rigid rule in Georgia

2004Ill of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 does provide that “no person discharging the duties of one [of the three branches of government] shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others . . . .” However, “separation of powers is not a rigid principle.” Greer v. State of Ga., 233 Ga. 667, 668 (1) ( 212 SE2d 836 ) (1975). “[T]here are some matters which do not inherently and essentially appertain to *666 one department of government rather than to another.” Southern R.

2004Ill of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 does provide that “no person discharging the duties of one [of the three branches of government] shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others . . . .” However, “separation of powers is not a rigid principle.” Greer v. State of Ga., 233 Ga. 667, 668 (1) ( 212 SE2d 836 ) (1975). “[T]here are some matters which do not inherently and essentially appertain to *666 one department of government rather than to another.” Southern R.

2020See id.

2014Invoking a rigid requirement that trial counsel must employ a mitigation specialist in order to effectively represent a defendant in a capital case would effectively revoke the presumption that trial counsel’s actions based upon strategic decisions are reasonable and would also “interfere with the ‘constitutionally protected independence of counsel’ at the heart of *67 Strickland.” (Citation omitted.) Wiggins, 539 U. S. at 533 (emphasizing that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence or to present mitigating evidence in every case).

2006See generally Brookins v. Brookins, 257 Ga. 205, 206 (2), 357 S.E.2d 77 (1987) ("a mechanical application of the res judicata rule in this situation would frustrate the purposes of the URESA").

2006See generally Brookins v. Brookins, 257 Ga. 205, 206 (2), 357 S.E.2d 77 (1987) ("a mechanical application of the res judicata rule in this situation would frustrate the purposes of the URESA").

2004Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 282 ( 65 SE 665 ) (1909).

2004Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 282 ( 65 SE 665 ) (1909).

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1993Nevertheless, giving due deference to the promulgated statutory policy of the General Assembly to preclude the usurpation of the executive functions of the board, and acting in an abundance of caution so as to follow the perceived judicial policy of our Supreme Court, we conclude that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department [by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant *648 by the State Board of Pardons and Parole] would b

1989“To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision-making.” City of Richmond, supra at 4139.

1989It would indeed be paradoxical to require a defendant to assert a given bad faith claim per [OCGA § 9-11-13 (a)] while at the same time withholding from that defendant any possible recovery of litigation expenses per [OCGA § 13-6-11]. . . . [W]hen a defendant asserts a claim for relief independent of a claim for litigation expenses incurred in defending against a plaintiff’s case-in-chief, [OCGA § 13-6-11] does not automatically operate to bar any recovery by the defendant of litigation expenses incurred in prosecuting such an independent claim. . . .” Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Cont

1989It would indeed be paradoxical to require a defendant to assert a given bad faith claim per [OCGA § 9-11-13 (a)] while at the same time withholding from that defendant any possible recovery of litigation expenses per [OCGA § 13-6-11]. . . . [W]hen a defendant asserts a claim for relief independent of a claim for litigation expenses incurred in defending against a plaintiff’s case-in-chief, [OCGA § 13-6-11] does not automatically operate to bar any recovery by the defendant of litigation expenses incurred in prosecuting such an independent claim. . . .” Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Cont

1985Id. p. 227, citing Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 622 (1852), and Hart v. Powell, 18 Ga. 635 (1855).

1985Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, after a thorough examination of the principles and conflicting policy matters involved, announced in Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 ( 290 SE2d 71 ) (1982); “a trial judge’s determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” The court retreated from a more rigid inquiry to the position that the determination of admissibility as part of res ges-tae should be left to the sound discretion

1985Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, after a thorough examination of the principles and conflicting policy matters involved, announced in Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 ( 290 SE2d 71 ) (1982); “a trial judge’s determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” The court retreated from a more rigid inquiry to the position that the determination of admissibility as part of res ges-tae should be left to the sound discretion

1982Peebles v. State, 236 Ga. 93 ( 222 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Henderson v. State, 210 Ga. 680, 683 ( 82 SE2d 638 ) (1954); Augusta & S. R.

1982Peebles v. State, 236 Ga. 93 ( 222 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Henderson v. State, 210 Ga. 680, 683 ( 82 SE2d 638 ) (1954); Augusta & S. R.

1975"While the Constitution declares that the three departments of government shall be separate and distinct, this separation is not and from the nature of things cannot be total." Mayor &c. of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 881 ( 40 SE 1004 ) (1902); Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210 (1850).

1975"While the Constitution declares that the three departments of government shall be separate and distinct, this separation is not and from the nature of things cannot be total.” Mayor &c. of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 881 ( 40 SE 1004 ) (1902); Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210 (1850).

1975The enactment of statues by the General Assembly pursuant to this constitutional provision can, in a fair and orderly manner, eliminate the inequities and injustices that have become apparent in our modern-day society because of the rigid immunity rule." Azizi v. Board of Regents of the University System of Ga., 233 Ga. 487, 488 ( 212 SE2d 627 ) (1975).

1975The enactment of statues by the General Assembly pursuant to this constitutional provision can, in a fair and orderly manner, eliminate the inequities and injustices that have become apparent in our modern-day society because of the rigid immunity rule." Azizi v. Board of Regents of the University System of Ga., 233 Ga. 487, 488 ( 212 SE2d 627 ) (1975).

1973See my dissenting opinion in Sims v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 377 .

1973See my dissenting opinion in Sims v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 377 .

1964It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden quite as onerous as that imposed in criminal cases.” Salmon v. McCrary, 197 Ga. 281, 285 ( 29 SE2d 58 ); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 212 Ga. 485, 487 ( 93 SE2d 743 ); Lance v. Crane, 214 Ga. 284 ( 104 SE2d 439 ). 4.

1964It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden quite as onerous as that imposed in criminal cases.” Salmon v. McCrary, 197 Ga. 281, 285 ( 29 SE2d 58 ); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 212 Ga. 485, 487 ( 93 SE2d 743 ); Lance v. Crane, 214 Ga. 284 ( 104 SE2d 439 ). 4.

1964It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden quite as onerous as that imposed in criminal cases.” Salmon v. McCrary, 197 Ga. 281, 285 ( 29 SE2d 58 ); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 212 Ga. 485, 487 ( 93 SE2d 743 ); Lance v. Crane, 214 Ga. 284 ( 104 SE2d 439 ). 4.

1964It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden quite as onerous as that imposed in criminal cases.” Salmon v. McCrary, 197 Ga. 281, 285 ( 29 SE2d 58 ); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 212 Ga. 485, 487 ( 93 SE2d 743 ); Lance v. Crane, 214 Ga. 284 ( 104 SE2d 439 ). 4.