67 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Giaccio v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences1998The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. 15 Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 342 , 441 A.2d 604 (1982); see Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-403 , 86 S. Ct. 518 , 15 L. 1998The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. 15 Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 342 , 441 A.2d 604 (1982); see Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-403 , 86 S. Ct. 518 , 15 L. | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. Goguengreen2 sentences2001The void for vagueness doctrine requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). 2001The void for vagueness doctrine requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). | 1 | 11 |
State v. Schrivergreen2 sentences1996Our Supreme Court has described the void for vagueness doctrine as applying to “ ‘a governing statute or regulation.’ ” State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 179 , 575 A.2d 216 (1990); see State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 459 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988). 1996Our Supreme Court has described the void for vagueness doctrine as applying to “ ‘a governing statute or regulation.’ ” State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 179 , 575 A.2d 216 (1990); see State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 459 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988). | 1 | 6 |
In re Shane P.green2 sentences2002See also In re Shyliesh CT Page 13320 H. , supra, 56 Conn. App. 181 , Accordingly, the court declines to accept this aspect of Ralph O.'s argument in opposition to the termination of his parental rights. 52 As noted by the respondent father, the void for vagueness doctrine accords due process protection in child protection matters in that it "requires statutes (1) to provide fair notice of the conduct governed by them and (2) to prescribe minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement." (Citations omitted.) In re Shane P. , 58 Conn. App. 244 , 253 , 754 A.2d 169 (2000) (rejecting claim of uncons 2002See also In re Shyliesh CT Page 13320 H. , supra, 56 Conn. App. 181 , Accordingly, the court declines to accept this aspect of Ralph O.'s argument in opposition to the termination of his parental rights. 52 As noted by the respondent father, the void for vagueness doctrine accords due process protection in child protection matters in that it "requires statutes (1) to provide fair notice of the conduct governed by them and (2) to prescribe minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement." (Citations omitted.) In re Shane P. , 58 Conn. App. 244 , 253 , 754 A.2d 169 (2000) (rejecting claim of uncons | 1 | 3 |
State v. Indrisanogreen2 sentences2002In State v. Indrisano , supra, 228 Conn. 795 , our Supreme Court considered a void for vagueness challenge as to § 53a-182 (a)(2), which the court found to be impermissibly vague both as to the mens rea requirement in subsection (a) and as to the conduct proscribed in subdivision (2). 1998Section 53a-183 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when ... (2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm . . . .” The defendant argues, citing State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 795 , that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the terms “ | 1 | 3 |
State v. Winotgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 770 , 988 A.2d 188 (2010) (‘‘the fundamen- tal purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine is to ensure fair warning in order to avoid traps for the innocent’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)). 2022See, e.g., State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 770 , 988 A.2d 188 (2010) (‘‘the fundamen- tal purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine is to ensure fair warning in order to avoid traps for the innocent’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2008Thus, as part of his vagueness claim, *619 the defendant contends that the kidnapping charge was “based upon a minuscule duration of confinement” and that “the restraint imposed was wholly incidental to the commission of the sexual assault.” The defendant points to dictum in our case law relating to the availability of a void for vagueness claim based in part, according to the defendant, on the merger doctrine; see State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 180 , 575 A.2d 216 (1990); 9 which prohibits a kidnapping charge under circumstances wherein “the restraint was so much [a] part of another substantiv 2008Thus, as part of his vagueness claim, *619 the defendant contends that the kidnapping charge was “based upon a minuscule duration of confinement” and that “the restraint imposed was wholly incidental to the commission of the sexual assault.” The defendant points to dictum in our case law relating to the availability of a void for vagueness claim based in part, according to the defendant, on the merger doctrine; see State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 180 , 575 A.2d 216 (1990); 9 which prohibits a kidnapping charge under circumstances wherein “the restraint was so much [a] part of another substantiv | 1 | 2 |
Gooding v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2021See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 , 92 S. Ct. 1103 , 31 L. 2021See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 , 92 S. Ct. 1103 , 31 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Parham v. Warden, Bridgeport Community Correctional Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Ralph M.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wainwright v. Stonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Burton
green
2 sentences2005“The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.” Id. 2002The constitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standard less law enforcement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burton , 258 Conn. 153 , 158-59 , 778 A.2d 955 (2001). | 8 | 2002–2009 |
State v. Payne
green
2 sentences2001“The constitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 777 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997). 2001“The constitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 777 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997). | 5 | 1997–2010 |
Packer v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2001“The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.” Packer v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 89, 98 , 717 A.2d 117 (1998). 2001“The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.” Packer v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 89, 98 , 717 A.2d 117 (1998). | 5 | 1999–2001 |
State v. Cavallo
green
2 sentences2003The void for vagueness doctrine is based on the principle that “laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.” State v. Cavallo, 200 Conn. 664, 667 , 513 A.2d 646 (1986); State v. Higgins, 74 Conn. App. 473, 488 , 811 A.2d 765 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 950 , 817 A.2d 110 (2003). 2003The void for vagueness doctrine is based on the principle that “laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.” State v. Cavallo, 200 Conn. 664, 667 , 513 A.2d 646 (1986); State v. Higgins, 74 Conn. App. 473, 488 , 811 A.2d 765 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 950 , 817 A.2d 110 (2003). | 3 | 1988–2003 |
Ramos v. Town of Vernon
green
2 sentences2003State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 269 , 562 A.2d 1060 (1989); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507-508 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 814 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). 2003State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 269 , 562 A.2d 1060 (1989); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507-508 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 814 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). | 3 | 2001–2003 |
Kolender v. Lawson
green
2 sentences2001The void for vagueness doctrine "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 , 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). 2001The void for vagueness doctrine "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 , 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). | 3 | 1997–2001 |
Baggett v. Bullitt
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 903 (1983). “[A] law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 , 84 S. Ct. 1316 , 12 L. 1997Ed. 2d 903 (1983). “[A] law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 , 84 S. Ct. 1316 , 12 L. | 3 | 1993–1997 |
State Management Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc. v. O'Neill
green
2 sentences2015Specifi- cally, he argues that the statutory terms ‘‘domiciled’’ and ‘‘principally dependent’’ are ambiguous, and, therefore, that the statute is void for vagueness.6 We conclude that the terms ‘‘domiciled’’ and ‘‘principally dependent’’ are not ambiguous. ‘‘Courts have derived the void for vagueness doctrine from the constitutional guarantee of due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, 204 Conn. 746, 757 , 529 A.2d 1276 (1987). ‘‘A statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is uncon- stitutional, makin 2015Specifi- cally, he argues that the statutory terms ‘‘domiciled’’ and ‘‘principally dependent’’ are ambiguous, and, therefore, that the statute is void for vagueness.6 We conclude that the terms ‘‘domiciled’’ and ‘‘principally dependent’’ are not ambiguous. ‘‘Courts have derived the void for vagueness doctrine from the constitutional guarantee of due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, 204 Conn. 746, 757 , 529 A.2d 1276 (1987). ‘‘A statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is uncon- stitutional, makin | 2 | 2011–2015 |
State v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). 2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). | 2 | 2009–2012 |
State v. Wilchinski
green
2 sentences2002In such cases as Ramos v. Town of Vernon , 254 Conn. 799 , 844 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000), and State v. Wilchinski , 242 Conn. 211 , 216 , 700 A.2d 1 (1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court has suggested, without deciding, that a facial analysis might also apply to claims that a statute infringes on a fundamental right. . . ." In re of William B ., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown (August 31, 2001, Frazzini, J .) "Our vagueness inquiry — whether facial or as applied — extends only to those portions of the statute that were applied to the defendant in this case. 2002In such cases as Ramos v. Town of Vernon , 254 Conn. 799 , 844 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000), and State v. Wilchinski , 242 Conn. 211 , 216 , 700 A.2d 1 (1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court has suggested, without deciding, that a facial analysis might also apply to claims that a statute infringes on a fundamental right. . . ." In re of William B ., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown (August 31, 2001, Frazzini, J .) "Our vagueness inquiry — whether facial or as applied — extends only to those portions of the statute that were applied to the defendant in this case. | 2 | 2001–2002 |
State v. Pickering
green
2 sentences2002Id., 57-58 n.3. “[T]o prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged law either could never be applied in a valid manner or that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 11 , 108 S. Ct. 2225 , 101 L. 2001(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Finally, this court relies on the seminal Connecticut case of State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54 (1980), for the standard of review of a statute on the claim that it is void for vagueness. | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Grayned v. City of Rockford
green
2 sentences1980Rev. 67 , 97. 4 United States Supreme Court opinions have indicated that a second principle of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is also considered — namely, whether a statute provides adequate standards for its enforcement and administration by police, prosecutors, judges and jury — when first amendment guarantees are explicitly or potentially at issue; e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 , 33 L. 1980Rev. 67 , 97. 4 United States Supreme Court opinions have indicated that a second principle of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is also considered — namely, whether a statute provides adequate standards for its enforcement and administration by police, prosecutors, judges and jury — when first amendment guarantees are explicitly or potentially at issue; e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 , 33 L. | 2 | 1980–1992 |
Middletown v. Wagner
neutral
1 sentence2025Laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accord- ingly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middletown v. Wagner, 228 Conn. App. 265, 281 , 325 A.3d 253 (2024). ‘‘If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained [it] will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2023Because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude, we will review the void for vagueness claim under Golding ‘‘to determine whether a constitutional violation . . . existed and, if so, whether it caused harm to the defendant.’’ State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 157 , 848 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915 , 853 A.2d 530 (2004). 2023Because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude, we will review the void for vagueness claim under Golding ‘‘to determine whether a constitutional violation . . . existed and, if so, whether it caused harm to the defendant.’’ State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 157 , 848 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915 , 853 A.2d 530 (2004). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2023Because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude, we will review the void for vagueness claim under Golding ‘‘to determine whether a constitutional violation . . . existed and, if so, whether it caused harm to the defendant.’’ State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 157 , 848 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915 , 853 A.2d 530 (2004). 2023Because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude, we will review the void for vagueness claim under Golding ‘‘to determine whether a constitutional violation . . . existed and, if so, whether it caused harm to the defendant.’’ State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 157 , 848 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915 , 853 A.2d 530 (2004). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Town of Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC
green
2 sentences2020We find no merit to these claimed defects and need not discuss them further. 11 ‘‘The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604 , 630–31, 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2 2020We find no merit to these claimed defects and need not discuss them further. 11 ‘‘The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604 , 630–31, 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Town of Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC
green
2 sentences2020We find no merit to these claimed defects and need not discuss them further. 11 ‘‘The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604 , 630–31, 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2 2020We find no merit to these claimed defects and need not discuss them further. 11 ‘‘The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604 , 630–31, 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. McMahon
green
2 sentences2019III The void for vagueness doctrine "is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. ... [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMahon , 257 Conn. 544 , 551 n.9, 778 A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 , 122 S.Ct. 1069 , 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). 2019III The void for vagueness doctrine "is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. ... [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMahon , 257 Conn. 544 , 551 n.9, 778 A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 , 122 S.Ct. 1069 , 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Moldo v. Matsco, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019III The void for vagueness doctrine "is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. ... [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMahon , 257 Conn. 544 , 551 n.9, 778 A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 , 122 S.Ct. 1069 , 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). 2019III The void for vagueness doctrine "is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. ... [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMahon , 257 Conn. 544 , 551 n.9, 778 A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 , 122 S.Ct. 1069 , 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Greene v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2019III The void for vagueness doctrine "is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. ... [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMahon , 257 Conn. 544 , 551 n.9, 778 A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 , 122 S.Ct. 1069 , 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re Michael L.
green
2 sentences2014“The doctrine [of vagueness] requires statutes to provide fair notice of the conduct to which they pertain and to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michael L., 56 Conn. App. 688, 695-96 , 745 A.2d 847 (2000). “[T]he minimum guidelines prong is applicable only where a statute is being challenged as unconstitutional on its face . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B., supra, 389. 2014“The doctrine [of vagueness] requires statutes to provide fair notice of the conduct to which they pertain and to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michael L., 56 Conn. App. 688, 695-96 , 745 A.2d 847 (2000). “[T]he minimum guidelines prong is applicable only where a statute is being challenged as unconstitutional on its face . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B., supra, 389. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2012Because the respondent did not preserve his constitutional claim at trial or affirmatively assert his entitlement to appellate review pursuant to State v. Golding, *246 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), in his main brief to this court, we decline to review his claim on appeal. 2012Because the respondent did not preserve his constitutional claim at trial or affirmatively assert his entitlement to appellate review pursuant to State v. Golding, *246 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), in his main brief to this court, we decline to review his claim on appeal. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Dow v. CITY CARTING COMPANY, INC. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| ERIC S. v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Romero green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Fauntleroy green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Sanseverino green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Salamon green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State Ex Rel. Gregan v. Koczur green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Hamlin green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Hamlin green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Liistro v. Robinson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rocque v. Farricielli green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Breton green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Zapata v. Burns green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Kronberg v. New Hampshire Insurance green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Springmann green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Springmann green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Higgins green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.