void-for-vagueness doctrine in Texas

2018“Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a statute will be invalidated if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited.” Id. at 96 (citing State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim.

2015Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited), in support of his contention.

2024As acknowledged by appellant, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982) (emphasis added).

2024The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand” what conduct is prohibited and “in a manner that does not permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

2010Id.; see also State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex.1970).

2010Id .; see also State v. Scott , 460 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. 1970).

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel’s conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders” in definition of “monetary instruments,” the laundering of which is prohibited). 4 Federal courts have upheld convictions f

2009Similarly, the federal money laundering statute, which clearly criminalizes the laundering of checks, further calls into question the panel's conclusion that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret former section 34.01 to include checks in the definition of "funds." See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including "coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders" in definition of "monetary instruments," the laundering of *34 which is prohibited). [4] Federal courts have upheld convict

2009While the panel notes that the precise issue of whether checks were considered “funds” under the money laundering statute was not before the court in Lee or Davis (just as it is not before this Court in the present case), the fact remains that the existence of two published cases by a Texas appellate court, upholding money laundering convictions based on checks, might cause a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to expect the Texas money laundering statute to criminalize the laundering of checks. 3 To survive a void for vagueness challenge, a statutory provision “need only give fair warn

2009While the panel notes that the precise issue of whether checks were considered "funds" under the money laundering statute was not before the court in Lee or Davis (just as it is not before this Court in the present case), the fact remains that the existence of two published cases by a Texas appellate court, upholding money laundering convictions based on checks, might cause a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to expect the Texas money laundering statute to criminalize the laundering of checks. [3] To survive a void for vagueness challenge, a statutory provision "need only give fair wa

1998See Smith, 415 U.S. at 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 ; see also Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1051 , 111 S.Ct. 2720 (concluding that though a lawyer disciplinary rule was a constitutional restriction on speech, a more stringent void-for-vagueness standard applied because the rule prohibited speech).

1998See Smith, 415 U.S. at 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 ; see also Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1051 , 111 S.Ct. 2720 (concluding that though a lawyer disciplinary rule was a constitutional restriction on speech, a more stringent void-for-vagueness standard applied because the rule prohibited speech).

2010But motive is not an element of murder or capital murder.") [4] A motive could be communicated by words or by circumstances. [5] See Posters `N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) (Explaining in an "as applied" context: "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."), quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855

2010But motive is not an element of murder or capital murder.") [4] A motive could be communicated by words or by circumstances. [5] See Posters `N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) (Explaining in an "as applied" context: "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."), quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855

2010But motive is not an element of murder or capital murder.") [4] A motive could be communicated by words or by circumstances. [5] See Posters `N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) (Explaining in an "as applied" context: "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."), quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855

2010But motive is not an element of murder or capital murder.") [4] A motive could be communicated by words or by circumstances. [5] See Posters `N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) (Explaining in an "as applied" context: "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."), quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855

2009Applicable Law The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a law is void if it fails to define the criminal offense with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Lawrence v. State , 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2009He argues that the restricted addresses in provision 29 are too vague to inform him of the injunction’s boundaries and that provision 2 is vague regarding persons he cannot appear with in public. 11 Applicable Law The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a law is void if it fails to define the criminal offense with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2024“The void-for- vagueness doctrine . . . guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute proscribes.” Id. ([citing] Papachristou v. [City of] Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S. Ct. 839 , [843] (1972)).

2024“The void-for-vagueness doctrine . . . guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute proscribes.” Sessions, 584 U.S. at 155–56.

2024“The void-for- vagueness doctrine . . . guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute proscribes.” Id. ([citing] Papachristou v. [City of] Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S. Ct. 839 , [843] (1972)).

2024“The void-for- vagueness doctrine . . . guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute proscribes.” Id. ([citing] Papachristou v. [City of] Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S. Ct. 839 , [843] (1972)).

2015The void for vagueness doctrine was well described in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), where the Court stated: “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

2010Nor does this persuade us that the statute is vague as applied to Appellant inasmuch as the component offenses he was charged with were all alleged to have occurred within the several years preceding the return of the indictment.2 The primary evil to be guarded against by the void for vagueness principle is laws that “trap the innocent” by not providing fair warning or by allowing “policemen, judges, and juries” a basis to apply the law on an “ad hoc or subjective basis.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 , 33 L.

2020The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to both criminal and civil statutes that proscribe conduct, but “the degree of vagueness that the Constitution [allows] depends in part on the nature of the enactment,” and the Supreme Court has “expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Villiage of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).

1998The Commission relies on Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , to support its argument.

2020See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108 (1972); Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998).

2000See State Bar of Texas v. Tinning, 875 S.W.2d 403,409 (Tex. App.Xorpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Harris County OutdoorAdvertising Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d at 50 ; Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 437 .

2015Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited), in support of his contention.

2015The following pronouncement of the void for vagueness doctrine was made by Justice Sutherland in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

2005Still, "[a] provision need not . . . be cast in terms that are mathematically precise; it need only give fair warning of the conduct prescribed, in light of common understanding and practices." State v. Garcia , 823 S.W.2d 793 , 798 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ ref'd).

2005Still, “[a] provision need not be cast in terms that are mathematically precise; it need only give fair warning of the conduct prescribed, in light of common understanding and practices.” State v. Garcia, 823 S.W.2d 793,798 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ ref d).

2024“Although a statute is not impermissibly vague because it fails to define words or phrases, it is invalid if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited.” Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 499 (first citing Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim.

2022We do note that a sister court has considered (and rejected) a sliding-scale-type argument advanced in connection with a void-for-vagueness challenge, holding that something is indeed a “gambling device” if it incorporates “any element of chance, even if the exercise of skill also influences the outcome.” State v. Gambling Device, 859 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (emphasis added). 9 slot machine[’s] with the only difference being the game is played on a video screen rather than mechanical columns and reels.”).6 C.

2018App. 2006)); see also Wagner, 539 S.W.3d at 313 (“A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”).

2015See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1966).

2000See State Bar of Texas v. Tinning, 875 S.W.2d 403,409 (Tex. App.Xorpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Harris County OutdoorAdvertising Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d at 50 ; Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 437 .