void-for-vagueness doctrine in Washington

2013A statute violates the due process clause if it (1) “does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed” or (2) “does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). ¶30 Our courts do not apply the void for vagueness doctrine casually; rather, we “approach a vagueness challenge with a strong presumption in favor of the statute’s validity.” State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1998).

2013A statute violates the due process clause if it (1) “does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed” or (2) “does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). ¶30 Our courts do not apply the void for vagueness doctrine casually; rather, we “approach a vagueness challenge with a strong presumption in favor of the statute’s validity.” State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1998).

2013A statute violates the due process clause if it (1) “does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed” or (2) “does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). ¶30 Our courts do not apply the void for vagueness doctrine casually; rather, we “approach a vagueness challenge with a strong presumption in favor of the statute’s validity.” State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1998).

2013A statute violates the due process clause if it (1) “does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed” or (2) “does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). ¶30 Our courts do not apply the void for vagueness doctrine casually; rather, we “approach a vagueness challenge with a strong presumption in favor of the statute’s validity.” State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1998).

2008After a brief exchange of signals, Reddick handed over a rock of cocaine, received a $20 bill, and then walked away with his girl friend. ¶ 27 Hollis and Reddick challenged their convictions, arguing the phrase "in any other manner involve" in former RCW 69.50.401(f) is unconstitutionally vague. ¶ 28 Because Hollis involved a void-for-vagueness challenge, the issue was whether, in light of the particular facts of the case, the statute defines the offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed" and whether it provided "ascertainable standard

2008After a brief exchange of signals, Reddick handed over a rock of cocaine, received a $20 bill, and then walked away with his girl friend. ¶ 27 Hollis and Reddick challenged their convictions, arguing the phrase "in any other manner involve" in former RCW 69.50.401(f) is unconstitutionally vague. ¶ 28 Because Hollis involved a void-for-vagueness challenge, the issue was whether, in light of the particular facts of the case, the statute defines the offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed" and whether it provided "ascertainable standard

2011Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988). ¶35 “The first step in any vagueness challenge ‘is to determine if the statute in question is to be examined as applied to the particular case or to be reviewed on its face.’ ” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992) (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181-82 ).

2011Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988). ¶35 “The first step in any vagueness challenge ‘is to determine if the statute in question is to be examined as applied to the particular case or to be reviewed on its face.’ ” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992) (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181-82 ).

2021This void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to both “laws that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.” Id.

2020In Beckles, the United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue when Travis Beckles challenged the federal advisory sentencing guidelines that provided for “career offender” sentencing enhancements. 137 S. Ct. at 890-91 .

2003Abercrombie, 85 Wn.

2003Abercrombie, 85 Wash.App. at 400 , 945 P.2d 1132 .

2021Then in Blakely, the Court held that under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any fact that allows the imposition of a penalty above the standard range, other than prior convictions, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301 .

2013Thaves urges this court to disregard Baldwin, alleging inconsistencies with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2014State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988); City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 27-28 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988).

2014State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988); City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 27-28 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988).

2008After a brief exchange of signals, Reddick handed over a rock of cocaine, received a $20 bill, and then walked away with his girl friend. ¶ 27 Hollis and Reddick challenged their convictions, arguing the phrase "in any other manner involve" in former RCW 69.50.401(f) is unconstitutionally vague. ¶ 28 Because Hollis involved a void-for-vagueness challenge, the issue was whether, in light of the particular facts of the case, the statute defines the offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed" and whether it provided "ascertainable standard

2008After a brief exchange of signals, Reddick handed over a rock of cocaine, received a $20 bill, and then walked away with his girl friend. ¶27 Hollis and Reddick challenged their convictions, arguing the phrase “in any other manner involve” in former RCW 69.50.401(f) is unconstitutionally vague. ¶28 Because Hollis involved a void-for-vagueness challenge, the issue was whether, in light of the particular facts of the case, the statute defines the offense “ ‘with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed’ ” and whether it provided “ ‘ascertainable stan

2007Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S. Ct. 1855 , 75 L.

2007Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S. Ct. 1855 , 75 L.

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 , 940 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wash.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 , 940 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wash.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Id. (citing City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 929 , 767 P.2d 572 (1989)).

2003Id. (citing City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 929 , 767 P.2d 572 (1989)).

2003The void for vagueness doctrine “is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S. Ct. 1953 , 32 L.

2003The void for vagueness doctrine “is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S. Ct. 1953 , 32 L.

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 , 940 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wash.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2003Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 , 675 (9th Cir. 1996)); State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 421-22 , 54 P.3d 147 (2002) (citing City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 4-5 , 759 P.2d 372 (1988)).

2001A party to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not challenge it on the ground that it is vague as applied to the conduct of others." Abercrombie, 85 Wash.App. at 400 , 945 P.2d 1132 (citing State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 117 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993); Haley v. Med.

1998The party challenging a statute under the void for vagueness doctrine bears the burden of overcoming a presumption of constitutionality, i.e., “a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it appears unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Halstien, 122 Wn.2d at 118 .

1997Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 770 ; Myles, 127 Wn.2d at 811 n.2.

1997Thorne, 129 Wash.2d at 770 , 921 P.2d 514 ; Myles, 127 Wash.2d at 811 n. 2, 903 P.2d 979 .

1979Ed. 2d 222 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972). (2) The law might also run afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, i.e., an advertiser of on-site activities, whose sign also serves another purpose, could never be sure whether the sign's allocation of space, content, or even design were such that the Highway Department could say it had crossed over the fuzzy line and begun "primarily" to serve that other purpose.

1975Petitioner contends RCW 13.04.120 results in “stripping away of juvenile court protections from those clearly entitled to them [and] is plainly overbroad.” The doctrine of overbreadth is explained, for example, in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 114, 33 L.