void-for-vagueness doctrine in Kentucky

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2017The latter "void-as-unintelligible" doctrine is most aptly reflected in our predecessor Court's statement in Folks v. Barren Cty., 232 S.W.2d 1010 , 1013 (Ky. 1950): "But where the law-making body, in framing the law, has .not expressed its intent intelligibly, or in language that the people upon whom it is designed to operate or whom it affects can understand, or 15 from which the courts can deduce the legislative will, the statute will be declared to be inoperative and void." As the Bd. of Trustees Court explains, the constitutional foundation for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the First

2017The latter “void-as-unintelligible” doctrine is most aptly reflected in our predecessor Court’s statement in Folks v. Barren Cty., 313 Ky. 515 , 232 S.W.2d 1010 , 1013 (1950): “But where the law-making body, in framing the law, has not expressed its intent intelligibly, or in language that the people upon whom it is designed to operate or whom it affects can understand, or from which the courts can deduce the legislative will, the statute will be declared to be inoperative and void.” As the Bd. of Trustees Court explains, the constitutional foundation for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the

2017The latter “void-as-unintelligible” doctrine is most aptly reflected in our predecessor Court’s statement in Folks v. Barren Cty., 313 Ky. 515 , 232 S.W.2d 1010 , 1013 (1950): “But where the law-making body, in framing the law, has not expressed its intent intelligibly, or in language that the people upon whom it is designed to operate or whom it affects can understand, or from which the courts can deduce the legislative will, the statute will be declared to be inoperative and void.” As the Bd. of Trustees Court explains, the constitutional foundation for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2006To satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Roc

2004The Court agreed “that § 857(d) establishes objective standards for determining what constitutes drug paraphernalia,” Posters ‘N’ Things, supra at 511 U.S. at 518 , 114 S.Ct. at 1750 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 547 , and thus rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge: Petitioners argue that § 857 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them in this case. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminator

2004The Court agreed “that § 857(d) establishes objective standards for determining what constitutes drug paraphernalia,” Posters ‘N’ Things, supra at 511 U.S. at 518 , 114 S.Ct. at 1750 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 547 , and thus rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge: Petitioners argue that § 857 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them in this case. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminator

2004First, a statute is impermissibly vague if it does not place someone to whom it applies on actual notice as to what conduct is prohibited; and second, a statute is impermissibly vague if it is written in a manner that encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."); Hardin, supra at 660 ; Commonwealth v. Kash, Ky.App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 42 (1997) ("The void-for-vagueness doctrine emanates from the due process provisions of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions.

2003However, the void-for-vagueness doctrine only requires that “a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).

2003However, the void-for-vagueness doctrine only requires that "a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. ( quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).

1987Thus the void-for-vagueness doctrine focuses on fair warning and nondiscriminatory enforcement as rationales for invalidating vague laws. 1 Previously, in 1913, Mr. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 , 33 S.Ct. 780 , 57 L.Ed. 1232 (1913) said, “... the criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.” 229 U.S. at 377 , 33 S.Ct. at 781 .

1987Thus the void-for-vagueness doctrine focuses on fair warning and nondiscriminatory enforcement as rationales for invalidating vague laws. 1 Previously, in 1913, Mr. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 , 33 S.Ct. 780 , 57 L.Ed. 1232 (1913) said, “... the criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.” 229 U.S. at 377 , 33 S.Ct. at 781 .

1987Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 , 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984).

1987Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 , 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984).