rigid rule in Kansas

1931Co. v. Townsend, 39 Kan. 115 , 17 Pac. 804 ; Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 .) With the coming of the automobile, a highly scientific invention and easy of control, and with its great weight and steel construction and its consequent capacity for imperiling the traveling public in case of collision, the courts have been compelled to develop a more rigid rule, or rather to insist more rigidly upon the application of the old rule, touching the duty of self-preservation imposed on those about to cross a railway track in such a vehicle.

1923Co. v. Townsend, 39 Kan. 115 , 17 Pac. 804 ; Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 .) With the coming of the automobile, a highly scientific invention and easy of control, and with its great weight and steel construction and its consequent capacity for imperiling the traveling public in case of collision, the courts have been compelled to develop a more rigid rule, or rather to insist more rigidly upon the application of the old rule, touching the duty of self-preservation imposed on those about to cross a railway track in such a vehicle.

1931Co. v. Townsend, 39 Kan. 115 , 17 Pac. 804 ; Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 .) With the coming of the automobile, a highly scientific invention and easy of control, and with its great weight and steel construction and its consequent capacity for imperiling the traveling public in case of collision, the courts have been compelled to develop a more rigid rule, or rather to insist more rigidly upon the application of the old rule, touching the duty of self-preservation imposed on those about to cross a railway track in such a vehicle.

1931Co. v. Townsend, 39 Kan. 115 , 17 Pac. 804 ; Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 .) With the coming of the automobile, a highly scientific invention and easy of control, and with its great weight and steel construction and its consequent capacity for imperiling the traveling public in case of collision, the courts have been compelled to develop a more rigid rule, or rather to insist more rigidly upon the application of the old rule, touching the duty of self-preservation imposed on those about to cross a railway track in such a vehicle.

1931(Wehe v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 794 , 156 Pac. 742 ; Jacobs v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 247 , 154 Pac. 1023 ; Cathcart v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav.

1931(Wehe v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 794 , 156 Pac. 742 ; Jacobs v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 247 , 154 Pac. 1023 ; Cathcart v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav.

1931(Wehe v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 794 , 156 Pac. 742 ; Jacobs v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 247 , 154 Pac. 1023 ; Cathcart v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav.

1931(Wehe v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 794 , 156 Pac. 742 ; Jacobs v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 247 , 154 Pac. 1023 ; Cathcart v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav.

2010The court recognized that “[tjhese factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent criteria for the district court to consider prior to imposing dismissal as a sanction,” and also that the district court “should ordinarily evaluate these factors on the record.” 965 F.2d at 921 .

2010The court recognized that "[t]hese factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent criteria for the district court to consider prior to imposing dismissal as a sanction," and also that the district court "should ordinarily evaluate these factors on the record." 965 F.2d at 921 .

2018Every case is different and restitution values are "unpredictable in practice because it is entirely relative, depending on who is doing the buying and who is doing the selling." Hall , 297 Kan. at 713 .

1999Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 .

1978The following from that case is pertinent herein: "At the outset, we reject the rigid rule which appellant urges us to adopt: That a police officer may stop an automobile for a spot check of the driver's license and the car's registration only when he has articulable suspicion, as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)], that either of such documents is invalid.

1978The following from that case is pertinent herein: "At the outset, we reject the rigid rule which appellant urges us to adopt: That a police officer may stop an automobile for a spot check of the driver's license and the car's registration only when he has articulable suspicion, as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)], that either of such documents is invalid.

1972For example in Coffin v. Reichard, supra, in which assaults at the hands of guards and co-inmates were alleged, the court ruled that any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired into by habeas corpus even though the person is in lawful custody.

1936In Johnson v. United Workmen, 91 Kan. 314 , 137 Pac. 1190 , the question was again presented.

1936In Johnson v. United Workmen, 91 Kan. 314 , 137 Pac. 1190 , the question was again presented.

1936In the case of Schnatterly v. Eslinger, 126 Kan. 9 , 266 Pac. 657 , it was held that the use of a fund collected for the building of a courthouse and jail, when used to purchase a courthouse site, was not a diversion prohibited by the constitution.

1936In the case of Schnatterly v. Eslinger, 126 Kan. 9 , 266 Pac. 657 , it was held that the use of a fund collected for the building of a courthouse and jail, when used to purchase a courthouse site, was not a diversion prohibited by the constitution.

1891Selden, J., in referring to The People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569 , said: “This subdivision was incidentally and partially consid ered, but the examination given to it was cursory merely, and no attempt was made to subject it to the rigid analysis which is indispensable to the development of its true meaning.” Denio, J., in his opinion said: “ I have not overlooked the opinions incidentally expressed by Chancellor Walworth and Mr. Justice Bronson, in The People v. White, ( 24 Wend. 520 ,) and in The People v. Rector, ( 19 Wend. 569 .) In neither of these cases was this question presented; and in

1891Selden, J., in referring to The People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569 , said: “This subdivision was incidentally and partially consid ered, but the examination given to it was cursory merely, and no attempt was made to subject it to the rigid analysis which is indispensable to the development of its true meaning.” Denio, J., in his opinion said: “ I have not overlooked the opinions incidentally expressed by Chancellor Walworth and Mr. Justice Bronson, in The People v. White, ( 24 Wend. 520 ,) and in The People v. Rector, ( 19 Wend. 569 .) In neither of these cases was this question presented; and in

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe

1872Co. v. Duffey, 2 Kas., 347, 353 ; Crowther v. Elliott, 7 Kas., 235 ; Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kas., 615 ; Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425 ; Richard, v. Edick, 17 Barb., 261 ; Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St., 441 ; Lewis v. Colter, 10 Ohio St., 451 ; Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St., 228 ; Summers v. Parrish, 10 Cal., 347 , But when the proper motions have been made to require the adverse party to so amend his defective pleading as to make it definite, certain, correct and formal, thereby giving the adverse party notice wherein his pleading is defective, informal, or insufficient; and whe