rigid rule in Indiana

1999McG rew, 682 N.E.2d at 1291 n. 4.

1998McGrew , 682 N.E.2d at 1291 n.4.

1991For instance, the court in DeVaney v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 483 , 288 N.E.2d 732 , abolished the rigid rule which had disallowed expert opinion as to an ultimate fact to be decided by the jury and made this testimony permissible.

1991For instance, the court in DeVaney v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 483 , 288 N.E.2d 732 , abolished the rigid rule which had disallowed expert opinion as to an ultimate fact to be decided by the jury and made this testimony permissible.

2015A rigid rule, applied without exception, that a tenant does not have a sufficient possessory interest in such property would defy logic and lead to an absurd result. [16] Id. at 267 . [17] In the present case, Johnson was convicted of trespass in connection with the April 6 incident.

2003The Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated its rejection of a rigid test in this regard when it stated, "There are no prescribed "talking points" the court is required to include in its advisement to the defendant; it need only come to a considered determination that the defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver." Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d at 1126 .

2003Nevertheless, courts are to make the determination "with the awareness that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right." Id.

1992The presumption under the clear and convincing standard is similar to that in a criminal action: the defendant is "cloaked with the presumption that his actions, though tortious, were nevertheless noniniquitous human failings, i.e. that he is not guilty of the quasi-crime alleged. " (Emphasis in original) Traina, supra, 486 N.E.2d at 1023 .

1992The presumption under the clear and convincing standard is similar to that in a criminal action: the defendant is "cloaked with the presumption that his actions, though tortious, were nevertheless noniniquitous human failings, i.e. that he is not guilty of the quasi-crime alleged. " (Emphasis in original) Traina, supra, 486 N.E.2d at 1023 .

1992In establishing a more rigid standard, the Court made clear its intention that punitive damages not be awarded lightly: "[I]t is better to exonerate a wrongdoer from punitive damages, even though his wrong be gross or wicked, than to award them at the expense of one whose error was one that society can tolerate and who has already compensated the victim for his error." Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, 442 N.E.2d at 362 .

1985The fact that the notice was oral instead of written should not invalidate that notice as a matter of law but should instead be one of the factors considered in deciding whether or not the notice was reasonable." 370 N.E.2d at 925 .

1983DeVaney v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 483 , 288 N.E.2d 732 ; State v. Bouras, (1981) Ind.App., 423 N.E.2d 741 .

1982I agree that application of the rigid rule enunciated in In re the Marriage of Robbins (3d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind.App. 509 , 358 N.E.2d 153 and Snider v. Gaddis (1st Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 322 simplifies resolution of this case.

1982I agree that application of the rigid rule enunciated in In re the Marriage of Robbins (3d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind.App. 509 , 358 N.E.2d 153 and Snider v. Gaddis (1st Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 322 simplifies resolution of this case.

1982I likewise acknowledge that the divergence and seeming irreconcilability of prior case law dealing with Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59 and Trial Rule 60, for the most part, results from attempts to reach the merits of an appeal (see In re the Marriage of Robbins, supra, 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (2d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind.App. 515 , 358 N.E.2d 146 ) rather than to dismiss upon technical grounds which are viewed by us in the clarity and wisdom of hindsight.

1982I likewise acknowledge that the divergence and seeming irreconcilability of prior case law dealing with Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59 and Trial Rule 60, for the most part, results from attempts to reach the merits of an appeal (see In re the Marriage of Robbins, supra, 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (2d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind.App. 515 , 358 N.E.2d 146 ) rather than to dismiss upon technical grounds which are viewed by us in the clarity and wisdom of hindsight.

1982I agree that application of the rigid rule enunciated in In re the Marriage of Robbins (3d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind.App. 509 , 358 N.E.2d 153 and Snider v. Gaddis (1st Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 322 simplifies resolution of this case.

1982I agree that application of the rigid rule enunciated in In re the Marriage of Robbins (3d Dist. 1976) 171 Ind. App. 509 , 358 N.E.2d 153 and Snider v. Gaddis (1st Dist. 1980) Ind. App., 413 N.E.2d 322 simplifies resolution of this case.

1977To hold otherwise would be to ignore the purpose behind the statute and to exalt procedural perfection over statutory compliance. 2 In Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 our Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt a rigid rule which would require that the trial judge, and only the trial judge, advise a defendant of his rights: “We conclude that Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] was concerned primarily with what the record must show and not who must make the record.

1977To hold otherwise would be to ignore the purpose behind the statute and to exalt procedural perfection over statutory compliance. 2 In Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 our Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt a rigid rule which would require that the trial judge, and only the trial judge, advise a defendant of his rights: “We conclude that Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] was concerned primarily with what the record must show and not who must make the record.

1977To hold otherwise would be to ignore the purpose behind the statute and to exalt procedural perfection over statutory compliance. 2 In Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 our Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt a rigid rule which would require that the trial judge, and only the trial judge, advise a defendant of his rights: “We conclude that Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] was concerned primarily with what the record must show and not who must make the record.

1977To hold otherwise would be to ignore the purpose behind the statute and to exalt procedural perfection over statutory compliance. 2 In Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 our Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt a rigid rule which would require that the trial judge, and only the trial judge, advise a defendant of his rights: “We conclude that Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] was concerned primarily with what the record must show and not who must make the record.

1916To sustain this contention counsel cite Fort Wayne, etc., Traction Co. v. Schoeff (1914), 56 Ind. App. 540 , 105 N. E. 924 .

1916To sustain this contention counsel cite Fort Wayne, etc., Traction Co. v. Schoeff (1914), 56 Ind. App. 540 , 105 N. E. 924 .

1893As is well said by the author referred to : “ Local legislation, however, has in many States altered the rule of the common law, and in a very recent case in Mississippi where a bill had been filed in that State for reimbursement of expenses in extinguishing a paramount title to land in Louisiana, which had been conveyed with covenants of warranty to the assignor of the plaintiff, it was suggested by the court that the suit being in equity, ‘ which never was hampered by distinctions of local and transitory causes of action, as were courts at law,’ the suit might be sustained on that ground alo

1888Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 110 , and Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153 , are placed solely on the statute of Henry VIII, and were decided as strictly common law cases, without reference to the equity rule, which, both in England and America, has long been different from the rigid rule of the common law.

1879Reed v. Reed, 44 Ind. 429 ; Camper v. Hayeth, 10 Ind. 528 .

1879Reed v. Reed, 44 Ind. 429 ; Camper v. Hayeth, 10 Ind. 528 .

1878We are not inclined to extend, and but little inclined to approve of, the rigid doctrine laid down by this court, as to the conclusive character of the official reports of certain officers, in the cases of The State, ex rel., etc., v. Grammer, 29 Ind. 530 , Wilmer v. The State, ex rel., etc., 44 Ind. 223 , The State, ex rel., etc., v. Prather, 44 Ind. 287 , and perhaps other cases.

1878We are not inclined to extend, and but little inclined to approve of, the rigid doctrine laid down by this court, as to the conclusive character of the official reports of certain officers, in the cases of The State, ex rel., etc., v. Grammer, 29 Ind. 530 , Wilmer v. The State, ex rel., etc., 44 Ind. 223 , The State, ex rel., etc., v. Prather, 44 Ind. 287 , and perhaps other cases.

1878We are not inclined to extend, and but little inclined to approve of, the rigid doctrine laid down by this court, as to the conclusive character of the official reports of certain officers, in the cases of The State, ex rel., etc., v. Grammer, 29 Ind. 530 , Wilmer v. The State, ex rel., etc., 44 Ind. 223 , The State, ex rel., etc., v. Prather, 44 Ind. 287 , and perhaps other cases.