Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. GBgreen2 sentences1993State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 455 (Alaska App.1989). 1990In State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 455-56 (Alaska App.1989) (citations omitted), we stated: Coleman addresses the problem of differentiating serious from nonserious harm by espousing a flexible approach based on practical necessity rather than a rigid standard of categorical exclusion. | 2 | 3 |
Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.green2 sentences2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t 2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Centergreen2 sentences2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t 2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t | 1 | 1 |
Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Crouse Ex Rel. Crousegreen2 sentences2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t 2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t | 1 | 1 |
State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaskagreen1 sentence2004In a later case involving the right to privacy, however, we emphasized that Javed’s " 'no set of circumstances’ language is not a rigid requirement.” State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 35 (Alaska 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Dillon v. Legggreen1 sentence1987Id. at 1043. | 1 | 1 |
Wester v. Stategreen1 sentence1978In finding that evidence sufficient to validate the test results, we said: “While we do not wish to undermine the status of the observation period as a necessary foundational fact in the introduction of breathalyzer results, we do conclude that a rigid standard of proof of this foundational fact is unnecessary.” (footnote omitted) Wester v. State, supra, at 1184. | 1 | 1 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences1974See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding parole revocation proceedings to be subsequent to “criminal prosecution” for purposes of constitutional interpretation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (declining, on the authority of Morrissey, to impose a rigid requirement of representation by counsel in probation revocation hearings). 1974See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding parole revocation proceedings to be subsequent to “criminal prosecution” for purposes of constitutional interpretation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (declining, on the authority of Morrissey, to impose a rigid requirement of representation by counsel in probation revocation hearings). | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences1974See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding parole revocation proceedings to be subsequent to “criminal prosecution” for purposes of constitutional interpretation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (declining, on the authority of Morrissey, to impose a rigid requirement of representation by counsel in probation revocation hearings). 1974See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding parole revocation proceedings to be subsequent to “criminal prosecution” for purposes of constitutional interpretation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (declining, on the authority of Morrissey, to impose a rigid requirement of representation by counsel in probation revocation hearings). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. Stuckey's, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Id. 24 . 2014Id. 24 In his reply brief, Mullings for the first time argues the applicability of the administrative employee exemption found in AS 23.10.055(a)(9)(A) and 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1) (2012). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Fruit v. Schreiner
green
1 sentence2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ortiz v. Clinton
green
2 sentences2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t 2018Crouse , 53 P.3d 1093 , 1099 (Alaska 2002) ("A wrongful act committed by an employee while acting in his employer's business does not take the employee out of the scope of employment, even if the employer has expressly forbidden the act." (quoting Ortiz v. Clinton , 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 , 723 (Ariz. App.1996) ) ). 68 Williams , 650 P.2d at 350 . 69 Id. 70 Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. , 791 P.2d 344 , 348 (Alaska 1990). 71 Laidlaw Transit, Inc. , 53 P.3d at 1096 , 1099 . 72 Id. at 1098-99 ("This court does not follow a rigid rule for determining when tortious conduct occurs within t | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
2 sentences2004Yet even under a relaxed standard of facial review it would be improper to declare Anchorage’s ordinance invalid on its face if it has a "plainly legitimate sweep." See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 85 & n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 2004Yet even under a relaxed standard of facial review it would be improper to declare Anchorage’s ordinance invalid on its face if it has a "plainly legitimate sweep." See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 85 & n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cooksey v. State
green
1 sentence1994Id. at 1255-56 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Brown v. Owen Litho Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1984We agree with the Brown court’s conclusion that “it is neither possible nor desirable to announce a rigid rule of law identifying specific facts that constitute ‘full disclosure.’ Disclosure is a question of fact to be treated as such by the reviewing court.” 384 N.E.2d at 1136 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gates v. Rivers Construction Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence1982Instead, we held that “when a statute imposes sanctions but does not specifically declare a contract to be invalid, it is necessary to ascertain whether the legislature intended to make unenforceable contracts entered into in violation of the statute.” Id. at 1021 . 5 *1005 In the present case the statute which attaches a penalty to the transfer of unplat-ted land, AS 29.33.190(a), is malum prohibi-tum and does not expressly provide that transfers of unplatted land are unenforceable. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.