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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sessions v. Dimayagreen2 sentences2018The civil/criminal distinction the Court said in Padilla is "ill suited" to evaluating a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla at 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473 , is equally ill-suited to evaluating a claim to a jury trial, which is another in the group of rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the accused in a criminal prosecution. 20 Cf. Dimaya , 584 U.S. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 1212-13 (noting government's civil/criminal distinction and rejecting the argument that because deportation is a civil sanction, a less searching standard should apply in a due process evaluatio 2018No. 104- 132, 110 Stat. 1214 , 1274 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012)). 21 assistance of counsel, id. at 366 , is equally ill-suited to evaluating a claim to a jury trial, which is another in the group of rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the accused in a criminal prosecution. 20 Cf. Dimaya, 584 U.S. at ____, 138 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (noting government‘s civil/criminal distinction and rejecting the argument that because deportation is a civil sanction, a less searching standard should apply in a due process evaluation of a void-for-vagueness challenge under | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Smithgreen1 sentence2023“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” 49 United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 384 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen1 sentence2023“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” 49 United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 384 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2018The civil/criminal distinction the Court said in Padilla is "ill suited" to evaluating a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla at 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473 , is equally ill-suited to evaluating a claim to a jury trial, which is another in the group of rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the accused in a criminal prosecution. 20 Cf. Dimaya , 584 U.S. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 1212-13 (noting government's civil/criminal distinction and rejecting the argument that because deportation is a civil sanction, a less searching standard should apply in a due process evaluatio | 1 | 1 |
Willcher v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1980See Willcher v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 67, 72-74 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Liparota v. United States
green
2 sentences2005The Court's express observation that neither party challenged the statute at issue as being unconstitutional, see id. at 424 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 2084 , assures us that Liparota cannot lend support to McNeely’s constitutional claim. 2005The Court's express observation that neither party challenged the statute at issue as being unconstitutional, see id. at 424 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 2084 , assures us that Liparota cannot lend support to McNeely’s constitutional claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Petrillo
green
2 sentences1975As we noted in District of Columbia v. Walters, supra, 319 A.2d at 335 n. 5, “the common law gives no precise meaning to the words lewd, obscene, and indecent but uses them as adjectives of general description.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “ . [T]he constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .” [Roth v. United States 1975As we noted in District of Columbia v. Walters, supra, 319 A.2d at 335 n. 5, “the common law gives no precise meaning to the words lewd, obscene, and indecent but uses them as adjectives of general description.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “ . [T]he constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .” [Roth v. United States | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Roth v. United States
green
2 sentences1975As we noted in District of Columbia v. Walters, supra, 319 A.2d at 335 n. 5, “the common law gives no precise meaning to the words lewd, obscene, and indecent but uses them as adjectives of general description.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “ . [T]he constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .” [Roth v. United States 1975As we noted in District of Columbia v. Walters, supra, 319 A.2d at 335 n. 5, “the common law gives no precise meaning to the words lewd, obscene, and indecent but uses them as adjectives of general description.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “ . [T]he constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .” [Roth v. United States | 1 | 1975–1975 |
District of Columbia v. Walters
green
2 sentences1975As we noted in District of Columbia v. Walters, supra, 319 A.2d at 335 n. 5, “the common law gives no precise meaning to the words lewd, obscene, and indecent but uses them as adjectives of general description.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “ . [T]he constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .” [Roth v. United States 1975I The void-for-vagueness doctrine as extensively developed by the Supreme Court is a due process doctrine incorporating notions of fair notice or warning. 2 It requires legislatures “to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” 3 It is clear from the legislative history of § 22-1112(a), which was enacted in its present form in 1953, 4 that Congress was “deeply concerned with what it termed ‘sex offenses” within the District of Colum *221 bia and that it specifically intended to broaden the | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.