2022While it is true that we do not “judge an attorney’s performance based only on settled law,” Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 19 , we agree with the State that without a clear basis in the statutory language and given the lack of legal precedent, defense counsel’s performance here did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, see Jones, 2020 UT App 31 , ¶¶ 46–47 (explaining that counsel could reasonably conclude there was no legal problem to correct and that “such a conclusion is particularly reasonable given that no Utah appellate court has squarely addressed” the relevant legal issue). ¶34

2022Relying on Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28 , 345 P.3d 619 , Calata proffers that “[a]ny breach of duty, act, or omission counts as fault so long as it is proximately connected to injury or damages.” Id. ¶ 49.

2022Relying on Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28 , 345 P.3d 619 , Calata proffers that “[a]ny breach of duty, act, or omission counts as fault so long as it is proximately connected to injury or damages.” Id. ¶ 49.

2019But, as we explain in section II of this opinion, the going-and–coming rule does not apply in this case, because Ms. Wilson’s accident occurred on IHG’s premises. 7 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928) (emphasis added). 4 Cite as: 2019 UT 55 Opinion of the Court Industrial Commission of Utah,8 one of our earliest workers’ compensation cases, we explained that the “arising out of” phrase “refer[s] to the origin or cause of the injury.” Subsequent cases have also interpreted the “arising out of” language as introducing a causation element into the statute.9 So, under our case law, the phrase “arising out of

2019JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 225 (2019). 6 Cite as: 2019 UT 55 Opinion of the Court compensation statute are triggered, the employer is obligated to provide benefits “regardless of who was at fault in causing [the accident].”19 The unexplained fall in this case meets that requirement. ¶14 Where “an employee falls while walking down the sidewalk or across a level factory floor for no discoverable reason,” the causation requirement is satisfied because the “particular injury would not have happened if the employee had not been engaged upon an employment errand at the time.”20 In other words,

2019That “word encompasses a narrow range of situations where a defendant would have appealed, but had that right ‘take[n] away’ or was ‘[kept] from the possession, enjoyment, or use’ of that right.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 31 , 342 P.3d 789 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 606 (2002)).5 A defendant like Stewart who is the cause of his appeal being dismissed cannot claim that his right to appeal was “taken away” or “kept” from him. ¶34 The precedent from which the language of rule 4(f) was derived likewise contemplates a causation analysis.

2019That “word encompasses a narrow range of situations where a defendant would have appealed, but had that right ‘take[n] away’ or was ‘[kept] from the possession, enjoyment, or use’ of that right.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 31 , 342 P.3d 789 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 606 (2002)).5 A defendant like Stewart who is the cause of his appeal being dismissed cannot claim that his right to appeal was “taken away” or “kept” from him. ¶34 The precedent from which the language of rule 4(f) was derived likewise contemplates a causation analysis.

2018And this matters because the causation standard applied could well affect the outcome of this case. ¶ 30 The State argues that but-for causation is the appropriate standard, but also contends that the causation standard is irrelevant because any standard-including proximate cause-would support the restitution award the court entered. ¶ 31 To determine what causal connection the Legislature intended to apply to the CVRA, we start with the statute's language. " 'When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of

2018The Trues argue that the permit exception does not apply for two reasons: (1) the issuance of the construction permit did not proximately cause their injuries under the causation standard announced in Barneck, and (2) UDOT’s negligent actions “cannot be characterized as formal, official acts,” as required under the supreme court’s statutory interpretation of the permit exception in Thayer v. Washington 20160704-CA 7 2018 UT App 86 True v. Utah Department of Transportation County School District, 2012 UT 31 , 285 P.3d 1142 .

2018The Trues argue that the permit exception does not apply for two reasons: (1) the issuance of the construction permit did not proximately cause their injuries under the causation standard announced in Barneck , and (2) UDOT's negligent actions "cannot be characterized as formal, official acts," as required under the supreme court's statutory interpretation of the permit exception in Thayer v. Washington County School District , 2012 UT 31 , 285 P.3d 1142 .

2018See, e.g. , Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc. , 844 P.2d 949 , 970-71 (Utah 1992) (requiring a showing that "conduct proximately caused [the plaintiff's] emotional distress" to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Reynolds v. MacFarlane , 2014 UT App 57 , ¶ 16, 322 P.3d 755 (" 'Damages ... may ... be recovered only to the extent that [the plaintiff] proves they were a proximate result' of the nonconsensual touching." (alteration in original) (second omission in original) (citation omitted) ).

2018See, e.g. , Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc. , 844 P.2d 949 , 970-71 (Utah 1992) (requiring a showing that "conduct proximately caused [the plaintiff's] emotional distress" to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Reynolds v. MacFarlane , 2014 UT App 57 , ¶ 16, 322 P.3d 755 (" 'Damages ... may ... be recovered only to the extent that [the plaintiff] proves they were a proximate result' of the nonconsensual touching." (alteration in original) (second omission in original) (citation omitted) ).

2018And this matters because the causation standard applied could well affect the outcome of this case. ¶ 30 The State argues that but-for causation is the appropriate standard, but also contends that the causation standard is irrelevant because any standard-including proximate cause-would support the restitution award the court entered. ¶ 31 To determine what causal connection the Legislature intended to apply to the CVRA, we start with the statute's language. " 'When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of

2018And this matters because the causation standard applied could well affect the outcome of this case. ¶ 30 The State argues that but-for causation is the appropriate standard, but also contends that the causation standard is irrelevant because any standard-including proximate cause-would support the restitution award the court entered. ¶ 31 To determine what causal connection the Legislature intended to apply to the CVRA, we start with the statute's language. " 'When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of

2018The causation standard then in effect and relied upon by the parties for determining whether a waiver exception applied was “but-for” causation, as articulated in cases such as Blackner v. State Department of Transportation, 2002 UT 44 , 48 P.3d 949 .

2018The causation standard then in effect and relied upon by the parties for determining whether a waiver exception applied was “but-for” causation, as articulated in cases such as Blackner v. State Department of Transportation, 2002 UT 44 , 48 P.3d 949 .

2018"The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain language of the statute itself.' " State v. Miller , 2008 UT 61 , ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 92 (citation omitted). ¶ 32 The CVRA addresses causation in two provisions.

2018"The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain language of the statute itself.' " State v. Miller , 2008 UT 61 , ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 92 (citation omitted). ¶ 32 The CVRA addresses causation in two provisions.