void-for-vagueness doctrine in Maryland

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2009As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citations omitted). *483 The Galloway Court further observed that “it will usually be immaterial that the statute is of questionable applicability in foreseeable marginal situations, if a contested provision clearly applies to the conduct of the defendant in a specific case.” 365 Md. at 616 , 781 A.2d 851 (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d 341 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 , 67 S.Ct. 1538 ,

2009As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citations omitted). *483 The Galloway Court further observed that “it will usually be immaterial that the statute is of questionable applicability in foreseeable marginal situations, if a contested provision clearly applies to the conduct of the defendant in a specific case.” 365 Md. at 616 , 781 A.2d 851 (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d 341 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 , 67 S.Ct. 1538 ,

2009On account of this “chilling effect” which vagueness can exert on First Amendment liberties, the Supreme Court has stated that whenever a criminal statute may, because of imprecise draftsmanship, impact upon free speech rights, the void-for-vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573, 94 S.Ct. 1242 ; accord, Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620, 96 S.Ct. 1755 ; cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (ordinance held unconstitutionally vague because it *484 conditi

2009On account of this “chilling effect” which vagueness can exert on First Amendment liberties, the Supreme Court has stated that whenever a criminal statute may, because of imprecise draftsmanship, impact upon free speech rights, the void-for-vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573, 94 S.Ct. 1242 ; accord, Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620, 96 S.Ct. 1755 ; cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (ordinance held unconstitutionally vague because it *484 conditi

2014XIV § 1. “[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two ... due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., -U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 , 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Galloway, 365 Md. at 615-16 , 781 A.2d at 860 ("[W]hen considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two criteria or rationales.

2014XIV § 1. “[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two ... due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., -U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 , 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Galloway, 365 Md. at 615-16 , 781 A.2d at 860 ("[W]hen considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two criteria or rationales.

2013We have previously noted that the void for vagueness doctrine is “not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)).

2013We have previously noted that the void for vagueness doctrine is “not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)).

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2009We summarized the principles governing review of a challenge to the vagueness of a statute as follows in Jeandell v. State, 165 Md.App. 26, 33-34 , 884 A.2d 739 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 556 , 910 A.2d 1141 (2006): In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co.,

2007See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 627, 634 , 781 A.2d 851, 867, 871 (2001) (redeeming a harassment law from a void-for-vagueness challenge by reading in a "reasonable person standard"); Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 90-92 , 767 A.2d 816, 823-24 (2001) (reading a drug nuisance abatement statute providing for "equitable relief" to exclude the razing of a building without just compensation to the owner to avoid possible constitutional infirmity of the statute); Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 725-35 , 580 A.2d 176, 181-86 (1990) (interpreting the law criminalizing fellatio as inapplicable

2007See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 627, 634 , 781 A.2d 851, 867, 871 (2001) (redeeming a harassment law from a void-for-vagueness challenge by reading in a "reasonable person standard"); Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 90-92 , 767 A.2d 816, 823-24 (2001) (reading a drug nuisance abatement statute providing for "equitable relief" to exclude the razing of a building without just compensation to the owner to avoid possible constitutional infirmity of the statute); Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 725-35 , 580 A.2d 176, 181-86 (1990) (interpreting the law criminalizing fellatio as inapplicable

2006See, e.g., Finucan, 380 Md. at 591 , 846 A.2d 377 (2004) (applying the void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on physician); Blaker v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 123 Md.App. 243 , 257 n. 3, 717 A.2d 964 (1998) (applying void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on licensed chiropractor); Tidewater/Havre De Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (applying void for vagueness analysis to local tax ordinance).

2006See, e.g., Finucan, 380 Md. at 591 , 846 A.2d 377 (2004) (applying the void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on physician); Blaker v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 123 Md.App. 243 , 257 n. 3, 717 A.2d 964 (1998) (applying void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on licensed chiropractor); Tidewater/Havre De Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (applying void for vagueness analysis to local tax ordinance).

2006See, e.g., Finucan, 380 Md. at 591 , 846 A.2d 377 (2004) (applying the void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on physician); Blaker v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 123 Md.App. 243 , 257 n. 3, 717 A.2d 964 (1998) (applying void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on licensed chiropractor); Tidewater/Havre De Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (applying void for vagueness analysis to local tax ordinance).

2006See, e.g., Finucan, 380 Md. at 591 , 846 A.2d 377 (2004) (applying the void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on physician); Blaker v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 123 Md.App. 243 , 257 n. 3, 717 A.2d 964 (1998) (applying void for vagueness analysis to regulations imposing sanctions on licensed chiropractor); Tidewater/Havre De Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (applying void for vagueness analysis to local tax ordinance).

2005“As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the ‘facts at hand.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he vagueness doctrine is designed to balance the need for criminal statutes ‘ “general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” ’ ” McKenzie v. State, 131 Md.App. 124, 137 , 748 A.2d 67 (2000) (citations omitted).

2005“The void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to the analysis of penal statutes requires that the statute be ‘sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 , 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990 , 122 S.Ct. 1547 , 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002).

2005“The void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to the analysis of penal statutes requires that the statute be ‘sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 , 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990 , 122 S.Ct. 1547 , 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002).

2005“As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the ‘facts at hand.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he vagueness doctrine is designed to balance the need for criminal statutes ‘ “general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” ’ ” McKenzie v. State, 131 Md.App. 124, 137 , 748 A.2d 67 (2000) (citations omitted).

2001As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)).

2001As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)).

2001As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)).

2001As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)).