void-for-vagueness doctrine in Idaho

2025“The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring that the meaning of a criminal statute be determinable.” State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 198 , 969 P.2d 244, 247 (1998).

2025“The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring that the meaning of a criminal statute be determinable.” State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 198 , 969 P.2d 244, 247 (1998).

2020The void-for-vagueness doctrine results in the invalidation of statutes that are so vague as to invite incongruous results because it would leave the “public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits” and “judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” Id. at 715, 791 P.2d at 1294 .

2003“However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil or noncriminal statute as opposed to a criminal statute under the void for vagueness doctrine.” Id. at 716 , 791 P.2d at 1295 .

2016He focuses upon the words “personal purpose” and argues that use of the cell phone for a personal purpose could be insignificant, be incidental to a governmental purpose, or not increase or require the expenditure of public funds. 1 He asserts that “[t]he Sheriff would have to constantly vet every purchase to ensure that there was no personal benefit for any purchase and to ensure that any benefit was exclusive to the county and did not have any ancillary benefit to any individual.” He also contends, “ ‘Personal purposes’ is not defined by the statute and no direction is provided as to how to

2016He focuses upon the words “personal purpose” and argues that use of the cell phone for a personal purpose could be insignificant, be incidental to a governmental purpose, or not increase or require the expenditure of public funds. 1 He asserts that “[t]he Sheriff would have to constantly vet every purchase to ensure that there was no personal benefit for any purchase and to ensure that any benefit was exclusive to the county and did not have any ancillary benefit to any individual.” He also contends, “ ‘Personal purposes’ is not defined by the statute and no direction is provided as to how to

2025“Due process requires that all ‘be informed as to what the State commands or forbids’ and that ‘men of common intelligence’ not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).

2025See State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 310 , 444 P.3d 877, 882 (2019); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (noting that the void- for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (warning that a failure to have adequate guidelines for enforcement may lead to “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections”).

2025See State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 310 , 444 P.3d 877, 882 (2019); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (noting that the void- for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (warning that a failure to have adequate guidelines for enforcement may lead to “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections”).

2025See State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 310 , 444 P.3d 877, 882 (2019); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (noting that the void- for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (warning that a failure to have adequate guidelines for enforcement may lead to “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections”).

2024“The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309 , 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019) (quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 , 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013)).

2024“The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309 , 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019) (quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 , 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013)).

1998A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty, see Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), or if the law interferes with a substantial amount of conduct protected by the First Amendment.

1998A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty, see Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), or if the law interferes with a substantial amount of conduct protected by the First Amendment.

1996In Bitt this Court reviewed the prior cases interpreting the void for vagueness doctrine and developed a test for its application. 118 Idaho at 587 , 798 P.2d at 46 .

1996In Bitt this Court reviewed the prior cases interpreting the void for vagueness doctrine and developed a test for its application. 118 Idaho at 587 , 798 P.2d at 46 .

2024“However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a criminal statute under the void for vagueness doctrine.” Id. at 716 , 791 P.2d at 1295.

2024“However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a criminal statute under the void for vagueness doctrine.” Id. at 716 , 791 P.2d at 1295.

1987The void-for-vagueness doctrine was defined as follows in Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 15 , 607 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1980): [A] statute is unconstitutionally vague when its language does not convey sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct, and its language is such that men [or women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

1987The void-for-vagueness doctrine was defined as follows in Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 15 , 607 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1980): [A] statute is unconstitutionally vague when its language does not convey sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct, and its language is such that men [or women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

2019"The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring that the meaning of a criminal statute be determinable." Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197 , 969 P.2d at 246 (citing Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) ).

2019"Due process requires that all 'be informed as to what the State commands or forbids' and that 'men of common intelligence' not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) ); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712 , 69 P.3d at 132 .

2012Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72 (1982); Cowan v. Board of Comm’rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 513-14 , 148 P.3d 1247, 1259-60 (2006). *390 A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a complainant’s conduct.

2012Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72 (1982); Cowan v. Board of Comm’rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 513-14 , 148 P.3d 1247, 1259-60 (2006). *390 A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a complainant’s conduct.

2025See State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 310 , 444 P.3d 877, 882 (2019); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (noting that the void- for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (warning that a failure to have adequate guidelines for enforcement may lead to “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections”).

2023“Due process requires that a statute defining a crime be sufficiently explicit so all persons may know what conduct will subject them to penalties.” Leferink, 133 Idaho at 783, 992 P.2d at 778 (quoting State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634 , 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)).

2023“Due process requires that a statute defining a crime be sufficiently explicit so all persons may know what conduct will subject them to penalties.” Leferink, 133 Idaho at 783, 992 P.2d at 778 (quoting State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634 , 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)).

2023“Due process requires that a statute defining a crime be sufficiently explicit so all persons may know what conduct will subject them to penalties.” Leferink, 133 Idaho at 783, 992 P.2d at 778 (quoting State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634 , 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)).

2023“Due process requires that a statute defining a crime be sufficiently explicit so all persons may know what conduct will subject them to penalties.” Leferink, 133 Idaho at 783, 992 P.2d at 778 (quoting State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634 , 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)).

2013As this Court stated in Nelson, “Although all aspects of the vagueness doctrine concerning criminal statutes may not be applicable to prison rules, it is established that, even with regard to prison regulations, due process requires fair notice that the conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.” Id. (citing Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1996); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1987); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1984)).

2013As this Court stated in Nelson, “Although all aspects of the vagueness doctrine concerning criminal statutes may not be applicable to prison rules, it is established that, even with regard to prison regulations, due process requires fair notice that the conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.” Id. (citing Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1996); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1987); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1984)).

2013As this Court stated in Nelson, “Although all aspects of the vagueness doctrine concerning criminal statutes may not be applicable to prison rules, it is established that, even with regard to prison regulations, due process requires fair notice that the conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.” Id. (citing Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1996); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1987); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1984)).

2010See Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 174 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir.1999) (record inadequate to determine whether regulation applied in a constitutional manner); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 , 640 A.2d 986, 990 (1994) (in order to review claim that statute is vague as applied, the record must reflect the situation which formed the basis of the action against the defendant). [4] NOTES [1] The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes employing civil sanctions for violations, but the standard of certainty is less stringent than that for criminal statutes.

2010See Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 174 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir.1999) (record inadequate to determine whether regulation applied in a constitutional manner); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 , 640 A.2d 986, 990 (1994) (in order to review claim that statute is vague as applied, the record must reflect the situation which formed the basis of the action against the defendant). [4] NOTES [1] The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes employing civil sanctions for violations, but the standard of certainty is less stringent than that for criminal statutes.

2010Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 , 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 , 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009).

2010Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 , 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 , 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009).

2010See Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 174 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir.1999) (record inadequate to determine whether regulation applied in a constitutional manner); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 , 640 A.2d 986, 990 (1994) (in order to review claim that statute is vague as applied, the record must reflect the situation which formed the basis of the action against the defendant). [4] NOTES [1] The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes employing civil sanctions for violations, but the standard of certainty is less stringent than that for criminal statutes.

2009“It is well settled that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for assignment of error.” State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580 , 199 P.3d 155 (Ct.App.2008) (citing State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho *682 395, 401, 925 P.2d 399, 405 (Ct.App.1996)).

2007See also Gonzales v. Carhart, — U.S.-, -, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 , 167 L.Ed.2d 480, 504 (2007); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747, 1754 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539, 552 (1994).

2007See also Gonzales v. Carhart, — U.S.-, -, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 , 167 L.Ed.2d 480, 504 (2007); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747, 1754 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539, 552 (1994).

2007See also Gonzales v. Carhart, — U.S.-, -, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 , 167 L.Ed.2d 480, 504 (2007); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747, 1754 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539, 552 (1994).

2007See also Gonzales v. Carhart, — U.S.-, -, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 , 167 L.Ed.2d 480, 504 (2007); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 , 114 S.Ct. 1747, 1754 , 128 L.Ed.2d 539, 552 (1994).

2003See also Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 15 , 607 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1980); Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Commission, 109 Idaho 112, 115 , 705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Ct.App.1985).

2003See also Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 15 , 607 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1980); Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Commission, 109 Idaho 112, 115 , 705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Ct.App.1985).