rigid rule in Ohio

2005Bd. Of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 495 , 700 N.E.2d 1234 , “[t]his court should adopt a less rigid standard regarding the application of laches in election cases where the relator is seeking to have an issue removed from the ballot.” Manley Burke, L.P.A., Timothy M.

2005Bd. Of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 495 , 700 N.E.2d 1234 , “[t]his court should adopt a less rigid standard regarding the application of laches in election cases where the relator is seeking to have an issue removed from the ballot.” Manley Burke, L.P.A., Timothy M.

2022In State v. Chappell, 97 Ohio App.3d 515 , 646 N.E.2d 1191 (8th Dist.1994), this court held: We would not adopt a rigid rule as to what constitutes “diagnosis and treatment” or limit diagnosis and treatment to licensed physicians, as such a narrow holding would undercut the function of nurses, psychiatrists, therapists, and various individuals who treat victims of sexual abuse.

2022In State v. Chappell, 97 Ohio App.3d 515 , 646 N.E.2d 1191 (8th Dist.1994), this court held: We would not adopt a rigid rule as to what constitutes “diagnosis and treatment” or limit diagnosis and treatment to licensed physicians, as such a narrow holding would undercut the function of nurses, psychiatrists, therapists, and various individuals who treat victims of sexual abuse.

2021Id.

2014Id.

2010Gupta predated Eberhart, 546 U.S. 12 , 126 S.Ct. 403 , 163 L.Ed.2d 14 , which undercuts Gupta’s characterization of Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)’s time limitation as jurisdictional. {¶ 30} The state has not pointed to an independent reason under Ohio law to believe that Crim.R. 29(C)’s time limitations impose a jurisdictional bar as distinct from a rigid claim-processing rule.

2010Gupta predated Eberhart, 546 U.S. 12 , 126 S.Ct. 403 , 163 L.Ed.2d 14 , which undercuts Gupta’s characterization of Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)’s time limitation as jurisdictional. {¶ 30} The state has not pointed to an independent reason under Ohio law to believe that Crim.R. 29(C)’s time limitations impose a jurisdictional bar as distinct from a rigid claim-processing rule.

2005Tube Co. v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 98 , 107, 50 O.O. 74 , 111 N.E.2d 11 , “The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within constitutional prohibitions.” Citing Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. of Mississippi (1932), 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 . {¶ 15} The proceeds from Ordinance 85

2005Tube Co. v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 98 , 107, 50 O.O. 74 , 111 N.E.2d 11 , “The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discriminations not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within constitutional prohibitions.” Citing Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. of Mississippi (1932), 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 52 S.Ct. 556 , 76 L.Ed. 1102 . {¶ 15} The proceeds from Ordinance 85

1999Therefore, the plurality observed, “[t]o whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.” Id.

1999Therefore, the plurality observed, “[t]o whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal fights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.” Id.

1905Rep., 816), and distinguishes Keener v. Grand Lodge, 38 Mo. App., 543 .

1905Rep. 816], and distinguishes Keener v. Grand Lodge, 38 Mo. App. 543 .

1905But this rigid rule has not been applied in insurance policies of the mutual benefit associations, now so common, where the partit ? have acted in good faith. ’ “The court follows the decision rendered in Story v. Benefit Assn., supra; also Supreme Lodge v. Hutchinson, 6 Ind. App., 399 (33 N. E.

1905But this rigid rule has not been applied in insurance policies of the mutual benefit associations, now so common, where the parties have acted in good faith.’ “The court follows the decision rendered in Story v. Benefit Assn. supra, also Supreme Lodge v. Hutchinson, 6 Ind. App. 399 [33 N. E.

2024By denying the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the trial court “effectively cut off the only avenue by which she could challenge the information on which the court would determine the amount of restitution.” Id. 12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS {¶35} The Quijada court acknowledged the burden on a complaining witness that a rigid rule requiring cross-examination would create.

2024Id. at 366 .

2014Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d at 387 , 415 N.E.2d 303 .

2014Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d at 387 , 415 N.E.2d 303 .

2010Id. {¶ 32} Cabrales modified the Rance analysis; however, the Cabrales standard failed to prevent the absurd results that obtained from comparing crimes in the abstract. {¶ 33} In State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149 , we announced what Chief Justice Moyer later described as a preemptive exception to the Rance/Cabrales analysis to prevent just such an 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO absurd result.

2010Id. {¶ 32} Cabrales modified the Rance analysis; however, the Cabrales standard failed to prevent the absurd results that obtained from comparing crimes in the abstract. {¶ 33} In State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149 , we announced what Chief Justice Moyer later described as a preemptive exception to the Rance/Cabrales analysis to prevent just such an 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO absurd result.

2010No. 07-MA- 14, 2007-Ohio-2866, at ¶22 . {¶20} Based on this precedent, Stanley’s bare assertion that his motion has been pending in excess of 120 days fails to establish a clear legal right to a ruling on the motion at this time.

2008Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274 , 617 N.E.2d 1075 , to narrowly define the types of injustices that could satisfy the element of “fraud or an illegal act” required for piercing the corporate veil, because the vast majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have effectively applied a less rigid standard to that part of the Belvedere test, because the majority’s modification of the Belvedere test adds words to the test but no clarification, and because the violation of an insurer’s duty of good faith satisfies even the majority’s distortion of the Belvedere test to “fraud, an illegal act,

2008Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274 , 617 N.E.2d 1075 , to narrowly define the types of injustices that could satisfy the element of “fraud or an illegal act” required for piercing the corporate veil, because the vast majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have effectively applied a less rigid standard to that part of the Belvedere test, because the majority’s modification of the Belvedere test adds words to the test but no clarification, and because the violation of an insurer’s duty of good faith satisfies even the majority’s distortion of the Belvedere test to “fraud, an illegal act,

2008Id. {¶ 46} This is not to suggest that a written waiver alone can never satisfy the requirement in the face of a silent record that a valid waiver occurred.

2007However, the Court did not intend in listing these factors to design a rigid inquiry; in fact, the Court specifically stated, "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." The court also noted that the inquiry is to be "flexible." Id. at 594 .

2007In contrast, OJI 411.33(2), offers a less rigid standard for proving self-defense when non-deadly force is involved in that a defendant need only demonstrate that he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm and that his only means of protecting himself was by use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm." State v. Durham , 8th Dist No. 87391, 2006-Ohio-5015 , at ¶ 54 . {¶ 7} In cases where a defendant has defended himself with his hands, courts have found that a non-deadly force instruction was appropriate.

2007See Dokes , *Page 5 supra; Durham , supra. In contrast, when a defendant has used a weapon to inflict serious harm on the victim, courts have found no error in denying an instruction on non-deadly force.

2006Id. {¶ 50} Beyond this, Ohio statutorily prescribes a more rigid standard to prevail in a wrongful death claim against a landlord.

2006In material part, R.C. 2151.01 provides: {¶ 51} "* * * No action for the wrongful death of a person may be maintained against the owner or lessee of the real property upon which the death occurred if the cause of the death was the violent unprovoked act of a party other than the owner, lessee, or a person under the control of the owner or lessee, unless the acts or omissions of the owner, lessee, or person under the control of the owner or lessee constitute gross negligence." {¶ 52} "Gross negligence" has been defined as "the want or absence of slight care and diligence," Monnin v. Fifth Third

2003However, the Court did not intend in listing these factors to design a rigid inquiry; in fact, the Court specifically stated, "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." The Court also noted that the inquiry is to be "flexible." Id. at 594 .

2002"A defendant * * * under Crim.R. 14 has the burden of affirmatively showing that his rights were prejudiced; he must furnish the trial court with sufficient information so that it can weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's right to a fair trial, and he must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in refusing to separate the charges for trial." State v. Torres, supra, at syllabus. [Id. at 163.] In following and applying Lott, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly upheld joinder of cases for trial, reiterating the rigid standard a defendant must satisfy in

1999As the court stated in Wilson , the "flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interest." Wilson , 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 .

1999Countervailing law enforcement interests (exigent circumstances) may include an officer's fear for his physical safety or an officer's reasonable belief that "evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." Id. , 514 U.S. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. at 1919 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 .

1995As was stated in paragraph six of the syllabus in National Tube Co. v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 98 , at page 100 [ 50 O.O. 74 , at 74-75, 111 N.E.2d 11 , at 12-13]: “ ‘The equal-protection provisions of the Constitutions do not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or capricious do not fall within constitutional prohibitions.’” (Emphasis added.) Towne, supra, 50 Ohio

1995As was stated in paragraph six of the syllabus in National Tube Co. v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 98 , at page 100 [ 50 O.O. 74 , at 74-75, 111 N.E.2d 11 , at 12-13]: “ ‘The equal-protection provisions of the Constitutions do not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or capricious do not fall within constitutional prohibitions.’” (Emphasis added.) Towne, supra, 50 Ohio

1991However, reflection upon the historic number of cases for appellate review concerning library board allocations would seem to suggest that it would not be unlawful for the Board of Tax Appeals to establish reasonably understandable criteria for the determination of need.” Id. at 395, 28 OBR at 452, 504 N.E.2d at 425 .

1990However, the absolute application of the doctrine of res judicata with respect to a post-conviction relief proceeding on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel has been modified. 1 In Cole, supra, an exception to the rigid rule of res judicata was found by the court as follows: "Where the defendant represented by new counsel upon direct appeal fails to raise therein the issue of competent trial counsel and said issue could fairly have been determined without resort to evidence dehors the record, res judicata is a proper basis for dismissing defendant's petition for post-conviction reli