rigid standard in Mississippi

2009Although our most recent decisions purport to adhere to the traditional standard, this Court has demanded more and more that “an expert ... be of the same specialty as the doctor about whom the expert is testifying,” while professing that such a rigid standard “is generally not required.” Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 957 . ¶ 28.

2009Although our most recent decisions purport to adhere to the traditional standard, this Court *184 has demanded more and more that "an expert ... be of the same specialty as the doctor about whom the expert is testifying," while professing that such a rigid standard "is generally not required." Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 957 . ¶ 28.

2001Our Court of Appeals recently applied this espousal in Thomas v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 1999-KA-01744-COA, 2001 WL 35987 (Miss.Ct.App.

1998Our Court of Appeals recently applied this espousal in Thomas v. State, 1999-KA-01744-COA, 2001 WL 35987 (Miss.

2012In Miranda, the Court stated that the warnings stated therein were necessary “in the absence of a fully effective equivalent.” 16 In Duckworth v. Eagan, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision” and 14 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 . 15 Id. 16 Id. at 476 . 7 that “[t]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.’” 17 ¶21.

2012In Miranda, the Court stated that the warnings stated therein were necessary “in the absence of a fully effective equivalent.” 16 In Duckworth v. Eagan, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision” and 14 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 . 15 Id. 16 Id. at 476 . 7 that “[t]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.’” 17 ¶21.

2002Robinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must pass the rigid test promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985).

2002Robinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must pass the rigid test promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985).

2002Robinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must pass the rigid test promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985).

1995"The pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and a dismissal should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which entitles him to relief." Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Miss. 1990); Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Assoc., 520 So.2d 1333 (Miss. 1987).

1971The rigid rule of duty upon a bank to know at all hazards the signature of its depositors, with whose signatures it is familiar, does not apply to endorsements of payees, with whose signatures they are seldom familiar. ( 196 Miss. at 72 , 16 So.2d at 390 ).

1971The rigid rule of duty upon a bank to know at all hazards the signature of its depositors, with whose signatures it is familiar, does not apply to endorsements of payees, with whose signatures they are seldom familiar. ( 196 Miss. at 72 , 16 So.2d at 390 ).

1944Co. v. Bain, 169 Miss. 271, 275 , 152 So. 845 , that “it is not what a person does . . . but it is the condition in which he is, and whether the activities will seriously endanger his health or life. ’ ’ In that case the insured suffered a second stroke of paralysis and was afflicted with high blood pressure, although he was still able to spend some time each morning looking over his plantation, but his physician testified that so to do was dangerous to his health and jeopardized his life — a conclusion which, as to a man in that condition, would not require a physician to establish.

1944Co. v. Bain, 169 Miss. 271, 275 , 152 So. 845 , that “it is not what a person does . . . but it is the condition in which he is, and whether the activities will seriously endanger his health or life. ’ ’ In that case the insured suffered a second stroke of paralysis and was afflicted with high blood pressure, although he was still able to spend some time each morning looking over his plantation, but his physician testified that so to do was dangerous to his health and jeopardized his life — a conclusion which, as to a man in that condition, would not require a physician to establish.

1929In this sense we recur to the language used by Judge Sumrall. in the ease of Hazlehurst Lodge, supra, *573 “The heir, or other person claiming derivatively from the decedent,” are subject to the rigid bar of this statute, and, attacking the title, are not permitted to inquire into the proceedings anterior to the sale.