7 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stock v. Stategreen2 sentences1978He also contends that they are unconstitutionally overbroad, that is, that they prohibit speech which is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as speech which may be unprotected. 2 In Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1974) we discussed the void for vagueness doctrine. 1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences1978Cf. Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316 (Alaska 1975). 1978Stock v. State, supra at 8; State v. Martin, supra at 324 (concurring opinion); see, e. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). (footnotes omitted) First amendment rights are not involved in this case, so that aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine will not be considered. | 1 | 2 |
Thornhill v. Alabamagreen2 sentences1978Stock v. State, supra at 8; State v. Martin, supra at 324 (concurring opinion); see, e. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). (footnotes omitted) First amendment rights are not involved in this case, so that aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine will not be considered. 1978Stock v. State, supra at 8; State v. Martin, supra at 324 (concurring opinion); see, e. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). (footnotes omitted) First amendment rights are not involved in this case, so that aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine will not be considered. | 1 | 2 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvillegreen2 sentences1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). 1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 2 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen1 sentence2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 21 19 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35-36 (Alaska 2016) (holding that “commonsense interpretation” of existing regulation does not require new regulation). 20 Because we hold the order was valid, we need not address the State’s argument that McLaughlin was obligated to follow the order regardless | 1 | 1 |
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 21 19 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35-36 (Alaska 2016) (holding that “commonsense interpretation” of existing regulation does not require new regulation). 20 Because we hold the order was valid, we need not address the State’s argument that McLaughlin was obligated to follow the order regardless | 1 | 1 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen1 sentence2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 21 19 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35-36 (Alaska 2016) (holding that “commonsense interpretation” of existing regulation does not require new regulation). 20 Because we hold the order was valid, we need not address the State’s argument that McLaughlin was obligated to follow the order regardless | 1 | 1 |
Treacy v. Municipality of Anchoragegreen1 sentence2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 21 19 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35-36 (Alaska 2016) (holding that “commonsense interpretation” of existing regulation does not require new regulation). 20 Because we hold the order was valid, we need not address the State’s argument that McLaughlin was obligated to follow the order regardless | 1 | 1 |
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birminghamgreen2 sentences1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). 1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marathon Oil Companygreen1 sentence1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Larson v. Cooper
green
1 sentence2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 21 19 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35-36 (Alaska 2016) (holding that “commonsense interpretation” of existing regulation does not require new regulation). 20 Because we hold the order was valid, we need not address the State’s argument that McLaughlin was obligated to follow the order regardless | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Poole v. State
green
1 sentence1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Anderson v. State
green
1 sentence1978Cf. Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316 (Alaska 1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Marks v. City of Anchorage
green
1 sentence1978We discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well as the authorities on which it rests, at some length in our opinion in Marks v. City of Anchorage, supra. See also Papachris-tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179 (1965); State v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1974); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974); Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 , 289 n.15 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences1977The basic outline of the void-for-vagueness doctrine was recently simply stated by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974): The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning. 1977The basic outline of the void-for-vagueness doctrine was recently simply stated by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974): The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Herndon v. Lowry
green
2 sentences1972Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 , 57 S.Ct. 732 , 81 L.Ed. 1066 . 1972Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 , 57 S.Ct. 732 , 81 L.Ed. 1066 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. Harriss
green
2 sentences1972The most comprehensive vagueness case, however, is Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), where Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, struck a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance. [26] The Court explicitly recognized both rationales for the void-for-vagueness doctrine: This ordinance is void-for-vagueness, both in the sense that it `fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , and because it 1972The most comprehensive vagueness case, however, is Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), where Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, struck a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance. [26] The Court explicitly recognized both rationales for the void-for-vagueness doctrine: This ordinance is void-for-vagueness, both in the sense that it `fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , and because it | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1969As pointed out in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966), it must not leave judges and juries free to decide in each case, without legally fixed standards, what conduct shall be deemed prohibited. 1969As pointed out in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966), it must not leave judges and juries free to decide in each case, without legally fixed standards, what conduct shall be deemed prohibited. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.