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20 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences1987The vagueness doctrine was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983), as follows: “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Accordingly, the vagueness doctrine has two requirements: (1) that the statute provide adequate warning as to the conduct proscribed, 1987The vagueness doctrine was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983), as follows: “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Accordingly, the vagueness doctrine has two requirements: (1) that the statute provide adequate warning as to the conduct proscribed, | 3 | 3 |
Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 755 (N.D.1989); In Interest of E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462 , 463 (N.D.1980). 2004Western Gas Res., Inc. v. Heitkamp, 489 N.W.2d 869, 873 (N.D.1992); Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 755 . | 2 | 2 |
In Interest of EBgreen2 sentences2004See Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 755 (N.D.1989); In Interest of E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462 , 463 (N.D.1980). 2004See Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 755 (N.D.1989); In Interest of E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462 , 463 (N.D.1980). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima 2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ferrerigreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima 2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima | 1 | 1 |
State v. Olsongreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima 2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima | 1 | 1 |
Town of Baldwin v. Cartergreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima | 1 | 1 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences2007See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, ¶ 24 , 564 N.W.2d 283 . 2007See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, ¶ 24 , 564 N.W.2d 283 . | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. City of Richmondgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima 2007See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Richmond, 39 Va.App. 706 , 576 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence for a violation of an ordinance that prohibited dogs from barking “in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fashion”); Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 794 A.2d 62, 66 (Me.2002) *126 (finding the term “continued or repeated” not impermissibly vague); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C.App. 616 , 495 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1998) (“The terms ... ‘habitually,’ ‘repeatedly,’ ‘excessive,’ ‘annoy,’ ‘disturb,’ ... have common ordinary meanings by which to understand and measure the noise of a particular anima | 1 | 1 |
Western Gas Resources, Inc. v. Heitkampgreen1 sentence2004Western Gas Res., Inc. v. Heitkamp, 489 N.W.2d 869, 873 (N.D.1992); Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 755 . | 1 | 1 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvillegreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). 2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tweedgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). 2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). 2001See, e.g., State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 418 . [¶ 14] The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires “ ‘a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
In Re JZgreen2 sentences1989See In Interest of E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462, 463 (N.D.1980); In Re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35-36 (N.D.1971). 1989See In Interest of E.B., 287 N.W.2d 462, 463 (N.D.1980); In Re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35-36 (N.D.1971). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haggegreen1 sentence1987Kolender v. Lawson, supra; State v. Woodworth, supra; State v. Hagge, 211 N.W.2d 395, 397 (N.D.1973); see also 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 17. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Belfield v. Kilkenny
green
2 sentences2015This Court has summarized the vagueness doctrine: “All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 33 , 771 N.W.2d 267 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ). 2015This Court has summarized the vagueness doctrine: “All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 33 , 771 N.W.2d 267 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ). | 8 | 2009–2015 |
State v. Holbach
green
2 sentences2025State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 24 , 763 N.W.2d 761 . [¶12] To survive a void for vagueness challenge, laws require a degree of specificity: A law is not unconstitutionally vague if: (1) the law creates minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcing the law, and (2) the law provides a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the prohibited conduct. 2025State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 24 , 763 N.W.2d 761 . [¶12] To survive a void for vagueness challenge, laws require a degree of specificity: A law is not unconstitutionally vague if: (1) the law creates minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcing the law, and (2) the law provides a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the prohibited conduct. | 3 | 2015–2025 |
In Re Disciplinary Action Against McGuire
green
2 sentences2015“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague ‘if the challenged language, when measured by common understanding and practice, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration of the law.’ ” State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 24 , 763 N.W.2d 761 (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against McGuire, 2004 ND 171, ¶ 19 , 685 N.W.2d 748 ). 2015“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague ‘if the challenged language, when measured by common understanding and practice, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration of the law.’ ” State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 24 , 763 N.W.2d 761 (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against McGuire, 2004 ND 171, ¶ 19 , 685 N.W.2d 748 ). | 3 | 2008–2015 |
City of Fargo v. Salsman
green
2 sentences2011B [¶ 29] Ben Simons argues the child abuse statutes are unconstitutionally vague. [¶ 30] This Court summarized the vagueness doctrine in Salsman, 2009 ND 15, ¶ 21 , 760 N.W.2d 123 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ): All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct. 2011B [¶ 29] Ben Simons argues the child abuse statutes are unconstitutionally vague. [¶ 30] This Court summarized the vagueness doctrine in Salsman, 2009 ND 15, ¶ 21 , 760 N.W.2d 123 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ): All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct. | 3 | 2010–2011 |
State v. Eldred
green
2 sentences2009This Court will “review the statute to determine if these two dictates are clear under a ‘reasonable person’ standard.” Id. (quoting State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, ¶ 24 , 564 N.W.2d 283 ). [¶ 34] In Kilkenny , we upheld a municipal ordinance employing operative language virtually identical to the language in the Ordinance in this case. 2009This Court will “review the statute to determine if these two dictates are clear under a ‘reasonable person’ standard.” Id. (quoting State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, ¶ 24 , 564 N.W.2d 283 ). [¶ 34] In Kilkenny , we upheld a municipal ordinance employing operative language virtually identical to the language in the Ordinance in this case. | 2 | 2007–2009 |
Olson v. City of West Fargo
green
1 sentence2025For example, in Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d at 822 , bar owners brought a void for vagueness challenge to a “cabaret ordinance” that prohibited certain dancing in establishments where liquor is served. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Moses
green
2 sentences2025A law is not unconstitutionally vague if the challenged language, when measured by common understanding and practice, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration of the law.” State v. Moses, 2022 ND 208, ¶ 17 , 982 N.W.2d 321 (cleaned up). 2025A law is not unconstitutionally vague if the challenged language, when measured by common understanding and practice, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration of the law.” State v. Moses, 2022 ND 208, ¶ 17 , 982 N.W.2d 321 (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2015This Court has summarized the vagueness doctrine: “All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 33 , 771 N.W.2d 267 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ). 2015This Court has summarized the vagueness doctrine: “All laws must meet two requirements to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge: (1) the law must create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, judge, or jury charged with enforcement of the statute; and (2) the law must provide a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 33 , 771 N.W.2d 267 (quoting City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 10 , 729 N.W.2d 120 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Beyer
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 921 (quoting People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 , 215 N.E.2d 345 (1966)). [¶ 16] Other jurisdictions’ dog-barking statutes with exact or similar language either were sufficiently definite to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge or were unchallenged on substantive due process grounds. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Byron
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 921 (quoting People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 , 215 N.E.2d 345 (1966)). [¶ 16] Other jurisdictions’ dog-barking statutes with exact or similar language either were sufficiently definite to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge or were unchallenged on substantive due process grounds. 2007Id. at 921 (quoting People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 , 215 N.E.2d 345 (1966)). [¶ 16] Other jurisdictions’ dog-barking statutes with exact or similar language either were sufficiently definite to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge or were unchallenged on substantive due process grounds. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1989State v. Johnson, supra. In determining whether the meaning of a statute is fairly ascertainable or adequate warning is given, we must view the statute from the standpoint of the reasonable person who might be subject to its terms. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Woodworth
green
1 sentence1987Kolender v. Lawson, supra; State v. Woodworth, supra; State v. Hagge, 211 N.W.2d 395, 397 (N.D.1973); see also 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 17. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.