15 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2005"To withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal ordinance must define the offense `with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Golin, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983)). 2005"To withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal ordinance must define the offense `with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Golin, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983)). | 2 | 5 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences1987See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). 1987See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Ribotsky v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). 1985See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences1987See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). 1985See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Leidingergreen2 sentences1987See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). 1985See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1982), reh. den. 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lashinskygreen2 sentences2020The void-for-vagueness doctrine is "essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play." State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 (1979). 2000The void for vagueness doctrine is "essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play." State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A. 2d 1121 (1979). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Rogersgreen1 sentence2021A civil action under this section shall not preclude the application of any other civil, administrative, or criminal remedy under any other provision of law. [N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22a.] Neither N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22 nor N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22a defines the "unauthorized practice of law." In State v. Rogers, against a void for vagueness challenge, we upheld N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22, but noted that "[w]hat constitutes the practice of law is often required to be decided on a case by case basis because of the broad scope of the fields of law." 308 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State of New Jersey v. Daniel A. Borjasgreen1 sentence2021Super. 356, 369 (App. Div. 2005).] A party asserting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation under the void for vagueness doctrine "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid . . . or that the A-4258-18 16 statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep." State v. Borjas, 436 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
K.G. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD C.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD J.L. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD D.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)green1 sentence2020K.G., 458 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Afanadorgreen2 sentences2020Because, in the criminal context, statutes must be given "sharper scrutiny," State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 170 (1993), a statute is understood to be impermissibly vague if it leaves persons "of common intelligence" to "necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its A-5199-17T1 6 application," ibid. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. 2020Because, in the criminal context, statutes must be given "sharper scrutiny," State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 170 (1993), a statute is understood to be impermissibly vague if it leaves persons "of common intelligence" to "necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its A-5199-17T1 6 application," ibid. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelmangreen1 sentence2019"A law is void if it is so vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" State, Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 181 (1999) (quoting Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schadgreen1 sentence2019"A law is void if it is so vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" State, Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 181 (1999) (quoting Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Laniergreen2 sentences2009United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225 , 137 L.Ed. 2d 432, 442-43 (1997) (stating that fair warning requirement is manifest in the vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the rule that a court may not add a gloss to an unclear statute that was not apparent from the face of the statute or prior judicial decision). 2009United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225 , 137 L.Ed. 2d 432, 442-43 (1997) (stating that fair warning requirement is manifest in the vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the rule that a court may not add a gloss to an unclear statute that was not apparent from the face of the statute or prior judicial decision). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
J.I. v. New Jersey State Parole Board(076442)
green
2 sentences2019In particular, we reach the following major legal conclusions: (1) the Board's imposition of Internet monitoring conditions upon PSL offenders, including the use of monitoring software, mandatory password disclosure, and unannounced device inspections, does not facially violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches or the constitutional rights to privacy; (2) the Board's use of the terms "Internet-capable device," "social networking service," "frequenting establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of alcohol," and "sexually-oriented websites, material, information 2019In particular, we reach the following major legal conclusions: (1) the Board's imposition of Internet monitoring conditions upon PSL offenders, including the use of monitoring software, mandatory password disclosure, and unannounced device inspections, does not facially violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches or the constitutional rights to privacy; (2) the Board's use of the terms "Internet-capable device," "social networking service," "frequenting establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of alcohol," and "sexually-oriented websites, material, information | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Cameron
green
2 sentences2009In considering the void-for-vagueness challenge, the extent of the court's scrutiny and the statutory clarity required "will depend on the purpose of the statute, the context in which the law is challenged, the conduct that is subject to its strictures, the nature of the punishment that is authorized, and, finally, the potential impact of the statute upon activities and interests that are constitutionally protected." State v. Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 594 , 498 A. 2d 1217 . 2009In considering the void-for-vagueness challenge, the extent of the court's scrutiny and the statutory clarity required "will depend on the purpose of the statute, the context in which the law is challenged, the conduct that is subject to its strictures, the nature of the punishment that is authorized, and, finally, the potential impact of the statute upon activities and interests that are constitutionally protected." State v. Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 594 , 498 A. 2d 1217 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Powell
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 5 , 593 A .2d 342 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Golin
green
2 sentences2005"To withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal ordinance must define the offense `with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Golin, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983)). 2005"To withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal ordinance must define the offense `with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Golin, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences1982Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). 1982Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246-47 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Cohen v. California
green
2 sentences1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). 1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). 1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Lewis v. City of New Orleans
green
1 sentence1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Gooding v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). 1972In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 , 92 S.Ct. 2479 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (Decided June 26, 1972) the United States Supreme Court without opinion vacated the judgment of conviction of defendant on the basis of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Dombrowski v. Pfister
green
2 sentences1968Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1116 , 14 L.Ed. 2 d 22 (1965). 1968Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1116 , 14 L.Ed. 2 d 22 (1965). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.