rigid requirement in Arizona

2024Id. at 120–21. ¶8 By the 1950s, the supreme court routinely applied this rule, i.e., mandatory implied confession of error on debatable issues.

2023Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127 , 132 ¶ 17 (2020) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the value to the rule of consistency, continuity, and predictability.”); Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252 , 256 ¶ 16 (2003) (stating stare decisis “seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is”). ¶18 We have recognized that stare decisis “should not require [unbending] adherence to authority.” Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 424 ¶ 33 (quoting Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 432 (1975)); see also State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192 , 200 ¶ 37 (2003

2023Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127 , 132 ¶ 17 (2020) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the value to the rule of consistency, continuity, and predictability.”); Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252 , 256 ¶ 16 (2003) (stating stare decisis “seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is”). ¶18 We have recognized that stare decisis “should not require [unbending] adherence to authority.” Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 424 ¶ 33 (quoting Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 432 (1975)); see also State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192 , 200 ¶ 37 (2003

2021See Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 260 ; Roden v. Roden, 190 Ariz. 407, 411 (App. 1997) (superseded in part by statute on other grounds); Porter, 67 Ariz. at 279 . ¶36 Courts are permitted to look at both direct and circumstantial evidence to arrive at whether an asset has maintained its identity as separate property, so long as the separate nature of the asset is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

2007Id. at 250 , 955 P.2d at 6 .

2007Id. at 250 , 955 P.2d at 6 .

2002Indeed, the court adopted precisely the kind of approach the Court in Gates prescribed, quoting the following language in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 , 85 S.Ct. 741, 746 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 689 (1965), which the court in Gates had quoted as well: *87 Berge, 130 Ariz. at 136 , 634 P.2d at 948 (alterations in Berge). *86 [Affidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion____ A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting

2002Indeed, the court adopted precisely the kind of approach the Court in Gates prescribed, quoting the following language in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 , 85 S.Ct. 741, 746 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 689 (1965), which the court in Gates had quoted as well: *87 Berge, 130 Ariz. at 136 , 634 P.2d at 948 (alterations in Berge). *86 [Affidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion____ A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting

2000In Wainwright , the Supreme Court took a step back from the rigid test articulated in Witherspoon , which required the prospective juror to unequivocally state that he could not set aside his feelings on the death penalty and impose a verdict based only on the facts and the law, and held that a juror was properly excused from service if the juror’s views would ‘“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 252

2000In Wainwright , the Supreme Court took a step back from the rigid test articulated in Witherspoon , which required the prospective juror to unequivocally state that he could not set aside his feelings on the death penalty and impose a verdict based only on the facts and the law, and held that a juror was properly excused from service if the juror’s views would ‘“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 252

2000In Wainwright , the Supreme Court took a step back from the rigid test articulated in Witherspoon , which required the prospective juror to unequivocally state that he could not set aside his feelings on the death penalty and impose a verdict based only on the facts and the law, and held that a juror was properly excused from service if the juror’s views would ‘“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 252

2000In Wainwright , the Supreme Court took a step back from the rigid test articulated in Witherspoon , which required the prospective juror to unequivocally state that he could not set aside his feelings on the death penalty and impose a verdict based only on the facts and the law, and held that a juror was properly excused from service if the juror’s views would ‘“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 252

1998The court did not adopt a rigid test and therefore did not “imply that these factors must be applied mechanically, or ... that they are the only factors that a court might consider.” Id. at 28 n. 3, 760 P.2d at 1077 n. 3 (emphasis added). ¶ 16 Thus, under Oliver a defendant can offer incidents of the child’s prior abuse to show motive, propensity, or ability to imagine or fabricate when the evidence is “introduced for purposes other than to impugn or cast doubt on a victim’s moral character.” Id. at 27 , 760 P.2d at' 1076.

1998The court did not adopt a rigid test and therefore did not “imply that these factors must be applied mechanically, or ... that they are the only factors that a court might consider.” Id. at 28 n. 3, 760 P.2d at 1077 n. 3 (emphasis added). ¶ 16 Thus, under Oliver a defendant can offer incidents of the child’s prior abuse to show motive, propensity, or ability to imagine or fabricate when the evidence is “introduced for purposes other than to impugn or cast doubt on a victim’s moral character.” Id. at 27 , 760 P.2d at' 1076.

1984Robinson v. Percy; United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980).

1973In Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542 , 144 N.W.2d 870 (1966), the court stated: “Defects in premises which are in no sense hidden and could only be classified objectively as open and obvious, may be of such nature that the possessor should know the invitee would not anticipate or guard against them in using the premises within the scope of the invitation. • To arbitrarily deny liability for open or ob- vióu's defects and apply liability only for bidden defects, traps or pitfalls, is to adopt a rigid rule based on objective classification in place of the concept of th

1973In Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542 , 144 N.W.2d 870 (1966), the court stated: “Defects in premises which are in no sense hidden and could only be classified objectively as open and obvious, may be of such nature that the possessor should know the invitee would not anticipate or guard against them in using the premises within the scope of the invitation. • To arbitrarily deny liability for open or ob- vióu's defects and apply liability only for bidden defects, traps or pitfalls, is to adopt a rigid rule based on objective classification in place of the concept of th

1931Even then, fraudulent claims may prevail, but the rigid requirement of the clearest proof will at least diminish the number.” Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199 , 44 L.

1923Co., 249 Pa. 238 , 94 Atl. 925 , and Gralka v. Worth Brothers Co., 245 Pa. 467 , 91 Atl. 860 .

1923Co., 249 Pa. 238 , 94 Atl. 925 , and Gralka v. Worth Brothers Co., 245 Pa. 467 , 91 Atl. 860 .

1923Co., 249 Pa. 238 , 94 Atl. 925 , and Gralka v. Worth Brothers Co., 245 Pa. 467 , 91 Atl. 860 .

1923Co., 249 Pa. 238 , 94 Atl. 925 , and Gralka v. Worth Brothers Co., 245 Pa. 467 , 91 Atl. 860 .