rigid rule in California

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2025Even if an award is entirely reasonable in light of the other two factors …, the award can be so disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay that the award is excessive for that reason alone.” (Adams v. Murakani (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 111 (Adams).) “Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay. [Citations.] Accordingly, there is no one particular type of financial evidence a plaintiff must obtain or introduce to 9 satisfy its burden of demonstrating the defendant’s financial condition.

2016(Id. at p. 120.) 19 The Adams court did not prescribe a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages, and stated it could not conclude, based on the record before it, “that any particular measure of ability to pay is superior to all others or that a single standard is appropriate in all cases.” (Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7 .) Net worth is often described as “the critical determinant of financial condition”; however, “there is no rigid formula and other factors may be dispositive especially when net worth is manipulated and fails to reflect actual weal

1985Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court's function to see that justice is done. *29 Cognizant of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits ( Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854-855 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 620 , 409 P.2d 600 ]; Slusher v. Durrer (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 747, 753-754 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 265 ]), judges usually consider whether to exercise their discretion in applying local court rules and frequently consider documents which have been untimely filed.

1985Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court's function to see that justice is done. *29 Cognizant of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits ( Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854-855 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 620 , 409 P.2d 600 ]; Slusher v. Durrer (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 747, 753-754 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 265 ]), judges usually consider whether to exercise their discretion in applying local court rules and frequently consider documents which have been untimely filed.

2021Evidence of the defendant’s net worth is the most commonly used, but that metric is too susceptible to manipulation to be the sole standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay. [Citations.] Yet the ‘net’ concept of 36 the net worth metric remains critical. ‘In most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not sufficient “without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Evidence of a defendant’s income, standing alone, is not ‘ “meaningful evidence.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and ev

2021Evidence of the defendant’s net worth is the most commonly used, but that metric is too susceptible to manipulation to be the sole standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay. [Citations.] Yet the ‘net’ concept of 36 the net worth metric remains critical. ‘In most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not sufficient “without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Evidence of a defendant’s income, standing alone, is not ‘ “meaningful evidence.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and ev

2013Faced with a similar issue, the Kapitanski court noted, ―Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court‘s function to see that justice is done.‖ (Kapitanski, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 .) Our high court repeated its observations from Mann and the quoted language from Kapitanski in Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1351, 1364 (Elkins).

2013Faced with a similar issue, the Kapitanski court noted, “Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court’s function to see that justice is done.” (Kapitanski, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 .) Our high court repeated its observations from Mann and the quoted language from Kapitanski in Elkins v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1351, 1364 (Elkins).

2003(See City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 , and cases there cited.) It is firmly established “that neither due process nor equal protection imposes a rigid rule of equality in tax legislation.” (City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, 301 U.S. 495, 509 [ 57 S.Ct. 868, 872 ]; Cohan v. Alvord, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 ; Henry’s Restaurants of Pomona, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1016 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 867 ].) Inequalities, which arise from the singling out of o

2003(See City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 , and cases there cited.) It is firmly established “that neither due process nor equal protection imposes a rigid rule of equality in tax legislation.” (City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, 301 U.S. 495, 509 [ 57 S.Ct. 868, 872 ]; Cohan v. Alvord, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 ; Henry’s Restaurants of Pomona, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1016 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 867 ].) Inequalities, which arise from the singling out of o

2025(Riddle v. Leuschner (1959) 51 Cal.2d 574, 580-581 [noting that “various employees” owned a miniscule portion of 13 stock (eight shares total)]; accord, USACM Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 645, 648 [concluding agents dominated corporation, even while owning only 83 percent of the stock].) Thus, we reject Content Checked’s argument that the case law already requires a rigid requirement of 100 percent ownership by the agent, and we decline to create such a requirement in a situation—like the one here—where the other shareholders own valueless stock and have no i

2025(Riddle v. Leuschner (1959) 51 Cal.2d 574, 580-581 [noting that “various employees” owned a miniscule portion of 13 stock (eight shares total)]; accord, USACM Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 645, 648 [concluding agents dominated corporation, even while owning only 83 percent of the stock].) Thus, we reject Content Checked’s argument that the case law already requires a rigid requirement of 100 percent ownership by the agent, and we decline to create such a requirement in a situation—like the one here—where the other shareholders own valueless stock and have no i

2025We also reject Content Checked’s argument—raised for the first time at oral argument— that we must evaluate the extent of the sole actor’s ownership at a particular moment in time; apart from being forfeited (People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 960, fn. 7 ), it lacks merit where, as here, the alleged negligence is RSBM’s failure to uncover the sole actor’s perpetual misrepresentations and the sole actor controlled the majority (at times, vast majority) of valueless and powerless stock throughout the time of those perpetual misrepresentations.

2025We also reject Content Checked’s argument—raised for the first time at oral argument— that we must evaluate the extent of the sole actor’s ownership at a particular moment in time; apart from being forfeited (People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 960, fn. 7 ), it lacks merit where, as here, the alleged negligence is RSBM’s failure to uncover the sole actor’s perpetual misrepresentations and the sole actor controlled the majority (at times, vast majority) of valueless and powerless stock throughout the time of those perpetual misrepresentations.

2025(Riddle v. Leuschner (1959) 51 Cal.2d 574, 580-581 [noting that “various employees” owned a miniscule portion of 13 stock (eight shares total)]; accord, USACM Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 645, 648 [concluding agents dominated corporation, even while owning only 83 percent of the stock].) Thus, we reject Content Checked’s argument that the case law already requires a rigid requirement of 100 percent ownership by the agent, and we decline to create such a requirement in a situation—like the one here—where the other shareholders own valueless stock and have no i

2025(Riddle v. Leuschner (1959) 51 Cal.2d 574, 580-581 [noting that “various employees” owned a miniscule portion of 13 stock (eight shares total)]; accord, USACM Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 645, 648 [concluding agents dominated corporation, even while owning only 83 percent of the stock].) Thus, we reject Content Checked’s argument that the case law already requires a rigid requirement of 100 percent ownership by the agent, and we decline to create such a requirement in a situation—like the one here—where the other shareholders own valueless stock and have no i

2003(See City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 , and cases there cited.) It is firmly established “that neither due process nor equal protection imposes a rigid rule of equality in tax legislation.” (City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, 301 U.S. 495, 509 [ 57 S.Ct. 868, 872 ]; Cohan v. Alvord, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 ; Henry’s Restaurants of Pomona, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1016 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 867 ].) Inequalities, which arise from the singling out of o

2003(See City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343 , and cases there cited.) It is firmly established “that neither due process nor equal protection imposes a rigid rule of equality in tax legislation.” (City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, 301 U.S. 495, 509 [ 57 S.Ct. 868, 872 ]; Cohan v. Alvord, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 ; Henry’s Restaurants of Pomona, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1016 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 867 ].) Inequalities, which arise from the singling out of o

2017Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court's mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only 'that portion of a determination, finding, or decision' violating CEQA." (Accord, Golden Gate, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 .) Allowing for the partial decertification of an EIR effectuates the statute's purpose. " Section 21168.9 was enacted in 1984 to give the trial courts some flexibility in tailoring a remedy to fit a specific CEQA violati

2017Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court's mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only 'that portion of a determination, finding, or decision' violating CEQA." (Accord, Golden Gate, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 .) Allowing for the partial decertification of an EIR effectuates the statute's purpose. " Section 21168.9 was enacted in 1984 to give the trial courts some flexibility in tailoring a remedy to fit a specific CEQA violati

2022Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court’s mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only ‘that portion of a determination, finding, or decision’ violating CEQA.” (Id. at p. 288, italics omitted; see Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. East Bay Regional Park Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 353, 373-376 ; see also Central Delta Water Agency v. Department of Water Resources (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 170 , 205 (Central Delta Water Agency) [stating that “[t]he plain langu

2017Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court's mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only 'that portion of a determination, finding, or decision' violating CEQA." (Accord, Golden Gate, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 .) Allowing for the partial decertification of an EIR effectuates the statute's purpose. " Section 21168.9 was enacted in 1984 to give the trial courts some flexibility in tailoring a remedy to fit a specific CEQA violati

2015(See Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18 , 28–29 [“‘Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court’s function to see that justice is done’” and there is a “‘strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits’”].) Equity also permits comparison of the parties’ conduct.

1998In Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 28 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ], the Supreme Court quoted with approval-a view that would not look altogether favorably on consigning legal results to the impersonal clockwork machinery of an algebraic formula: “ ‘Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court’s function to see that justice is done.’ ” (Quoting Kapitanski v. Von’s Grocery Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 29, 32-33 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 839 ].) When things are done blindly by computers, there is the potential for injustice in individual cases when there is a flaw in the compute

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

1981Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. 310, 319 . .., pointed out that it is not a question whether the defendant’s activity within the state ‘is a little more or a little less.’ The court there rejected a rigid test in favor of a flexible approach grounded in the quality and nature of the activity of the defendant in the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over him, fairness to the parties, and the orderly administration of the law.

1981Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. 310, 319 . .., pointed out that it is not a question whether the defendant’s activity within the state ‘is a little more or a little less.’ The court there rejected a rigid test in favor of a flexible approach grounded in the quality and nature of the activity of the defendant in the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over him, fairness to the parties, and the orderly administration of the law.

2025Evidence of the defendant’s net worth is the most commonly used, but that metric is too susceptible to manipulation to be the sole standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay. [Citations.] Yet the ‘net’ concept of the net worth metric remains critical. ‘In most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not sufficient “without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Evidence of a defendant’s income, standing alone, is not ‘ “meaningful evidence.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and evide

2025Evidence of the defendant’s net worth is the most commonly used, but that metric is too susceptible to manipulation to be the sole standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay. [Citations.] Yet the ‘net’ concept of the net worth metric remains critical. ‘In most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not sufficient “without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Evidence of a defendant’s income, standing alone, is not ‘ “meaningful evidence.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and evide

2017Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court's mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only 'that portion of a determination, finding, or decision' violating CEQA." (Accord, Golden Gate, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 .) Allowing for the partial decertification of an EIR effectuates the statute's purpose. " Section 21168.9 was enacted in 1984 to give the trial courts some flexibility in tailoring a remedy to fit a specific CEQA violati

2017Such a rigid requirement also conflicts with the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court's mandates to only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes specified findings, to only 'that portion of a determination, finding, or decision' violating CEQA." (Accord, Golden Gate, supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 .) Allowing for the partial decertification of an EIR effectuates the statute's purpose. " Section 21168.9 was enacted in 1984 to give the trial courts some flexibility in tailoring a remedy to fit a specific CEQA violati

2015As the court noted, “claims of anticompetitive collusion resulting in higher market prices are particularly suited for class treatment.” (Cipro, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 .) “[I]t has long been recognized [in the antitrust context] that, although the fact of injury must be established with reasonable certainty, a less rigid standard of proof is imposed with respect to the amount of damage caused by an antitrust violation, because economic harm in such actions is difficult to quantify.” (Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1431 (Evans).) In such cases, “rather than

2009First, Cipro Cases was decided in the context of antitrust litigation, where it has long been recognized that, although the fact of injury must be established with reasonable certainty, a less rigid standard of proof is imposed with respect to the amount of damage caused by an antitrust violation, because economic harm in such actions is difficult to quantify. 8 (See, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. (5th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 575, 580 ; Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures (1946) 327 U.S. 251, 264 [ 90 L.Ed. 652 , 66 S.Ct. 574 ] [“[T]he [fact finder] may make a just and reasonable estimat

2010If it were otherwise, a juvenile’s request for almost anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid rule of Miranda.” (Fare, at p. 723.) Defendant in the case before us argues that Burton, supra, 6 Cal. 3d 375 , survives the high court’s decision in Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707 , because Fare addresses probation officers rather than parents and does not expressly overrule Burton.

1980If it were otherwise, a juvenile’s request for almost anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid rule of Miranda.” (Fare, 442 U.S. at p. 723 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 211 ].) The court concluded: “We hold, therefore, that it was error to find that the request by respondent to speak with his probation officer per se constituted an invocation of respondent’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.