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13 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cassibry v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... `The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) ( quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg 1997Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 127- 28, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... 'The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) (quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg | 3 | 3 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences1997Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States defined the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858-59 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983): As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 1997Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States defined the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858-59 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983): As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. | 3 | 3 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.green2 sentences1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... `The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) ( quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg 1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... `The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) ( quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg | 2 | 3 |
Fulgham v. Stategreen2 sentences2021We recognize that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 492 (¶30) (quoting Fulgham, 47 So. 3d at 701 (¶8)). “[T]he test is whether the language conveys [a] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Id. 2021We recognize that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 492 (¶30) (quoting Fulgham, 47 So. 3d at 701 (¶8)). “[T]he test is whether the language conveys [a] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Reining v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... `The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) ( quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg 1997Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 127- 28, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... 'The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) (quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg | 2 | 2 |
Meeks v. Tallahatchie Countygreen2 sentences1999The void for vagueness doctrine states, "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process." Meeks v. Tallahatchie County, 513 So.2d 563, 565 (Miss.1987) ( quoting Connally v. General Constr. 1997The void for vagueness doctrine states, "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process." Meeks v. Tallahatchie County, 513 So.2d 563, 565 (Miss.1987) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. | 2 | 2 |
Kenneth M. Crook v. City of Madison, Mississippigreen1 sentence2021Mohamed, as the challenging party, bears the burden of proving “the statute’s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Crook v. City of Madison, 168 So. 3d 930, 935 (¶14) (Miss. 2015)). | 1 | 1 |
Stephen Nolan v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Nolan v. State, 182 So. 3d 484, 492 (¶¶28-31) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NYgreen2 sentences2017Furthermore, this Court recognizes, in the context of a void-for-vagueness analysis, that where a statute, by its terms, is applicable to speech and thus “is capable of reaching First Amendment rights, the statute ... should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.” Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Miss. 1991) 4 ; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 , 87 S.Ct. 675 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). ¶59. 2017Furthermore, this Court recognizes, in the context of a void-for-vagueness analysis, that where a statute, by its terms, is applicable to speech and thus “is capable of reaching First Amendment rights, the statute ... should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.” Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Miss. 1991) 4 ; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 , 87 S.Ct. 675 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). ¶59. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. City of Gulfportgreen2 sentences2017Furthermore, this Court recognizes, in the context of a void-for-vagueness analysis, that where a statute, by its terms, is applicable to speech and thus “is capable of reaching First Amendment rights, the statute ... should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.” Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Miss. 1991) 4 ; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 , 87 S.Ct. 675 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). ¶59. 2017Furthermore, this Court recognizes, in the context of a void-for-vagueness analysis, that where a statute, by its terms, is applicable to speech and thus “is capable of reaching First Amendment rights, the statute . . . should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.” Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (Miss. 1991)4; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 , 87 S. Ct. 675 , 17 L. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson-Berney Bldg. Co. v. Lowrygreen1 sentence2011Dismissing the void-for-vagueness claim, the McQueen court cited language from numerous jurisdictions; we restate that discussion here in part: In Robinson v. State, 149 S.W. 186 [, 187] (Tex.1912), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stated, “violence is a general term and includes all sorts of force.” In Anderson-Berney Bldg. v. Lowry, 143 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.Civ.App.1940), the court stated: “Violence” is force, physical force; force unlawfully exercised. | 1 | 1 |
McQueen v. Stategreen1 sentence1988In McQueen v. State, 473 So.2d 971, 973 (Miss. 1985), this Court dismissed a void for vagueness claim concerning what is a crime of violence under Miss. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jordan v. De George
green
2 sentences1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... `The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) ( quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg 1997Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 127- 28, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). "[A] criminal statute is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is so vague and uncertain that it does not inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid, or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.... 'The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Miss.1981) (quoting Jordan v. DeGeorg | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence2011Dismissing the void-for-vagueness claim, the McQueen court cited language from numerous jurisdictions; we restate that discussion here in part: In Robinson v. State, 149 S.W. 186 [, 187] (Tex.1912), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stated, “violence is a general term and includes all sorts of force.” In Anderson-Berney Bldg. v. Lowry, 143 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.Civ.App.1940), the court stated: “Violence” is force, physical force; force unlawfully exercised. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Powell
green
2 sentences1976This is simply another way of stating that it is "void for vagueness." The United States Supreme Court addressed this question in United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) and held that 18 U.S.C. § 1715 , which proscribes mailing pistols, revolvers and "other fire arms capable of being concealed on the person" is not unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine. 1976This is simply another way of stating that it is "void for vagueness." The United States Supreme Court addressed this question in United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) and held that 18 U.S.C. § 1715 , which proscribes mailing pistols, revolvers and "other fire arms capable of being concealed on the person" is not unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.