rigid rule in Alabama

1916If suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a rigid’ inquiry should be made into the reasons of its nonproduction; but, if there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is a reasonable diligence to obtain the original, in respect to which the courts extend great liberality.” — Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662 , 44 Am.

1910If suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons of its nonproduction; but if there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is a reasonable diligence to obtain the original, in respect to which the courts extend great lib erality.” — Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662 (9th headnote), 44 Am.

2001The Estes Court noted: "Doubtless there may be inequalities but our courts are committed to the proposition, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556, 559 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 [ (1932) ], as follows: "`The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or caprici

2001The Estes Court noted: "Doubtless there may be inequalities but our courts are committed to the proposition, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556, 559 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 [ (1932) ], as follows: "`The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or caprici

1916Dec. 448 , this court declared, touching th'e admission of secondary evidence, that “if any suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons of its nonprdduction” before secondary evidence will be admitted of its contents. —Agee v. Messer-Moore, etc., Co., 165 Ala. 291 , 51 South. 829 .

1916Dec. 448 , this court declared, touching th'e admission of secondary evidence, that “if any suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons of its nonprdduction” before secondary evidence will be admitted of its contents. —Agee v. Messer-Moore, etc., Co., 165 Ala. 291 , 51 South. 829 .

2007This Court stated: "While we do not believe that Alabama should adopt a rigid requirement of physical contact, we agree with the authorities cited above that the act of `getting in' or entering a vehicle must be distinguished from approaching the vehicle, as well as from the act of preparing to enter the vehicle." 661 So.2d at 1173 .

2001The Estes Court noted: "Doubtless there may be inequalities but our courts are committed to the proposition, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556, 559 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 [ (1932) ], as follows: "`The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or caprici

2001The Estes Court noted: "Doubtless there may be inequalities but our courts are committed to the proposition, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556, 559 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 [ (1932) ], as follows: "`The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or caprici

2001Additionally, the Estes Court rejected the taxpayers' claim that the amount of the tax levied (1%) was so burdensome as to be unconstitutional, recognizing that "the extent of the burden is a matter for the discretion of the lawmakers, unless the act is so arbitrary as not to be an exercise of the taxing power at all, the form of the tax being a cloak for something else." Id., citing Bessemer Theatres v. City of Bessemer, 261 Ala. 632 , 75 So.2d 651 (1954).

2001Additionally, the Estes Court rejected the taxpayers' claim that the amount of the tax levied (1%) was so burdensome as to be unconstitutional, recognizing that "the extent of the burden is a matter for the discretion of the lawmakers, unless the act is so arbitrary as not to be an exercise of the taxing power at all, the form of the tax being a cloak for something else." Id., citing Bessemer Theatres v. City of Bessemer, 261 Ala. 632 , 75 So.2d 651 (1954).

1989Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2719 (2d ed. 1983): “According to Rule 6(d), any affidavits in support of the summary judgment motion also should be served at the time the motion is served, unless the court exercises its discretion under Rule 6(b) and permits later service.” (footnotes omitted) Our supreme court, in considering whether a tardy supporting affidavit may be properly considered has held that “[tjardy affidavits are permissible under Rule 6(b)(2), but only when that rule is complied with.” Cabaniss v. Wilson, 501 So.2d 1177 (Ala.1986).

1977The rigid rule of Van Dyke v. Battle , 1 Stewart 218 (Ala. 1827), that venue in a civil action cannot be changed as to one defendant and not as to all is contrary to the policy of the Alabama Rules of Civil *Page 419 Procedure and is overruled.

1893But this court long since adopted the less rigid rule of ratifying, in such cases, that which would clearly have been previously authorized, at least to the extent of allowing credit to the guardian, upon the settlement of his accounts, for sums paid out for maintenance and education, from the principal of the estate, or beyond the income realized by him.— Stewart v. Lewis, 16 Ala. 734 ; Montgomery v. Givhan, 24 Ala. 568 ; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 41 Ala. 369 ; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285 .

1893But this court long since adopted the less rigid rule of ratifying, in such cases, that which would clearly have been previously authorized, at least to the extent of allowing credit to the guardian, upon the settlement of his accounts, for sums paid out for maintenance and education, from the principal of the estate, or beyond the income realized by him.— Stewart v. Lewis, 16 Ala. 734 ; Montgomery v. Givhan, 24 Ala. 568 ; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 41 Ala. 369 ; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285 .

1893But this court long since adopted the less rigid rule of ratifying, in such cases, that which would clearly have been previously authorized, at least to the extent of allowing credit to the guardian, upon the settlement of his accounts, for sums paid out for maintenance and education, from the principal of the estate, or beyond the income realized by him.— Stewart v. Lewis, 16 Ala. 734 ; Montgomery v. Givhan, 24 Ala. 568 ; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 41 Ala. 369 ; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285 .

1893But this court long since adopted the less rigid rule of ratifying, in such cases, that which would clearly have been previously authorized, at least to the extent of allowing credit to the guardian, upon the settlement of his accounts, for sums paid out for maintenance and education, from the principal of the estate, or beyond the income realized by him.— Stewart v. Lewis, 16 Ala. 734 ; Montgomery v. Givhan, 24 Ala. 568 ; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 41 Ala. 369 ; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285 .