void-for-vagueness doctrine in South Carolina

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2024Comm'n v. Zeyi Chen, 430 S.C. 509 , 529, 846 S.E.2d 861 , 871 (2020) (explaining "the void- for-vagueness doctrine" provides a statute may not set forth a "rule or standard . . . so vague and indefinite as to really be no rule or standard at all" (citing Boutilier v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 , 87 S. Ct. 1563, 1566 , 18 L.

2024Comm'n v. Zeyi Chen, 430 S.C. 509 , 529, 846 S.E.2d 861 , 871 (2020) (explaining "the void- for-vagueness doctrine" provides a statute may not set forth a "rule or standard . . . so vague and indefinite as to really be no rule or standard at all" (citing Boutilier v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 , 87 S. Ct. 1563, 1566 , 18 L.

2021"The void-for-vagueness doctrine rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication." State v. Neuman, 384 S.C. 395, 402 , 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (quoting State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 113 , 651 S.E.2d 314, 318 (2007)).

2021"The void-for-vagueness doctrine rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication." State v. Neuman, 384 S.C. 395, 402 , 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (quoting State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 113 , 651 S.E.2d 314, 318 (2007)).

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2025See Chimento, 401 S.C. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ("One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory prescription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.").

2025See Chimento, 401 S.C. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ("One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory prescription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.").

2020"As generally stated, the void- for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

2012Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

2021"The void-for-vagueness doctrine rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication." State v. Neuman, 384 S.C. 395, 402 , 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (quoting State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 113 , 651 S.E.2d 314, 318 (2007)).

2021"The void-for-vagueness doctrine rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication." State v. Neuman, 384 S.C. 395, 402 , 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (quoting State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 113 , 651 S.E.2d 314, 318 (2007)).

2020See generally Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (observing an appellate court need not address remaining issues when the determination of another point is dispositive).

2020See generally Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (observing an appellate court need not address remaining issues when the determination of another point is dispositive).

2020Griffin v. Bryant, 30 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1173 (D.N.M. 2014).

2020Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); see also Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992) ("To find a civil statute void for vagueness, the statute must be 'so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.'" (quoting Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123 )).

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21

2007Peterson Outdoor Advert. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230, 236 , 489 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1997).

2007Peterson Outdoor Advert. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230, 236 , 489 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1997).