78 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1868–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heastie v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2022See id. ¶ 35. “ ‘[T]he requisite control is not a rigid standard, but a flexible one in which the key question is whether the probable cause of the plaintiff’s injury was one which the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.’ ” Id. ¶ 42 (quoting Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 532 (2007)). ¶ 65 Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to recognize res ipsa loquitur as a separate theory for proving negligence. 2022Regardless, “the requisite control is not a rigid standard, but a flexible one in which the key question is whether the probable cause of the plaintiff’s injury was one which the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.” Id. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Vaughngreen2 sentences2024Respondent is correct that “a less rigid standard of waiver applies when the issue involves potential misconduct by a trial judge.” People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill. 2007Initially, while defendant has waived this issue by failing to object at trial and raise it in a posttrial motion, we note that "a less rigid standard of waiver applies when the issue involves potential misconduct by a trial judge." People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Fronabarger v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2018See Fronabarger, 385 Ill. 2017See Fronabarger , 385 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Jones v. Minstergreen2 sentences2007See Jones v. Minster, 261 Ill. 2007See Jones v. Minster, 261 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill.2d 317, 343 , 235 Ill.Dec. 918 , 706 N.E.2d 473 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 85 , 218 Ill.Dec. 916 , 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). 2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill.2d 317, 343 , 235 Ill.Dec. 918 , 706 N.E.2d 473 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 85 , 218 Ill.Dec. 916 , 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). 2004People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L. 2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L. | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences1998Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 66-67 , 675 N.E.2d at 608 , citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 , 131 L. 1998Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 66-67 , 675 N.E.2d at 608 , citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 , 131 L. | 1 | 3 |
Ford v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927) (“The ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2018Ford v. United States , 273 U.S. 593 , 612, 47 S.Ct. 531 , 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927) ("The 'exclusio' is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ). | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.green1 sentence2020This helps to preserve the identification element because liability will surely fall on the actual wrongdoer.” Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 257 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Sorensongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People ex rel. Reiter v. Lupegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Vincent Beltempo, Guiseppe Gallina, A/K/A \Fillipo\"green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lindergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Digginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Precision MacHine Shop, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2008Plaintiff cites Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd., 93 Ill. 2d 266, 272 , 443 N.E.2d 569 (1982), in support of his position that the requisite degree of control is not a rigid standard. 2008Plaintiff cites Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd., 93 Ill. 2d 266, 272 , 443 N.E.2d 569 (1982), in support of his position that the requisite degree of control is not a rigid standard. | 4 | 1984–2008 |
Fare v. Michael C.
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L. 1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L. | 4 | 1992–1993 |
Minnick v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L. 1993Ed. 2d 489 , 111 S. Ct. 486 .) The Court in Miranda thus “fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 61 L. | 4 | 1992–1993 |
Ferro v. Griffiths
green
2 sentences2007Ferro, 361 Ill. 2007Ferro, 361 Ill.App.3d at 743 , 297 Ill.Dec. 194 , 836 N.E.2d 925 . | 3 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Winsett
green
2 sentences2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L. 2003In Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 349 , 606 N.E.2d at 1194 , our supreme court discussed the procedures police must follow if a suspect invokes his right to counsel: “If a suspect invokes his right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citations.] The Court in Miranda thus ‘fashioned *** the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his [flifth [a]mendment rights.’ [Citation.] In Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L. | 3 | 1993–2003 |
Jennings v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2019Norfolk asks us to apply the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing excludes any other thing—to find that, because Congress did not specifically exclude a lost-wages award, it intended to include it in the definition of compensation. ¶ 34 Known as the “negative implication canon,” (Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (plurality opinion)), the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius sets out a rigid rule of construction that must be applied with “great caution” to avoid bringing about an unfair and unjust ou 2018Norfolk asks us to apply the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius- the expression of one thing excludes any other thing-to find that, because Congress did not specifically exclude a lost-wages award, it intended to include it in the definition of compensation. ¶ 34 Known as the "negative implication canon," ( Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 830 , 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (plurality opinion) ), the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius sets out a rigid rule of construction that must be applied with "great caution" to avoid bringing about an | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Ford v. Grizzle
green
2 sentences2019Ford , 398 Ill. 2019Ford, 398 Ill. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Tragarz v. Keene Corporation
green
2 sentences2017The Tragarz court summarized the testimony of other witnesses who said that “Tragarz was exposed to Kaylo asbestos products on more than one occasion,” and “Kaylo *** was on the majority of sites [the witness] worked from the mid-1960s onward.” Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 419 . ¶ 32 The Tragarz court then applied the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to the evidence: “[The] frequency, regularity, and proximity test is not a rigid test with an absolute threshold level necessary to support a jury verdict. *** [T]he frequency and regularity -8- prongs become less cumbersome when dealing with cas 2017The Tragarz court summarized the testimony of other witnesses who said that “Tragarz was exposed to Kaylo asbestos products on more than one occasion,” and “Kaylo *** was on the majority of sites [the witness] worked from the mid-1960s onward.” Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 419 . ¶ 32 The Tragarz court then applied the frequency, regularity and proximity test to the evidence: “[The] frequency, regularity, and proximity test is not a rigid test with an absolute threshold level necessary to support a jury verdict. *** [T]he frequency and regularity prongs become less cumbersome when dealing with cases in | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Larsen v. Vic Tanny International
green
2 sentences2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is “untenable according to the standards of common experience.” Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins’s injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. 2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is "untenable according to the standards of common experience." Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins's injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is “untenable according to the standards of common experience.” Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins’s injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. 2015Like Larsen, the assertion that Hawkins would necessarily contemplate the danger of a mirror detaching from the wall and accordingly follow a more rigid standard of caution, either by avoiding certain areas or in some other way altering habits while present in those areas, is "untenable according to the standards of common experience." Id. at 578 . ¶ 26 Moreover, Hawkins's injury is distinguishable from those suffered in Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs
green
2 sentences2015App. 3d 581 (1990), Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill. 2015App. 3d 581 (1990), Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Woodard
green
2 sentences2005Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 445 , 677 N.E.2d at 940 . 2005Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 445 , 677 N.E.2d at 940 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences1999Nevertheless, the Court did concede that section 514(a) was perhaps “not a model of legislative drafting.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 85 L. 1999Nevertheless, the Court did concede that section 514(a) was perhaps “not a model of legislative drafting.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 85 L. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1967In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 . 1966The court first noted that “the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. ed. 565 to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , go L. | 2 | 1966–1967 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1967In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 . 1966The court first noted that “the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. ed. 565 to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , go L. | 2 | 1966–1967 |
Sinclair v. Jackson
neutral
2 sentences1906(Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Me. 102 ; Schmidt v. New York Mutual Fire Ins. 1868Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Maine 102 ; Schmidt v. N. Y. | 2 | 1868–1906 |
Lafler v. Cooper
green
1 sentence2024Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165 . ¶ 28 Here, we are not dealing with an inaccurate sentencing range to which constitutional right deprivations are rightfully assigned. 3 While Strickland prejudice is not limited to errors that affect the fairness of a trial (id. (the Court does not follow “a rigid rule that an otherwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at the trial itself”)), the analysis has always focused on the outcome of the case itself. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Ladd
green
2 sentences2022Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 611-12 . ¶ 62 In Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 605-06 , the defendant filed his discharge motion on August 14, 1995, and the motion was heard the next day. 2022Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 611-12 . ¶ 62 In Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d at 605-06 , the defendant filed his discharge motion on August 14, 1995, and the motion was heard the next day. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gocmen
green
2 sentences2021We view the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 32 , 115 N.E.3d 153 , as particularly helpful, even though that case dealt with probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion. ¶ 78 In Gocmen, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, and the officer eventually reached the conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of illegal drugs. 2021We view the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 32 , 115 N.E.3d 153 , as particularly helpful, even though that case dealt with probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion. ¶ 78 In Gocmen, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, and the officer eventually reached the conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of illegal drugs. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Linley
green
1 sentence2021Linley, 388 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fronabarger v. Burns green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Thompkins green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Krueger green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Randall v. Loftsgaarden green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Gayle v. Human Rights Commission green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Illinois v. Gates green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People Ex Rel. Tucker v. Kotsos green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| The People v. Redlich green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kolakowski v. Voris green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Bruszewski v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| cluster 327484 green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Nora Faye Johnson v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Mike Oldham, Charles J. Oldham and Rona Oldham v. Margaret Ann Pritchett green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.