void-for-vagueness doctrine in Minnesota

2016Id: Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not unconstitutionally vague. “ ‘As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 4 The [vagueness] doctrine is based on fairness and is not designed to “convert into a consti

2006The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that statutes define an offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) cited in State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985).

2017The void-for- vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

2015The void- for-vagueness doctrine, which arises under the federal and state due-process clauses, “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

2016Id: Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not unconstitutionally vague. “ ‘As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 4 The [vagueness] doctrine is based on fairness and is not designed to “convert into a consti

2016Id: Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not unconstitutionally vague. “ ‘As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 4 The [vagueness] doctrine is based on fairness and is not designed to “convert into a consti

1978The rationale of the void-for-vagueness doctrine was set out in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972): “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

1978The rationale of the void-for-vagueness doctrine was set out in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972): “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

2015“The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not allow one who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question to attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit.” State, City of Minneapolis v. Reha, 483 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Minn.1992) (quotation omitted).

2009“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness and certainty that ‘ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” State v. Reha, 483 N.W.2d 688, 690-91 (Minn.1992) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).

2013“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 88 (Minn.2007) (quotation omitted). “[A] law is impermissibly vague when it fails to draw a reasonably clear line between lawful and unlawful conduct.” City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.App.1985).

2013City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.App.1985) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 , 103 S.Ct. at 1858 ).

2013“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient defi niteness and certainty that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn.App.2008) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008). “[Vlagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.1984) (citing United States v. Powell,

1996Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), quoted in State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.1984).

2017State v. Phipps, 820 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2012) (applying the void-for-vagueness doctrine to an order for protection). 6 jurisdiction to decide property owner’s challenge to city’s enforcement of an ordinance).

2015State v. Phipps, 820 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2012).

2016Id: Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not unconstitutionally vague. “ ‘As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 4 The [vagueness] doctrine is based on fairness and is not designed to “convert into a consti

2008Nevertheless, “[a] criminal statute need not be drafted with absolute certainty or mathematical precision.” State v. Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d 311, 321 (Minn.App.2004).

2015“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness and certainty that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a .manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 269 (quotation omitted).

2013“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient defi niteness and certainty that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn.App.2008) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008). “[Vlagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.1984) (citing United States v. Powell,

2013“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient defi niteness and certainty that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn.App.2008) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008). “[Vlagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.1984) (citing United States v. Powell,

2013“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient defi niteness and certainty that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn.App.2008) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008). “[Vlagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.1984) (citing United States v. Powell,

2016Safety, 455 N.W.2d 89, 90-91 (Minn. App. 1990) (involving a void-for-vagueness challenge to the implied-consent laws).

2016Special Permit No. 16868, 867 N.W.2d 522, 532-23 (Minn. App. 2015) (considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine on certiorari review), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2015).

2015“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 88 (Minn.2007) (quotation omitted). *910 “The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Minn.2012).

2012“However, when a statute clearly applies to a person’s conduct, that person may not successfully challenge the statute for vagueness.” State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn.1995) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 , 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2561-62 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)).

2007“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted).

2003Exam’rs., 525 N.W.2d 559, 564 (Minn.App.1994) (stating that a phrase is unconstitutionally vague only when its meaning “is neither commonly understood nor established by judicial construction” (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1992))), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995); but see Nyeholt v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 298 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2002) (stating that where statute defining eligibility for veterans medical benefits “[did] not purport to define what is lawful and unlawful conduct,” veteran’s petition ”fail[ed] to present a constitutional challenge that is cognizable under the vo

1999Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555 , 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 , 60 S.Ct. 523 , 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940).

1999Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555 , 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 , 60 S.Ct. 523 , 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940).

1994State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (Minn.1983).

1993The patterned sex offender statute was recently found constitutional under a void-for-vagueness challenge in State v. Christie, 494 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.1993), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 25, 1993).

1993See, e.g., State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn.1980); State v. Michaud, 276 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn.1979).

1993See, e.g., State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn.1980); State v. Michaud, 276 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn.1979).