16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Irelandgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 1207 (―In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.‖); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (―We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .‖ (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s 2017Id. at 1207 (“In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.”); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (“We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cornishgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 1207 (―In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.‖); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (―We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .‖ (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s 2017Id. at 1207 (“In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.”); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (“We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s | 2 | 3 |
State v. Germontogreen2 sentences2017Id. at 1207 (―In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.‖); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (―We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .‖ (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s 2017Id. at 1207 (“In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.”); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (“We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Lankowgreen2 sentences2021Id. at 131 ; see also id. (rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that “a party must provide actual notice of the nature and timing of any action that could lead to destruction of evidence” (cleaned up) (emphasis in original)). 2021Id. at 131 ; see also id. (rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that “a party must provide actual notice of the nature and timing of any action that could lead to destruction of evidence” (cleaned up) (emphasis in original)). | 1 | 1 |
Kallas v. Kallasgreen1 sentence2016Thus, the district court did not err when it failed to require a showing of material change in circumstances to alter the parties' parent-time arrangement,. {12 We next decide whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that exercising standard parent-time with Mother at her home in Moab was in the children's best interests. {13 The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that "[t]rial courts have continuing jurisdiction to consider motions to modify dealing with ... visitation rights." Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (3) (Lex | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Timothy Smithgreen1 sentence2005Id. at 428 (internal quotations omitted). ¶29 Other jurisdictions have refused to adopt such a rigid rule, declaring that “ ‘the varying circumstances of particular cases ... militate against [the] adoption of inflexible criteria applicable to all eases.’ ” United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Frank Joseph Fuentes and Carmello Sansone, A/K/A \Michel\""green1 sentence2005Id. at 428 (internal quotations omitted). ¶29 Other jurisdictions have refused to adopt such a rigid rule, declaring that “ ‘the varying circumstances of particular cases ... militate against [the] adoption of inflexible criteria applicable to all eases.’ ” United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2005Id. at 428 (internal quotations omitted). ¶29 Other jurisdictions have refused to adopt such a rigid rule, declaring that “ ‘the varying circumstances of particular cases ... militate against [the] adoption of inflexible criteria applicable to all eases.’ ” United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp.green2 sentences1993Two years later, in Horgan v. Industrial Design Cory., 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982), we said that the Heglar-Fox formulation is “not a rigid rule based on precise elements that must be satisfied in every case,” but rather is “a general definition to be applied flexibly to the distinct facts of each case.” We noted that the law of duress had since broadened, which made it difficult to arrive at a clear-cut definition of duress. 1993Two years later, in Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982), we said that the Heglar-Fox formulation is "not a rigid rule based on precise elements that must be satisfied in every case," but rather is "a general definition to be applied flexibly to the distinct facts of each case." We noted that the law of duress had since broadened, which made it difficult to arrive at a clear-cut definition of duress. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Gary Rubin United States of America v. Louis Martin Agnes A/K/A Louis Martingreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 267-68 (3rd Cir. 1973); 2 W. 1987See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 267-68 (3rd Cir.1973); 2 W. | 1 | 1 |
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillmangreen1 sentence1982We reaffirmed this definition in Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, Utah, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (1980), and we follow it in this case, not as a rigid rule based on precise elements that must be satisfied in every case, but as a general definition to be applied flexibly to the distinct facts of each case. | 1 | 1 |
Urban Plumbing & Heating Co., an Oregon Corporation v. The United Statesgreen1 sentence1982As Professor Williston states: “ ‘The law of duress has broadened somewhat during recent years making it virtually impossible to arrive at any clear-cut definition, and the courts have stated that its application must of necessity depend upon the circumstances of each individual case.’ ” 13 S. Williston, supra, § 1603 at 665 (citing Urban Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 382, 389 (Ct.Cl.1969)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rushton
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 1207 (―In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.‖); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (―We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .‖ (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s 2017Id. at 1207 (“In this case there was a distinct difference in time [and] location . . . and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place or purpose.”); see State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (“We . . . [take] care to avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 21 Opinion of the Court defendant commits a crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (declining to hold that a failure to s | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski
green
2 sentences2022Our instruction should not be construed as a rigid rule requiring district courts to factor into every alimony determination all donations, charitable contributions, or the “need to fund post-divorce savings, investment, or retirement accounts.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 , 80 P.3d 153 . 2022Our instruction should not be construed as a rigid rule requiring district courts to factor into every alimony determination all donations, charitable contributions, or the “need to fund post-divorce savings, investment, or retirement accounts.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 , 80 P.3d 153 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Knowles v. Knowles
green
1 sentence2022The inclusion of such obligations as part of the needs analysis is discretionary after consideration of all relevant facts and equitable principles and is appropriate only in circumstances where such spending was “standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple’s marital standard of living.” Id. 20200032 24 2022 UT App 47 Knowles v. Knowles B. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds
green
1 sentence2021In other words, they “do not constitute a rigid test” that a district court must apply with trepidation.15 See id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wiggins v. Smith, Warden
green
2 sentences2011To the contrary, a rigid requirement that to effectively represent a capital defendant a capital defense attorney must employ a mitigation specialist "would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 . 2011To the contrary, a rigid requirement that to effectively represent a capital defendant a capital defense attorney must employ a mitigation specialist "would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2009It "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence ... will be found." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 2009It "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence ... will be found." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. David S. King, United States of America v. Stanley E. Deal, M. D.
green
1 sentence2005In United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir.1978), the Ninth Circuit stated as follows: *426 [W]e think that the [seven] elements, ... are useful, but not dispositive, guidelines for determining when a proper foundation for the introduction of sound recordings has been made. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Condemarin v. University Hospital
green
2 sentences2002Id. 2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
V-1 Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Solid & Hazardous Waste
green
1 sentence1997Consequently, the Court held that “McKnight’s own characterization of his dual role as presiding officer and DERR staff attorney ... creates the appearance of impropriety that erodes confidence in the basic fairness of the hearing process and must be avoided in quasi-judicial proceedings as diligently as in judicial proceedings.” V-l Oil Co. 1, 893 P.2d at 1097 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Moulds
green
1 sentence1988Like the above cited jurisdictions, we prefer a “pragmatic approach to a rigid rule that would bar all further questioning of the accused.” Moulds, 673 P.2d at 1082 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Vale v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1987The circuit courts, however, have generally rejected the rigid standard implied in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 , 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). 1987The circuit courts, however, have generally rejected the rigid standard implied in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 , 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1951It is comparatively easy, in the light of subsequent events, to say that an accident could have been avoided if the parties involved had done this or that thing but the law does not apply such a rigid test * * The court further observed “* * * It is only in the clearest of cases that a court is warranted in withdrawing this question from the consideration of the jury.” The principle that where unusual conditions exist a jury question is presented is dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Pokora v. Wabash Rail *48 way Co., 292 U. S. 98 , 54 S. Ct. 580, 581 , 78 L. 1951It is comparatively easy, in the light of subsequent events, to say that an accident could have been avoided if the parties involved had done this or that thing but the law does not apply such a rigid test * * The court further observed “* * * It is only in the clearest of cases that a court is warranted in withdrawing this question from the consideration of the jury.” The principle that where unusual conditions exist a jury question is presented is dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Pokora v. Wabash Rail *48 way Co., 292 U. S. 98 , 54 S. Ct. 580, 581 , 78 L. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.