rigid rule (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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rigid rule in Illinois

78 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1868–2024 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
Heastie v. Robertsgreen
ill · 2007 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2015–2022
2 sentences

2022See id. ¶ 35. “ ‘[T]he requisite control is not a rigid standard, but a flexible one in which the key question is whether the probable cause of the plaintiff’s injury was one which the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.’ ” Id. ¶ 42 (quoting Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 532 (2007)). ¶ 65 Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to recognize res ipsa loquitur as a separate theory for proving negligence.

2022Regardless, “the requisite control is not a rigid standard, but a flexible one in which the key question is whether the probable cause of the plaintiff’s injury was one which the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.” Id.

35
People v. Vaughngreen
illappct · 2004 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2007–2024
2 sentences

2024Respondent is correct that “a less rigid standard of waiver applies when the issue involves potential misconduct by a trial judge.” People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill.

2007Initially, while defendant has waived this issue by failing to object at trial and raise it in a posttrial motion, we note that "a less rigid standard of waiver applies when the issue involves potential misconduct by a trial judge." People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill.

33
Fronabarger v. Burnsgreen
illappct · 2008 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018
2 sentences

2018See Fronabarger, 385 Ill.

2017See Fronabarger , 385 Ill.

24
Jones v. Minstergreen
illappct · 1994 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See Jones v. Minster, 261 Ill.

2007See Jones v. Minster, 261 Ill.

22
People v. Williamsgreen
ill · 1996 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill.2d 317, 343 , 235 Ill.Dec. 918 , 706 N.E.2d 473 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 85 , 218 Ill.Dec. 916 , 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996).

2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996).

22
People v. Davisgreen
ill · 1998 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill.2d 317, 343 , 235 Ill.Dec. 918 , 706 N.E.2d 473 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 85 , 218 Ill.Dec. 916 , 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996).

2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996).

22
Edwards v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1981 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L.

2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L.

22
Wilson v. Arkansasgreen
scotus · 1995 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1996–1998
2 sentences

1998Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 66-67 , 675 N.E.2d at 608 , citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 , 131 L.

1998Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 66-67 , 675 N.E.2d at 608 , citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 , 131 L.

13
Ford v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1926 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2018–2019
2 sentences

2019Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927) (“The ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2018Ford v. United States , 273 U.S. 593 , 612, 47 S.Ct. 531 , 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927) ("The 'exclusio' is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ).

12
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.green
ill · 1990 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020This helps to preserve the identification element because liability will surely fall on the actual wrongdoer.” Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 257 (1990).

11
In Re Marriage of Sorensongreen
illappct · 1984 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
People ex rel. Reiter v. Lupegreen
ill · 1950 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
United States v. Vincent Beltempo, Guiseppe Gallina, A/K/A \Fillipo\"green
· 1982 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11
People v. Lindergreen
ill · 1999 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
Robinson v. Adamsgreen
ca9 · 1987 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc.green
iowa · 1966 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Digginsgreen
ill · 1940 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
11
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss.green
scotus · 1932 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1971–1971
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (54)

CaseCitedYears
Lynch v. Precision MacHine Shop, Ltd. green
ill · 1982
2 sentences

2008Plaintiff cites Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd., 93 Ill. 2d 266, 272 , 443 N.E.2d 569 (1982), in support of his position that the requisite degree of control is not a rigid standard.

2008Plaintiff cites Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd., 93 Ill. 2d 266, 272 , 443 N.E.2d 569 (1982), in support of his position that the requisite degree of control is not a rigid standard.

41984–2008
Fare v. Michael C. green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L.

1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L.

41992–1993
Minnick v. Mississippi green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L.

1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L.

41992–1993
Ferro v. Griffiths green
illappct · 2005
2 sentences

2007Ferro, 361 Ill.

2007Ferro, 361 Ill.App.3d at 743 , 297 Ill.Dec. 194 , 836 N.E.2d 925 .

32007–2007
People v. Winsett green
ill · 1992
2 sentences

2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L.

2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L.

31993–2003
Jennings v. Rodriguez green
scotus · 2018
2 sentences

2019Norfolk asks us to apply the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing excludes any other thing—to find that, because Congress did not specifically exclude a lost-wages award, it intended to include it in the definition of compensation. ¶ 34 Known as the “negative implication canon,” (Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (plurality opinion)), the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius sets out a rigid rule of construction that must be applied with “great caution” to avoid bringing about an unfair and unjust ou

2018Norfolk asks us to apply the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius- the expression of one thing excludes any other thing-to find that, because Congress did not specifically exclude a lost-wages award, it intended to include it in the definition of compensation. ¶ 34 Known as the "negative implication canon," ( Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 830 , 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (plurality opinion) ), the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius sets out a rigid rule of construction that must be applied with "great caution" to avoid bringing about an

22018–2019
Ford v. Grizzle green
illappct · 2010
2 sentences

2019Ford , 398 Ill.

2019Ford, 398 Ill.

22019–2019
Tragarz v. Keene Corporation green
ca7 · 1993
2 sentences

2017The Tragarz court summarized the testimony of other witnesses who said that “Tragarz was exposed to Kaylo asbestos products on more than one occasion,” and “Kaylo *** was on the majority of sites [the witness] worked from the mid-1960s onward.” Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 419 . ¶ 32 The Tragarz court then applied the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to the evidence: “[The] frequency, regularity, and proximity test is not a rigid test with an absolute threshold level necessary to support a jury verdict. *** [T]he frequency and regularity -8- prongs become less cumbersome when dealing with cas

2017The Tragarz court summarized the testimony of other witnesses who said that “Tragarz was exposed to Kaylo asbestos products on more than one occasion,” and “Kaylo *** was on the majority of sites [the witness] worked from the mid-1960s onward.” Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 419 . ¶ 32 The Tragarz court then applied the frequency, regularity and proximity test to the evidence: “[The] frequency, regularity, and proximity test is not a rigid test with an absolute threshold level necessary to support a jury verdict. *** [T]he frequency and regularity prongs become less cumbersome when dealing with cases in

22017–2017
Larsen v. Vic Tanny International green
illappct · 1984
2 sentences

2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is “untenable according to the standards of common experience.” Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins’s injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.

2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is "untenable according to the standards of common experience." Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins's injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.

22015–2015
Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd. green
illappct · 1990
2 sentences

2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is “untenable according to the standards of common experience.” Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins’s injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.

2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is "untenable according to the standards of common experience." Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins's injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.

22015–2015
Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs green
illappct · 1979
2 sentences

2015App. 3d 581 (1990), Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill.

2015App. 3d 581 (1990), Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill.

22015–2015
People v. Woodard green
ill · 1997
2 sentences

2005Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 445 , 677 N.E.2d at 940 .

2005Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 445 , 677 N.E.2d at 940 .

22005–2005
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

1999Nevertheless, the Court did concede that section 514(a) was perhaps “not a model of legislative drafting.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 85 L.

1999Nevertheless, the Court did concede that section 514(a) was perhaps “not a model of legislative drafting.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 85 L.

21999–1999
Pennoyer v. Neff red
· 1878
2 sentences

1967In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 .

1966The court first noted that “the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. ed. 565 to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , go L.

21966–1967
International Shoe Co. v. Washington green
scotus · 1945
2 sentences

1967In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 .

1966The court first noted that “the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. ed. 565 to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , go L.

21966–1967
Sinclair v. Jackson neutral
me · 1860
2 sentences

1906(Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Me. 102 ; Schmidt v. New York Mutual Fire Ins.

1868Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Maine 102 ; Schmidt v. N. Y.

21868–1906
Lafler v. Cooper green
scotus · 2012
1 sentence

2024Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165 . ¶ 28 Here, we are not dealing with an inaccurate sentencing range to which constitutional right deprivations are rightfully assigned. 3 While Strickland prejudice is not limited to errors that affect the fairness of a trial (id. (the Court does not follow “a rigid rule that an otherwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at the trial itself”)), the analysis has always focused on the outcome of the case itself.

12024–2024
People v. Ladd green
ill · 1999
2 sentences

2022Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 611-12 . ¶ 62 In Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 605-06 , the defendant filed his discharge motion on August 14, 1995, and the motion was heard the next day.

2022Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 611-12 . ¶ 62 In Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 605-06 , the defendant filed his discharge motion on August 14, 1995, and the motion was heard the next day.

12022–2022
People v. Gocmen green
ill · 2018
2 sentences

2021We view the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 32 , 115 N.E.3d 153 , as particularly helpful, even though that case dealt with probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion. ¶ 78 In Gocmen, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, and the officer eventually reached the conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of illegal drugs.

2021We view the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 32 , 115 N.E.3d 153 , as particularly helpful, even though that case dealt with probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion. ¶ 78 In Gocmen, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, and the officer eventually reached the conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of illegal drugs.

12021–2021
People v. Linley green
illappct · 2009
1 sentence

2021Linley, 388 Ill.

12021–2021
Fronabarger v. Burns green
illappct · 2008
12010–2010
People v. Thompkins green
ill · 1988
12005–2005
People v. Krueger green
ill · 1996
11998–1998
Randall v. Loftsgaarden green
scotus · 1986
11994–1994
Gayle v. Human Rights Commission green
illappct · 1991
11991–1991
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno green
scotus · 1982
11990–1990
Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises green
illappct · 1964
11984–1984
People v. Harris green
illappct · 1981
11984–1984
Illinois v. Gates green
scotus · 1983
11983–1983
People Ex Rel. Tucker v. Kotsos green
ill · 1977
11983–1983
The People v. Redlich green
ill · 1949
11983–1983
Cuyler v. Sullivan green
scotus · 1980
11982–1982
People v. Scott green
illappct · 1981
11982–1982
Kolakowski v. Voris green
ill · 1980
11982–1982
Bruszewski v. United States green
ca3 · 1950
11980–1980
cluster 327484 green
ca3 · 1975
11980–1980
Nora Faye Johnson v. United States green
ca5 · 1978
11980–1980
Mike Oldham, Charles J. Oldham and Rona Oldham v. Margaret Ann Pritchett green
ca8 · 1979
11980–1980
Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green
ill · 1974
11977–1977
Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen green
ill · 1972
11977–1977

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (4) IL § 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 107 (1881–2026) NY 88 (1862–2023) IL 78 (1868–2024) PA 73 (1846–2025) TX 64 (1887–2022) NJ 62 (1880–2022) TN 54 (1879–2026) OH 47 (1884–2024) MD 41 (1949–2023) FL 38 (1885–2018) MA 36 (1936–2023) MI 31 (1863–2021) WI 30 (1909–2023) WA 29 (1903–2020) MO 27 (1882–2017) MN 26 (1890–2024) GA 25 (1895–2020) DC 25 (1973–2024) WV 23 (1888–2020) AR 21 (1954–2020) OK 21 (1906–2016) OR 21 (1898–2019) LA 20 (1944–2012) ID 18 (1899–2024) CO 18 (1890–2025) IN 17 (1878–2015) NC 17 (1895–2019) UT 16 (1951–2022) AZ 15 (1923–2024) MT 15 (1933–2026) AK 13 (1974–2018) NE 13 (1902–2022) MS 13 (1929–2012) KS 13 (1872–2018) VA 13 (1837–2009) SD 12 (1956–2022) DE 12 (1958–2024) KY 12 (1925–2020) CT 12 (1959–2025) ND 11 (1898–2010) IA 11 (1951–2016) VT 10 (1848–2025) AL 10 (1893–2007) RI 10 (1996–2023) NM 9 (1962–2012) NH 9 (1979–2019) ME 8 (1936–2025) NV 7 (1909–2016) SC 7 (1966–2015) WY 5 (1966–2025) HI 5 (1960–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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