rigid rule in New York

2019With respect to the Election Law, we have cautioned that “where . . . the Legislature ‘erects a rigid framework of regulation, detailing . . . specific particulars,’ there is no invitation for the courts to exercise flexibility in statutory interpretation” (Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 NY3d 251, 258 [2004], quoting Matter of Higby v Mahoney, 48 NY2d 15 , 20 n 2 [1979]).

2016Whatever may be our view, the Legislature has erected ‘a rigid framework of regulation, detailing as it does throughout specific particulars’ ” (Matter of Hutson v Bass, 54 NY2d at 774 , quoting Matter of Higby v Mahoney, 48 NY2d 15 , 20 n 2 [1979]).

1997CPL 260.30, which provides for the order of trial in criminal cases, “is not a rigid framework; the trial court retains its common-law discretionary power to alter the order of proof’ up until the time the case is presented to the jury (People v Hinkley, 178 AD2d 800 , lv denied 79 NY2d 948 ; see, People v Olsen, 34 NY2d 349, 353 ).

1991The statutory order of trial (CPL 260.30) is not a rigid framework; the trial court retains its common-law discretionary power to alter the order of proof "at least up to the time the case is submitted to the jury” (People v Olsen, 34 NY2d 349, 353 ).

2023Generally, active assets are valued as of the commencement date while passive assets are valued closer to the date of trial, however this must be viewed as a helpful guidepost rather than a rigid rule ( see McSparron v McSparron , 87 NY2d 275, 287-288 [1995]).

2005As defendant acknowledges, the principle that active assets are valued as of the commencement date is a helpful guidepost rather than a rigid rule (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 288 [1995]).

2000Under Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 (2), it is unlawful to furnish an alcoholic beverage to any “visibly intoxicated person.” “The Legislature’s use of the term ‘visible’ * * * does not create a rigid requirement that that essential element of the claim be established by direct proof in the form of testimonial evidence from someone who actually observed the allegedly intoxicated person’s demeanor at the time and place that the alcohol was served.” (Romano v Stanley, 90 NY2d 444, 450 [1997].) Rather, the statutory language permits “‘the introduction of circumstantial evidence to establish

1998Noticeably absent was any eyewitness testimony that Ziriakus showed signs of intoxication that could have alerted Friday’s. *401 As we noted in Romano v Stanley ( 90 NY2d 444 ), the failure to provide direct proof of visible intoxication in Dram Shop Act cases is not itself dispositive: “The Legislature’s use of the term ‘visible,’ however, does not create a rigid requirement that that essential element of the claim be established by direct proof in the form of testimonial evidence from someone who actually observed the allegedly intoxicated person’s demeanor at the time and place that the alc

2023Auth. , 67 NY2d 219, 227 ; see Marinaro v Reynolds , 152 AD3d at 659 ).

2021“The touchstone” of that test “is not a rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident” or strict relational criteria, “but rather” whether there is a “reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm” (Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v Kavorkian, 727 P2d 1038, 1043 [Alaska 1986]; accord Leong, 55 Haw at 408; Sinn v Burd, 486 Pa 146, 172-173173, 404 A2d 672, 686 [1979]; Wages v First Nat.

2021“The touchstone” of that test “is not a rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident” or strict relational criteria, “but rather” whether there is a “reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm” (Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v Kavorkian, 727 P2d 1038, 1043 [Alaska 1986]; accord Leong, 55 Haw at 408; Sinn v Burd, 486 Pa 146, 172-173173, 404 A2d 672, 686 [1979]; Wages v First Nat.

2020Whatever may be our view, the legislature has erected a rigid framework of regulation, detailing as it does throughout specific particulars’” (Matter of Avella v Johnson, 142 AD3d 1111, 1113 [2d Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Hutson, 54 NY2d at 774).

2019With respect to the Election Law, we have cautioned that “where . . . the Legislature ‘erects a rigid framework of regulation, detailing . . . specific particulars,’ there is no invitation for the courts to exercise flexibility in statutory interpretation” (Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 NY3d 251, 258 [2004], quoting Matter of Higby v Mahoney, 48 NY2d 15 , 20 n 2 [1979]).

2019Thus, while we have cautioned that, in the election context, the legislature has “erect[ed] a rigid framework of regulation” with regard to which there is no room “for the courts to exercise flexibility” - 12 - - 13 - No. 41 (Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 NY3d 251, 258 [2004]), it is the majority—not I—who disregards the language of the Election Law and fails to faithfully execute the relevant legislative pronouncements.

2017"If as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the causal relation exists" ( Vitanza v Growth Realties , 91 AD2d 917, 917 [1st Dept 1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2017“If as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the causal relation exists” (Vitanza v Growth Realties, 91 AD2d 917, 917 [1st Dept 1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015At the time Bard was decided, only the Fourth Department adhered to a rigid rule that liability for animal- induced injuries "is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping or confining the animal, but is predicated upon the owner's keeping of the animal, despite his [or her] knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities" (Plennert v Abel, 269 AD2d 796, 796 [4th Dept 2000]; see Smith v Farner, 229 AD2d 1017, 1018 [4th Dept 1996]).

2015At the time Bard was decided, only the Fourth Department adhered to a rigid rule that liability for animal-induced injuries “is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping or confining the animal, but is predicated upon the owner’s keeping of the animal, despite his [or her] knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities” (Plennert v Abel, 269 AD2d 796, 796 [4th Dept 2000]; see Smith v Farner, 229 AD2d 1017, 1018 [4th Dept 1996]).

2015At the time Bard was decided, only the Fourth Department adhered to a rigid rule that liability for animal- induced injuries "is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping or confining the animal, but is predicated upon the owner's keeping of the animal, despite his [or her] knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities" (Plennert v Abel, 269 AD2d 796, 796 [4th Dept 2000]; see Smith v Farner, 229 AD2d 1017, 1018 [4th Dept 1996]).

2015At the time Bard was decided, only the Fourth Department adhered to a rigid rule that liability for animal-induced injuries “is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping or confining the animal, but is predicated upon the owner’s keeping of the animal, despite his [or her] knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities” (Plennert v Abel, 269 AD2d 796, 796 [4th Dept 2000]; see Smith v Farner, 229 AD2d 1017, 1018 [4th Dept 1996]).

2009As the dissent correctly points out, this Court has never sanctioned such a rigid rule (see Prozeralik v Capital Cities Communications, 82 NY2d 466, 478 [1993]).

2005Where, as here, a business suffers “losses due to adverse forces outside the spouse’s control,” a trial date valuation may be appropriate (Grunfeld v Grunfeld, 255 AD2d 12, 17 [1999], mod on other grounds 94 NY2d 696 [2000]).