rigid standard in Pennsylvania

2025Eckenrod, however, is not a rigid test that sets an absolute threshold required to support liability. [See] Gregg, . . . 943 A.2d at 225 .

2016Instead, to permit trial courts to make a reasoned determination at the summary judgment stage as to whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to permit a jury to make the “necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s product and the asserted injury,” id. at 227 , we adopted the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test, as refined and applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992): Tragarz explains that these criteria do not establish a rigid standard with an absolut

2025To this rigid rule of non-liability there are but two exceptions[, the first of which is pertinent here]: (1) when the landlord conceals or fails to disclose dangerous conditions of which he has knowledge and of when the tenant is unaware and cannot be expected to discover…[.] Id. (quoting Doyle v. Atlantic Refining Co., 53 A.2d 68, 71 (Pa. 1947) (internal citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

2016An exception to “this rigid rule of non- liability” is “when the landlord conceals or fails to disclose dangerous conditions of which he has knowledge and of [which] the tenant is unaware and cannot be expected to discover….” Id.

2016Instead, to permit trial courts to make a reasoned determination at the summary judgment stage as to whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to permit a jury to make the “necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s product and the asserted injury,” id. at 227 , we adopted the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test, as refined and applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992): Tragarz explains that these criteria do not establish a rigid standard with an absolut

2016Instead, to permit trial courts to make a reasoned determination at the summary judgment stage as to whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to permit a jury to make the “necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s product and the asserted injury,” id. at 227, we adopted the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test, as refined and applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992): Tragarz explains that these criteria do not establish a rigid standard with an absolute

2021Now echoed in harmony with the eminent criminal-law probable cause standard pronounced in Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 234-38 , the importance of Camara’s proportional balancing test is not overstated: [In Camara] the Court has taken the view that the evidentiary requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid standard, requiring precisely the same quantum of evidence in all cases, but instead is a flexible standard, [J-39A-2021 and J-39B-2021] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 26 permitting consideration of the public and individual interests as they are reflected in the facts of a particular case.

2021Now echoed in harmony with the eminent criminal-law probable cause standard pronounced in Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 234-38 , the importance of Camara’s proportional balancing test is not overstated: [In Camara] the Court has taken the view that the evidentiary requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid standard, requiring precisely the same quantum of evidence in all cases, but instead is a flexible standard, [J-39A-2021 and J-39B-2021] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 26 permitting consideration of the public and individual interests as they are reflected in the facts of a particular case.

2020In reaching this conclusion, I find persuasive the Third Circuit’s statement in Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453, 468 (3[]d Cir. 1987) (en banc) that, ‘the operation of a SEPTA vehicle cannot be divorced from the purposes of the vehicle’s operation.’ The Toombs court rejected the rigid analysis that a vehicle is 11 operated only where it is in motion and determined that, when applied to a common carrier, the term ‘operation’ covered the discharge of passengers from a subway car.

1999In reaching this conclusion, I find persuasive the Third Circuit’s statement in Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453, 468 (3rd Cir.l987)(en banc) that, “the operation of a SEPTA vehicle cannot be divorced from the purposes of the vehicle’s operation.” The Toombs court rejected the rigid analysis that a vehicle is operated only where it is in motion and determined that, when applied to a common carrier, the term “operation” covered the discharge of passengers from a subway car.

2017See, e.g., United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 110 (2nd Cir. 2016) (“Our unwillingness in past cases to describe the Bqjakajian factors as exhaustive reflects Bajakajian itself, which never prescribed those factors as a rigid test.”); Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C.

2017See, e.g., United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 110 (2nd Cir. 2016) (“Our unwillingness in past cases to describe the Bajakajian factors as exhaustive reflects Bajakajian itself, which never prescribed those factors as a rigid test.”); Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 512, 527 (D.C.

2015In Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1979), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created “a new ground for an appeal nunc pro tunc, i.e. non-negligent happenstance.” In re In the Interest of C.K., 535 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. Super. 1987).

2000In Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256 , 401 A.2d 1133 (1979), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created “a new ground for an appeal nunc pro tunc, i.e. non-negligent happenstance.” In re In the Interest of C.K., 369 Pa.Super. 445 , 535 A.2d 634, 637 (1987). ¶ 13 In Bass, supra, an appeal was prepared and ready to be filed on a Friday, six days prior to the expiration of the appeal period.

2017The Court then fashioned of whole cloth the hypothesis that the only way we might “attempt to define the specific components of a' ‘thorough and efficient [system of] education’ ” in a “judicially manageable” fashion would be to impose “the rigid rule that each pupil must receive the same dollar expenditures.” Id.

2017The Court then fashioned of whole cloth the hypothesis that the only way we might “attempt to define the specific components of a ‘thorough and efficient [system of] education’” in a “judicially manageable” fashion would be to impose “the rigid rule that each pupil must receive the same dollar expenditures.” Id.

2025See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 604 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (“We certainly recognize this established principle [that immunity must be specifically waived by the General Assembly], but such waiver is not confined to the specific words ‘immunity is waived[.]’”); Coughlin, 599 U.S. at 388 (“The rule is not a magic-words requirement[.]”). [J-47-2024] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 7 agencies — to liability under the Act.

2025See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 604 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (“We certainly recognize this established principle [that immunity must be specifically waived by the General Assembly], but such waiver is not confined to the specific words ‘immunity is waived[.]’”); Coughlin, 599 U.S. at 388 (“The rule is not a magic-words requirement[.]”). [J-47-2024] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 7 agencies — to liability under the Act.

2017Following Danson’s dubious lead, the Marrero I court asserted baldly that the only judicially manageable standard for monitoring the legislature’s compliance with the constitutional mandate would be to impose a rigid requirement that each student receive the benefit of equal expenditures, despite the fact that plaintiffs suggested no such thing. 44 To this premise, the Commonwealth Court responded, again without development or citation of developed authority, that expenditures alone “are not the exclusive yardstick of educational quality, or even of educational quantity.” Id. at 964 (quoting D

2017Following Danson’s dubious lead, the Marrero I court asserted baldly that the only judicially manageable standard for monitoring the legislature’s compliance with the constitutional mandate would be to impose a rigid requirement that each student receive the benefit of equal expenditures, despite the fact that plaintiffs suggested no such thing.44 To this premise, the Commonwealth Court responded, again without development or citation of developed authority, that expenditures alone “are not the exclusive yardstick of educational quality, or even of educational quantity.” Id. at 964 (quoting Da

2017See, e.g., United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 110 (2nd Cir. 2016) (“Our unwillingness in past cases to describe the Bqjakajian factors as exhaustive reflects Bajakajian itself, which never prescribed those factors as a rigid test.”); Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C.

2011Tarzia v. American Standard, 952 A.2d 1170, 1171-72 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc). *224 The frequency, regularity and proximity test is not a rigid test with an absolute threshold necessary to support liability.

2007See Biester, 487 Pa. at 445 , 409 A.2d at 852 ; Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 278 , 227 A.2d 619, 621-22 (1967) (stating that “the fundamental reason for granting [taxpayer] standing is simply that otherwise a large body of governmental activity would be unchallenged in the courts.”).

2007See Biester, 487 Pa. at 445 , 409 A.2d at 852 ; Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 278 , 227 A.2d 619, 621-22 (1967) (stating that “the fundamental reason for granting [taxpayer] standing is simply that otherwise a large body of governmental activity would be unchallenged in the courts.”).

2007See also Makozy v. Makozy, 874 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 740 , 891 A.2d 733 (2005).