64 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1887–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stadt v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone."). [20] Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)). [21] Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)(citing Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)(opinion on rehearing)). [22] Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Royster, 622 S.W.2d 442 ). [23] Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 52 2008In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”). 20 Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
In re CVR Energy, Inc.green2 sentences2016See id. 2016See id. | 2 | 2 |
Morris v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Morris v. State , 361 S.W.3d 649, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. 2013See Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Rousseau v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone."). [20] Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)). [21] Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)(citing Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)(opinion on rehearing)). [22] Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Royster, 622 S.W.2d 442 ). [23] Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 52 2008In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone."). [20] Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)). [21] Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)(citing Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)(opinion on rehearing)). [22] Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Royster, 622 S.W.2d 442 ). [23] Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 52 | 2 | 2 |
Lemmerman v. Fealkgreen2 sentences1996See Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich.App. 544 , 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1993) (“Adults who have repressed child sexual abuse bring to the courts unusual circumstances and injuries not readily conforming to the ordinary constructs on which periods of limitations are imposed.”) (citing Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271 , 792 P.2d 18, 24 (1990)). 1996See Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich.App. 544 , 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1993) (“Adults who have repressed child sexual abuse bring to the courts unusual circumstances and injuries not readily conforming to the ordinary constructs on which periods of limitations are imposed.”) (citing Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271 , 792 P.2d 18, 24 (1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Petersen v. Bruengreen2 sentences1996See Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich.App. 544 , 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1993) (“Adults who have repressed child sexual abuse bring to the courts unusual circumstances and injuries not readily conforming to the ordinary constructs on which periods of limitations are imposed.”) (citing Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271 , 792 P.2d 18, 24 (1990)). 1996See Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich.App. 544 , 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1993) (“Adults who have repressed child sexual abuse bring to the courts unusual circumstances and injuries not readily conforming to the ordinary constructs on which periods of limitations are imposed.”) (citing Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271 , 792 P.2d 18, 24 (1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Rowland v. City of Tylergreen2 sentences1969In Rowland v. City of Tyler, supra, the court said: “The courts have frequently, and we think properly, condemned the action of boards of equalization in taking any one particular element as a rigid standard by which values of real estate shall be determined. 1968For the benefit of the parties in the event of a new trial, we call attention to the case of Rowland v. City of Tyler, 5 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Com.App.1928), wherein the court states: “The courts have frequently, and we think properly, condemned the action of boards of equalization in taking any one particular element as a rigid standard by which values of real estate shall be determined. | 1 | 3 |
Hanson v. Dencklagreen2 sentences1979“But it is a mistake to assume that this trend [minimal contacts] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 (1958). 4 . 1979“But it is a mistake to assume that this trend [minimal contacts] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 (1958). 4 . | 1 | 2 |
Pierce v. Reynoldsgreen1 sentence2022It is a rigid rule, but that is why it is useful.”); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001) (if order’s language is clear and unequivocal, “it must be given effect despite any other indications that one or more parties did not intend for the judgment to be final;” “express adjudication of all parties and claims in a case is not interlocutory merely because the record does not afford a legal basis for the adjudication,” and such orders “must be appealed and reversed”); Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) (“No matter how erroneous its conclusion and action may hav | 1 | 1 |
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.red1 sentence2022It is a rigid rule, but that is why it is useful.”); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001) (if order’s language is clear and unequivocal, “it must be given effect despite any other indications that one or more parties did not intend for the judgment to be final;” “express adjudication of all parties and claims in a case is not interlocutory merely because the record does not afford a legal basis for the adjudication,” and such orders “must be appealed and reversed”); Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) (“No matter how erroneous its conclusion and action may hav | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Hillerygreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 , 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 Held: L.Ed.2d 598. 2015See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 , 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 Held: L.Ed.2d 598. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.green1 sentence2013United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Guzman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| American Mutual Liability Insurance v. Parkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Killingsworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silver v. Silvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dickey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilmeth v. Wilmethgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
green
2 sentences2015The United States Supreme Court has refused to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion,” noting that “[e]ach case turns on its facts.” Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249 ; 102 S. Ct. at 263 . 2015The United States Supreme Court has refused to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion,” noting that “[e]ach case turns on its facts.” Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249 ; 102 S. Ct. at 263 . | 7 | 2010–2015 |
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2003Id. 2003Id. | 5 | 2003–2003 |
Honea, by Next Friend v. Coca Cola Bot. Co.
green
2 sentences2021“The possibility of other causes for the accident besides the defendant’s negligence does not have to be eliminated, but the likelihood of other causes must be so reduced that the jury can reasonably find that the negligence, if any, was committed by the defendant.” Id. (citing Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). “[T]he ‘control’ requirement is not a rigid rule that the instrumentality must have always been in the defendant’s possession or even that it must have been in the defendant’s control at the time of the injury.” Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 S.W.2d 968 (T 1979Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944). | 3 | 1974–2021 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences2014In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . 1979In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 . 3 . | 3 | 1973–2014 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . 1979In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 . 3 . | 3 | 1973–2014 |
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Management Team, LLC
green
2 sentences2013The Quixtar court emphasized the United States Supreme Court’s purposeful refusal to 9 “lay down a rigid rule to govern [a trial court’s] discretion” in these cases because “[e]ach case turns on its facts.” 315 S.W.3d at 34 (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249 , 102 S. Ct. at 263 ). 2011The Quixtar court further emphasized that the United States Supreme Court purposefully refused to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion” in these cases because “[e]ach case turns on its facts.” Id. at 34 (quoting Piper Aircraft , 454 U.S. at 249 , 102 S. Ct. at 263 ). | 3 | 2010–2013 |
Flores v. State
green
2 sentences2008In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone."). [20] Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)). [21] Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)(citing Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)(opinion on rehearing)). [22] Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Royster, 622 S.W.2d 442 ). [23] Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 52 2008In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”). 20 Flores v. State, 215 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2007)(citing Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 2008–2008 |
Brownson v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences1972“In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986, 987 , Judge Gaines, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: ‘It is a rigid rule that courts of equity will not grant a party to a judgment a new trial when the failure to have a full and fair presentment of his case has resulted from the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. 1941In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986, 987 , Judge Gaines, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: “It is a rigid rule that courts of equity will not grant a party to a judgment a new trial when the failure to have a full and fair presentment of his case has resulted from the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. | 3 | 1932–1972 |
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kendzora
green
2 sentences1972“In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986, 987 , Judge Gaines, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: ‘It is a rigid rule that courts of equity will not grant a party to a judgment a new trial when the failure to have a full and fair presentment of his case has resulted from the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. 1941In Brownson v. Reynolds, 77 Tex. 254 , 13 S.W. 986, 987 , Judge Gaines, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: “It is a rigid rule that courts of equity will not grant a party to a judgment a new trial when the failure to have a full and fair presentment of his case has resulted from the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. | 3 | 1932–1972 |
Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner
green
2 sentences2021“The possibility of other causes for the accident besides the defendant’s negligence does not have to be eliminated, but the likelihood of other causes must be so reduced that the jury can reasonably find that the negligence, if any, was committed by the defendant.” Id. (citing Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). “[T]he ‘control’ requirement is not a rigid rule that the instrumentality must have always been in the defendant’s possession or even that it must have been in the defendant’s control at the time of the injury.” Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 S.W.2d 968 (T 2021“It is sufficient that the defendant be in control of the instrumentality at the time that the negligence inferable from the accident probably occurred.” Marathon Oil Co., 632 S.W.2d at 574 .4 4 When the doctrine applies, it allows the factfinder to infer negligence provided the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence and the evidence shows that the instrument causing the injury was under the management and control of the defendant. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mobil Chemical Company v. Bell
green
2 sentences2021“The possibility of other causes for the accident besides the defendant’s negligence does not have to be eliminated, but the likelihood of other causes must be so reduced that the jury can reasonably find that the negligence, if any, was committed by the defendant.” Id. (citing Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). “[T]he ‘control’ requirement is not a rigid rule that the instrumentality must have always been in the defendant’s possession or even that it must have been in the defendant’s control at the time of the injury.” Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 S.W.2d 968 (T 2021“The possibility of other causes for the accident besides the defendant’s negligence does not have to be eliminated, but the likelihood of other causes must be so reduced that the jury can reasonably find that the negligence, if any, was committed by the defendant.” Id. (citing Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). “[T]he ‘control’ requirement is not a rigid rule that the instrumentality must have always been in the defendant’s possession or even that it must have been in the defendant’s control at the time of the injury.” Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 S.W.2d 968 (T | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Claborn
green
1 sentence2015The State counters that Carson should not be the standard and urges a less rigid test for determining whether a court cost is valid, such as the one given by the court in State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1994). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tiller v. Fields
green
1 sentence2015Unitization can should be upheld, although the grant of power is in be said to be advantageous to both lessors and lessees. general terms, because it is subject to implied terms We think these facts lead to the conclusion that in the that will prevent arbitrary and unfair dealing, will absence of clear language to the contrary, pooling require compliance with the implied covenants in the clauses should not be construed in a narrow or limited lease for the benefit of the lessor and will impose a sense.’ rigid standard of good faith on the part of the lessee.’ And in Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W.2d | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway
green
2 sentences2015PROC. 179, 231 (1996) (remarks of James A. Henderson, Reporter, introducing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995)) (″Section 3 is derived quite faithfully from § 328D of the Restatement, Second, of Torts.″). 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). 6 See infra note 3. 7 Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 , 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 591 (Tex. 1990) (″Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when two factors are present: (1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the Jamie Grah 2015PROC. 179, 231 (1996) (remarks of James A. Henderson, Reporter, introducing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995)) (″Section 3 is derived quite faithfully from § 328D of the Restatement, Second, of Torts.″). 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). 6 See infra note 3. 7 Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 , 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 591 (Tex. 1990) (″Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when two factors are present: (1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the Jamie Grah | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Haddock v. Arnspiger
green
1 sentence2015PROC. 179, 231 (1996) (remarks of James A. Henderson, Reporter, introducing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995)) (″Section 3 is derived quite faithfully from § 328D of the Restatement, Second, of Torts.″). 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). 6 See infra note 3. 7 Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 , 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 591 (Tex. 1990) (″Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when two factors are present: (1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the Jamie Grah | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Glover v. United States
green
1 sentence2015Applying cing, see, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. Strickland, it found that counsel had provided defi- 198, 203-204, 121 S.Ct. 696 , I 48 L.Ed.2d 604 . cient perfonnance by advising respondent of an in- This Court has not followed a rigid rule that an oth- corre~t legal rule, and that respondent suffered pre- erwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at tri- judice because he lost the opportunity to take the al, but has instead inquired whether the trial cured more favorable sentence offered in the plea. the particular error at issue. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Katherine Elizabeth Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2014With regard to Caffe Ribs’s contention that Dominy’s logic is not supported by market data, adjustments are not “deemed unreliable or invalid if they have not previously been subject to peer review because the very nature of appraisal adjustments calls for a less rigid test of reliability and can hinge on an expert’s experience.” Williams, 406 S.W.3d at 291 . 2014Adjustments are not “deemed unreliable or invalid if they have hot previously been subject to' peer review because the very nature of appraisal adjustments calls for a less rigid test of reliability and can hinge on an expert’s experience.” Williams, 406 S.W.3d at 291 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Henson, Kevin Ray
green
1 sentence2014The majority opinion cites a line of cases, including Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Williams v. Green Bay & Western Railroad green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Royster v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Human v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Ratcliffe v. Mahres green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Illinois v. Gates green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bergeron v. Session green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Plessinger v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Rhode Island v. Innis green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Fare v. Michael C. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Messenger v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| In Re Marriage of Brown green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| French v. French red | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Whittenburg green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Colorado v. United States green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Dailey v. Preferred Masonic Mutual Accident Ass'n of America green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Schwindermann v. Great Eastern Casualty Co. neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Smith v. Ferrell green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Kost v. Rose neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Forest Oil Co. v. Wilson green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Goss v. McClaren green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.