54 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1879–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Gable v. State, 836 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tenn. 1992)). 2021Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993). -3- “If the availability of relief cannot be conclusively determined from a pro se petition and the accompanying records, the petitioner must be given the aid of counsel.” Swanson v. State, 749 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1988) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-104 , -107, - 115). | 14 | 14 |
Gable v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Allen v. State, 854 -2- S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Gable v. State, 836 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tenn. 1992)). 2025Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Gable v. State, 836 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tenn. 1992)). | 10 | 10 |
Barger v. Brockgreen2 sentences2007The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.” Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W. 2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976). 2006The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.” Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976). | 9 | 10 |
State v. Irickgreen2 sentences2020The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.”) (quoting State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995)); Levitan v. Banniza, 34 Tenn. App. 176, 185 , 236 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (“This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). 2017The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.”) (quoting State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995)); Levitan v. Banniza, 236 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (“This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). | 8 | 8 |
Levitan v. Bannizagreen2 sentences2020The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.”) (quoting State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995)); Levitan v. Banniza, 34 Tenn. App. 176, 185 , 236 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (“This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). 2020The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.”) (quoting State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995)); Levitan v. Banniza, 34 Tenn. App. 176, 185 , 236 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (“This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). | 5 | 5 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 173 (Tenn. Crim. 2001The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.’”) (citation omitted), see also Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 173 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2011See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491-97 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”). 2011See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491-97 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”). | 2 | 2 |
Bah v. Bahgreen2 sentences2004“The only rigid principle is and must be that the best interests of the child are paramount in any custody determination.” Id. 1998The only rigid principle is and must be that the best interests of the child are paramount in any custody determination.” 668 S.W.2d at 666 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Reevesgreen2 sentences2003In rejecting an “overt act” requirement to establish a “substantial step” toward the commission of the crime, the Court specifically noted that under such a rigid requirement, “no criminal responsibility would have attached unless the poison had actually been placed in the teacher’s cup.” Id. at 914 . 2003In rejecting an “overt act” requirement to establish a “substantial step” toward the commission of the crime, the Court specifically noted that under such a rigid requirement, “no criminal responsibility would have attached unless the poison had actually been placed in the teacher’s cup.” Id. at 914 . | 1 | 3 |
Swanson v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993). -3- “If the availability of relief cannot be conclusively determined from a pro se petition and the accompanying records, the petitioner must be given the aid of counsel.” Swanson v. State, 749 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1988) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-104 , -107, - 115). | 1 | 1 |
Kendrick v. Shoemakegreen1 sentence2004“When the trial court makes no specific findings of fact . . . we must review the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.” Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Ganzevoort v. Russellgreen1 sentence2004“When the trial court makes no specific findings of fact . . . we must review the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.” Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dominygreen1 sentence2001App. 1997) (holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals “is bound by the decisions of [the Tennessee] supreme court.”) We are also unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument that he was entitled to the instruction under State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. 1996), because he was tried before our supreme court overruled that decision in State v. Dominy, 6 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trustyred1 sentence2001App. 1997) (holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals “is bound by the decisions of [the Tennessee] supreme court.”) We are also unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument that he was entitled to the instruction under State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. 1996), because he was tried before our supreme court overruled that decision in State v. Dominy, 6 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Bloodworth v. Stuart Ex Rel. Stuartgreen2 sentences1997See also Bloodworth v. Stuart, 221 Tenn. 567 , 428 S.W.2d 786 (1968). 1997See also Bloodworth v. Stuart, 221 Tenn. 567 , 428 S.W.2d 786 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Levescy v. Crockergreen1 sentence1997The slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the judicial process.’” State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Barger v. Brock, 585 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1981–1993 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1981–1993 |
Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries
green
1 sentence2021In Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019), the Court adopted a “third approach fall[ing] between” limitless foreseeability and a rigid rule: Under the third approach, foreseeability that the product may be used with another product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not enough to trigger a duty to warn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2012Tennessee also has “rejected such a rigid rule[,]” noting that “[t]he primary burden, after all, is on the courts and prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dupuy v. State
red
1 sentence1997The statute further provides that “[c]onduct does not constitute a substantial step under 5 subdivision (a)(3) unless the person’s entire course of action is corroborative of the intent to commit the offense.” The defendant argues that, under this statute and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Dupuy v. State, 325 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1959), his actions were “mere preparations” to commit statutory rape and therefore did not amount to a “substantial step.” However, in State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909, 912-14 (Tenn. 1996), the Supreme Court abandoned the “mere preparations” test from Dupuy and | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1996Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 84 . 1996Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 84 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Holmes v. Roddy
green
1 sentence1996We see no reason why a more rigid rule should be applied with reference to the admission of parol evidence to identify the subject of a devise or legacy when the testator's language is obscure. 144 S.W.2d at 789 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Newte
neutral
1 sentence1988State v. Newte, 197 N.W.2d at 407 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Nabors v. Durham
neutral
2 sentences1975We are not unmindful of the holding in Nabors v. Durham, 60 Tenn.App. 637 , 450 S.W.2d 314 (1968) wherein the Court of Appeals for the Western Section held that proceedings in the juvenile court to determine paternity are equitable in nature; however this was in order to avoid a rigid rule of law with respect to pleading and does not purport to characterize a bastardy action as a suit in equity. 1975We are not unmindful of the holding in Nabors v. Durham, 60 Tenn.App. 637 , 450 S.W.2d 314 (1968) wherein the Court of Appeals for the Western Section held that proceedings in the juvenile court to determine paternity are equitable in nature; however this was in order to avoid a rigid rule of law with respect to pleading and does not purport to characterize a bastardy action as a suit in equity. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Boteler
green
1 sentence1930Railroad Co. v. Boteler, 38 Md., 568 , cited for plaintiff, the Railroad Company was sued as the proprietor of a toll bridge across the Potomac River at Harper’s Ferry. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Manley v. Manley
neutral
2 sentences1909On the other hand, other courts have adopted a “more liberal view,” and, as we think, altogether a more reasonable one, and with these this court, as is said in Manley v. Manley, 107 Tenn., 191 , 64 S. W., 8 , has ranged itself. 1909On the other hand, other courts have adopted a “more liberal view,” and, as we think, altogether a more reasonable one, and with these this court, as is said in Manley v. Manley, 107 Tenn., 191 , 64 S. W., 8 , has ranged itself. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
City Electric Street Railway Co. v. Conery
green
1 sentence1903The requirement does not carry with it too heavy a burden.” In City Electric Railway Company v. Conery, 61 Ark., 381, 33 S. W., 426 , 31 L. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Barry's Lessee v. Rheas.
neutral
1 sentence1879Barry v. Rhea, 1 Tenn., 345 . | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.