void-for-vagueness doctrine in Pennsylvania

2021Generally speaking, in criminal matters, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

2017The Supreme Court of the United States further has recognized that, although the void-for-vagueness principle focuses upon both fair notice and the poten tial for arbitrary enforcement, “the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ ” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2021Under the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be found unconstitutional if it is “so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. 2000) (quotations omitted).

2021Under the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be found unconstitutional if it is “so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. 2000) (quotations omitted).

2018“Therefore, we will address the alleged vagueness of [the statutory provision] as it applies to this case.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 2003)).6 Further, as our Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nder the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be found unconstitutional if the statute is ‘so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 207 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. 2000) (quotations omitted)); see also Mayfi

2018“Therefore, we will address the alleged vagueness of [the statutory provision] as it applies to this case.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 2003)).6 Further, as our Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nder the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be found unconstitutional if the statute is ‘so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 207 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. 2000) (quotations omitted)); see also Mayfi

2024See Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996) (“The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).

2024Commonwealth v. McCoy, 895 A.2d 18, 30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth. v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996)) (emphasis added).3 The void for vagueness doctrine does not apply to SCF because SCF is not a penal statute, but rather a protocol of disciplinary procedures to guide the Department’s handling of an inmate’s violation of prison rules.

2023Along these same lines, we add that our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 213 (Pa. 2007), examined a void-for-vagueness challenge to Section 6312 and its prohibition of “nudity” in the context of possessing the materials.

2021Under the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute is unconstitutional if it is “so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198 , -3- J-S46013-20 207 (Pa. 2007).

2017“The void for vagueness doctrine, as extensively developed by the United States Supreme Court, is a due process doctrine incorporating notions of fair notice and warning.” Commonwealth v. Potts, 460 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. Super. 1983).

2004We cannot agree. ¶ 6 “The void for vagueness doctrine, as extensively developed by the United States Supreme Court, is a due process doctrine incorporating notions of fair notice and warning.” Commonwealth v. Potts, 314 Pa.Super. 256 , 460 A.2d 1127, 1133 (1983).

2026The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Duda, 923 A.2d 1138, 1147 (Pa. 2007).

2017The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Duda, 923 A.2d 1138, 1147 (Pa. 2007).

2026This is to say that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded on federal due process norms,” Commonwealth v. Herman, 161 A.3d 194, 214 (Pa. 2017), and “[t]he doctrine is based on the idea of fairness [and i]ts purpose is only to give ‘fair warning’ of prohibited conduct,” San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).8 In Borough of Palmyra v. Brandt (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 866 C.D. 2016, filed August 25, 2017), this Court set forth the void-for-vagueness doctrine as it has been applied in Pennsylvania: “Due p

2021The void for vagueness doctrine “prevents the government from imposing sanctions under a criminal law that fails to give fair notice of the proscribed conduct.” Commonwealth v. Herman, 161 A.3d 194, 204 (Pa. 2017) (citing Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).

2019“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does - 17 - J-S12006-19 not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does - 17 - J-S12006-19 not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023Many laws that are “arbitrary” or “irrational” may be seen in some sense as failures of procedure, perhaps because they offer no process to prevent unjustified deprivations or no process to weigh the reasons for the government’s actions.50 And, as noted above, the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s concern for “fair notice” 47 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 48 West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 392 . 49 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928 (1973). 50 Indeed, the Court has described “arbitrariness” in such terms.

2023Many laws that are “arbitrary” or “irrational” may be seen in some sense as failures of procedure, perhaps because they offer no process to prevent unjustified deprivations or no process to weigh the reasons for the government’s actions.50 And, as noted above, the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s concern for “fair notice” 47 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 48 West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 392 . 49 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928 (1973). 50 Indeed, the Court has described “arbitrariness” in such terms.

2007As generally stated, the void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 251 , 470 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1983)], quoting, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

2007As generally stated, the void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 251 , 470 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1983)], quoting, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

2017Unlike Perreault, which dealt with a restriction on access to ____________________________________________ 5 In the context of penal statutes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute “creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties[.]” Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (Pa. 1976)). - 12 - J-S51010-17 material that was otherwise legal, the underlying conduct herein is not constitutionally protect

1987Statutes are not “to be tested against paradigms of draftmanship____ Rather, the requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in question contains reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct.” Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, supra 467 Pa. at 6 , 354 A.2d at 246 ; Commonwealth v. Mikulan, supra. In Rose v. Locke, supra, Tennessee’s statute prohibiting the commission of “crimes against nature” 5 withstood a void-for-vagueness challenge that the phrase “crimes against nature” did not encompass cunnilingus because respondent (defendant) could not be held “criminally responsible fo

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990 , 998 (Pa. 2021) (concluding a void for vagueness challenge to Section 1102(b) is cognizable under the PCRA – overruling Commonwealth v. Rouse, 191 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2018)).

2021In affirming the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition, we noted that this Court had rejected the same void-for-vagueness challenge to section 1102 in Commonwealth v. Rouse, 191 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2023In the Court’s words, punitive damages must bear a “reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages.136 But Gore also added an entirely new flavor of due process to the mix: “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”137 Here the Court introduced another procedural concept—“fair notice.” Further, although not stated explicitly, this new addition to the punitive damages lexicon was a near word-

2023In the Court’s words, punitive damages must bear a “reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages.136 But Gore also added an entirely new flavor of due process to the mix: “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”137 Here the Court introduced another procedural concept—“fair notice.” Further, although not stated explicitly, this new addition to the punitive damages lexicon was a near word-

2017The Supreme Court of the United States further has recognized that, although the void-for-vagueness principle focuses upon both fair notice and the poten tial for arbitrary enforcement, “the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ ” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2017The Supreme Court of the United States further has recognized that, although the void-for-vagueness principle focuses upon both fair notice and the poten tial for arbitrary enforcement, “the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ ” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2020“The void for vagueness doctrine incorporates the due process notions of fair notice or warning.” Id. at 85 Here, section 3 of the TTD Amendment provides as follows: SECTION 3.

2017“The void for vagueness doctrine incorporates the due process notions of fair notice or warning.” Id. at 85; see Williams (stating the vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).

2022Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-170 (1972).

2012Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Commonwealth v. Asamoah, 809 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa.Super. 2002).

2021This void-for-vagueness doctrine . . . implicates due process notions that a statute must provide reasonable standards by which a person may gauge his future conduct, i.e., notice and warning.” Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 628 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).

2019The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as it is known, provides that “[a] statute may be deemed to be unconstitutionally vague if it fails in its definiteness or adequacy of statutory expression.” Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 628 .

2017As far back as 1979, the Supreme Court stated it “ha[d] long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.” Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 , 99 S.Ct. at 685 .

2017As far back as 1979, the Supreme Court stated it “ha[d] long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.” Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 , 99 S.Ct. at 685 .

2026In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford T[wp.] v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2017In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford Township v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2026In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford T[wp.] v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2017In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford Township v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2023In the Court’s words, punitive damages must bear a “reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages.136 But Gore also added an entirely new flavor of due process to the mix: “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”137 Here the Court introduced another procedural concept—“fair notice.” Further, although not stated explicitly, this new addition to the punitive damages lexicon was a near word-

2023In the Court’s words, punitive damages must bear a “reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages.136 But Gore also added an entirely new flavor of due process to the mix: “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”137 Here the Court introduced another procedural concept—“fair notice.” Further, although not stated explicitly, this new addition to the punitive damages lexicon was a near word-

2023See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (the history of due process “reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.

2023See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (the history of due process “reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.

2026This is to say that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded on federal due process norms,” Commonwealth v. Herman, 161 A.3d 194, 214 (Pa. 2017), and “[t]he doctrine is based on the idea of fairness [and i]ts purpose is only to give ‘fair warning’ of prohibited conduct,” San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).8 In Borough of Palmyra v. Brandt (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 866 C.D. 2016, filed August 25, 2017), this Court set forth the void-for-vagueness doctrine as it has been applied in Pennsylvania: “Due p

2013Indeed, due process and the void for vagueness doctrine are not intended to elevate the “practical difficulties” of drafting legislation into a “constitutional dilemma.” Id. (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)).

2012In the context of eases in which the United States Supreme Court has considered challenges to statutory measures allegedly implicating First Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court has held: The void for vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 391 [ 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 ] (1926).

2012In the context of eases in which the United States Supreme Court has considered challenges to statutory measures allegedly implicating First Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court has held: The void for vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 391 [ 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 ] (1926).

2026This is to say that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded on federal due process norms,” Commonwealth v. Herman, 161 A.3d 194, 214 (Pa. 2017), and “[t]he doctrine is based on the idea of fairness [and i]ts purpose is only to give ‘fair warning’ of prohibited conduct,” San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).8 In Borough of Palmyra v. Brandt (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 866 C.D. 2016, filed August 25, 2017), this Court set forth the void-for-vagueness doctrine as it has been applied in Pennsylvania: “Due p

2013In addressing Habay’s claim, we first acknowledged the applicable principle and standards of the void-for-vagueness doctrine as set forth in Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552 (Pa.Super.2006): Due process demands that a statute not be vague.

2024Commonwealth v. McCoy, 895 A.2d 18, 30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth. v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996)) (emphasis added).3 The void for vagueness doctrine does not apply to SCF because SCF is not a penal statute, but rather a protocol of disciplinary procedures to guide the Department’s handling of an inmate’s violation of prison rules.

2006Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 422 ; Band, 681 A.2d at 165 ; Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d at 1343 (Pa.1983) (plurality); McCoy, 895 A.2d at 30 . ¶ 16 At the same time, however, the void for vagueness doctrine does not mean that statutes must detail criminal conduct with utter precision.

2020Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).

2007Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000).