rigid rule in Minnesota

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575 , 586–87 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 608 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “the factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test” and that “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case”).

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 587 (Minn. 2010). “[T]he factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test,” and “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case.” Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 608 (Minn. 2012).

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575 , 586–87 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 608 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “the factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test” and that “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case”).

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 587 (Minn. 2010). “[T]he factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test,” and “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case.” Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 608 (Minn. 2012).

2024We decline to adopt this rigid rule, as it does not comport with the legislature’s direction that reasonable efforts should be “tailored to the individualized needs of the child and the child’s family.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (h)(2); see also In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996) (holding “[t]he nature of the services which constitute ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the problem presented”).

2023See Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (“[N]either res judicata nor collateral estoppel is to be rigidly applied.”); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 868 (analyzing a collateral attack according to “competing principles of finality and validity”); Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740 , 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that law of the case is a “discretionary doctrine”); Levine v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 49, 56 (Minn. App. 2019) (explaining that “comity is a principle taken into account when addressing whether to apply the first-to-file rule,” which 7 is “not a rigid rule”). 2

2023See Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (“[N]either res judicata nor collateral estoppel is to be rigidly applied.”); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 868 (analyzing a collateral attack according to “competing principles of finality and validity”); Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740 , 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that law of the case is a “discretionary doctrine”); Levine v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 49, 56 (Minn. App. 2019) (explaining that “comity is a principle taken into account when addressing whether to apply the first-to-file rule,” which 7 is “not a rigid rule”). 2

2023See Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (“[N]either res judicata nor collateral estoppel is to be rigidly applied.”); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 868 (analyzing a collateral attack according to “competing principles of finality and validity”); Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740 , 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that law of the case is a “discretionary doctrine”); Levine v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 49, 56 (Minn. App. 2019) (explaining that “comity is a principle taken into account when addressing whether to apply the first-to-file rule,” which 7 is “not a rigid rule”). 2

2019The first-to-file rule is not a rigid rule, but a principle to be applied flexibly as "a blend of courtesy and expediency." Id. at 449 (quotation omitted).

2016See 840 N.W.2d at 29 .

2015Later, in United States v. Ramirez, another case involving a “no-knock” entry, the Supreme Court stated, “The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of the warrant.” 523 U.S. 65, 71 , 118 S. Ct. 992, 996 (1998) (citation omitted).

2015Later, in United States v. Ramirez, another case involving a “no-knock” entry, the Supreme Court stated, “The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of the warrant.” 523 U.S. 65, 71 , 118 S. Ct. 992, 996 (1998) (citation omitted).

2015See Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (“In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.

2013In Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Minn.2011), we considered “the degree of fault assigned to the party asserting the interests-of-justice claim.” The petitioner in Rickert was provided the transcripts needed to substantiate his postconviction claim just two business days before the expiration of the limitations period, even though he had requested the transcripts several months before the expiration of the limitations period.

2005Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236 , 397 N.Y.S.2d 718 , 366 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1977) (holding that where evidence showed that market for large food processing plants was regional, appraisers could rely on comparable sales in other states, and noting that a rigid rule regarding political boundaries would “abandon the economic realism which should characterize valuation”).

2005Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236 , 397 N.Y.S.2d 718 , 366 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1977) (holding that where evidence showed that market for large food processing plants was regional, appraisers could rely on comparable sales in other states, and noting that a rigid rule regarding political boundaries would “abandon the economic realism which should characterize valuation”).

1995See City of Bloomington v. Local 2828, AFSCME, 290 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn.1980) (“The proper role of judicial review in arbitration cases is solely to determine whether specific language in the agreement or submission precludes the arbitrator from deciding the case as he did.”).

1991See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277 , 284 (8th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 , 105 S.Ct. 3491 , 87 L.Ed.2d 625 (1985).

1991See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277 , 284 (8th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 , 105 S.Ct. 3491 , 87 L.Ed.2d 625 (1985).

1991See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277 , 284 (8th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 , 105 S.Ct. 3491 , 87 L.Ed.2d 625 (1985).

1991See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277 , 284 (8th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 , 105 S.Ct. 3491 , 87 L.Ed.2d 625 (1985).

1987Respondent cites Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 487-88 , 239 N.W. 223, 224 (1931) and several other cases following Smith for the proposition that release of one joint tortfeasor automatically discharges the others.

1987Respondent cites Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 487-88 , 239 N.W. 223, 224 (1931) and several other cases following Smith for the proposition that release of one joint tortfeasor automatically discharges the others.