void-for-vagueness analysis in Kansas

2016“A void-for-vagueness challenge is based on the due process requirement that a statute’s language must ‘ “convey a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.’” State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 438 , 866 P.2d 1017 (1994) (quoting City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 257 , 788 P.2d 270 [1990]).

2016“A void-for-vagueness challenge is based on the due process requirement that a statute’s language must ‘ “convey a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.’” State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 438 , 866 P.2d 1017 (1994) (quoting City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 257 , 788 P.2d 270 [1990]).

1991In City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 259 , 788 P.2d 270 (1990), this court recognized that, to determine whether an ordinance is void, two inquiries are appropriate: “ ‘(1) whether the ordinance gives fair warning to those persons potentially subject to it, and (2) whether the ordinance adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” (Quoting State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 [1983].) The void-for-vagueness analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys

1991In City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 259 , 788 P.2d 270 (1990), this court recognized that, to determine whether an ordinance is void, two inquiries are appropriate: “ ‘(1) whether the ordinance gives fair warning to those persons potentially subject to it, and (2) whether the ordinance adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” (Quoting State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 [1983].) The void-for-vagueness analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys

2026The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as we have called it, guarantees that ordinary people have 'fair notice' of the conduct a statute proscribes." Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 155-56 , 138 S. Ct. 1204 , 200 L.

2026The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as we have called it, guarantees that ordinary people have 'fair notice' of the conduct a statute proscribes." Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 155-56 , 138 S. Ct. 1204 , 200 L.

2020In State v. Groschang, 272 Kan. 652, 668 , 36 P.3d 231 (2001), we considered a void-for-vagueness challenge to K.S.A. 21-3401(a) and its accompanying jury instruction, which read "'[p]remeditation means to have thought over the matter beforehand for any length of time sufficient to form an intent to act.'" Groschang alleged the statute and instruction together "blur[red] the distinction between premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder to the point where there can never be an intentional killing that is not a premeditated killing." 272 Kan. at 669-70 .

2020In State v. Groschang, 272 Kan. 652, 668 , 36 P.3d 231 (2001), we considered a void-for-vagueness challenge to K.S.A. 21-3401(a) and its accompanying jury instruction, which read "'[p]remeditation means to have thought over the matter beforehand for any length of time sufficient to form an intent to act.'" Groschang alleged the statute and instruction together "blur[red] the distinction between premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder to the point where there can never be an intentional killing that is not a premeditated killing." 272 Kan. at 669-70 .

2016“A void-for-vagueness challenge is based on the due process requirement that a statute’s language must ‘ “convey a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.’” State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 438 , 866 P.2d 1017 (1994) (quoting City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 257 , 788 P.2d 270 [1990]).

2016“A void-for-vagueness challenge is based on the due process requirement that a statute’s language must ‘ “convey a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.’” State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 438 , 866 P.2d 1017 (1994) (quoting City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 257 , 788 P.2d 270 [1990]).

2004In Mitchell , die Court *50 of Appeals determined that “[t]he phrase ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life’ is easily understood,” and rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to the second-degree murder statute. 23 Kan.

1989“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 75 L.

1989“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 75 L.