void-for-vagueness doctrine in California

2025“A probation condition is invalid if it: ‘ “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” ’ ” (In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901 .) Under the void for vagueness doctrine, a condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) In addition, if a pr

2025CintoDeLeon refers to the rights to due process and to travel; the People point to the right to travel and the right to freedom of association. 13 The void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to in

2022Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 (Acuna); People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 (Ervin).) The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 .) A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is “ ‘impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ ” ( Acuna at p. 1116 .) 6 Under sect

2021Under both constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elements: a criminal statute must ‘ “be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.” ’ ” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 ; see Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [“the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 3We do not describe the evidence related to counts 6 and 7 involving Jan

2018Under the more lenient standard, we ask whether the statute is unconstitutional in the generality or great majority of cases. ( Ibid. ) The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. ( U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) The doctrine prevents the government "from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 , 500, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 , 388 P

2018Under the more lenient standard, we ask whether the statute is unconstitutional in the generality or great majority of cases. ( Ibid. ) The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. ( U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) The doctrine prevents the government "from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 , 500, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 , 388 P

2026The void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the conditio

2025CintoDeLeon refers to the rights to due process and to travel; the People point to the right to travel and the right to freedom of association. 13 The void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to in

2022Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 (Acuna); People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 (Ervin).) The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 .) A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is “ ‘impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ ” ( Acuna at p. 1116 .) 6 Under sect

2005Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ].) The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ].) The starting point of our analysis is the presumption that legislative enactments

2018Under the more lenient standard, we ask whether the statute is unconstitutional in the generality or great majority of cases. ( Ibid. ) The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. ( U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) The doctrine prevents the government "from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 , 500, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 , 388 P

2018Under the more lenient standard, we ask whether the statute is unconstitutional in the generality or great majority of cases. ( Ibid. ) The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. ( U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) The doctrine prevents the government "from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 , 500, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 , 388 P

2025(Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell (1976) 425 U.S. 610, 620 .) We need not address whether the vagueness chills speech because we find the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague under the ordinary, two-part test. 19 to determine the terms’ clarity, including “judicial construction of similar provisions.” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500 .) “‘“To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality, voiding the statute as a whole, [Plaintiffs] cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the stat

2000The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 ]; Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1106.) To satisfy constitutional requirements, a statute must be sufficiently precise to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed and to provide sufficiently definite guidelines for the police in order to pre

2021Under both constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elements: a criminal statute must ‘ “be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.” ’ ” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 ; see Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [“the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 3We do not describe the evidence related to counts 6 and 7 involving Jan

2016(Cf. In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1137 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 ] (Shaun R.) [in juvenile probation case where a probationer appealed from a 2009 dispositional order and sought to bring a vagueness challenge to multiple *340 probation conditions, some of which were originally imposed in 2008 but were merely incorporated by reference in the 2009 order, the conditions imposed in 2008 were not appealable].) 5 The traditional test in cases involving facial vagueness challenges to legislation is often phrased as whether the language or phrasing at issue is reasonably understandable to “o

2002A statute that either forbids or requires the doing of an act in "terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." ( Connolly v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .) The basic premise of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." ( Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S. 451, 453 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 .) In the Fourth

2002A statute that either forbids or requires the doing of an act in "terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." ( Connolly v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .) The basic premise of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." ( Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S. 451, 453 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 .) In the Fourth

2022Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 (Acuna); People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 (Ervin).) The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 .) A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is “ ‘impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ ” ( Acuna at p. 1116 .) 6 Under sect

2005Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ].) The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ].) The starting point of our analysis is the presumption that legislative enactments

1975In such instances the wrongdoer cannot be heard to complain on grounds of vagueness as the essential element upon which the void-for-vagueness doctrine rests—the lack of a fair notice of proscribed conduct—is itself lacking.” ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 328, fn. 3 ; see also People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Here inmate possession of a razor blade, per se, was prohibited by jail regulation.

1975In such instances the wrongdoer cannot be heard to complain on grounds of vagueness as the essential element upon which the void-for-vagueness doctrine rests—the lack of a fair notice of proscribed conduct—is itself lacking.” ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 328, fn. 3 ; see also People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Here inmate possession of a razor blade, per se, was prohibited by jail regulation.

2017Probation conditions are subject to constitutional challenges on the grounds of vagueness. ‘“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ], quoting People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ].) ‘“Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the c

2017Probation conditions are subject to constitutional challenges on the grounds of vagueness. ‘“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ], quoting People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ].) ‘“Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the c

2016Heitzman In Heitzman, supra, 9 Cal.4th 189 , our Supreme Court addressed a void-for-vagueness challenge to a section 368 charge, a statute “based almost verbatim on section 273a.” (Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 788 .) Heitzman summarized the void-for-vagueness principles by explaining that a penal statute must “ ‘define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ]

2016(Valdez, at pp. 787-791.) Heitzman In Heitzman, supra, 9 Cal.4th 189 , our Supreme Court addressed a void-for- vagueness challenge to a section 368, a statute "based almost verbatim on section 273a . . . ." (Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 788 .) Heitzman summarized the void-for- vagueness principles by explaining that a penal statute must " 'define the criminal offense 23 with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 , 357 . .

2013(People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1075 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 856 P.2d 1134 ] [Senate floor analysis “demonstrates that the Legislature intended” that the bill “correct [an] anomaly in the statutory scheme”].) Chapple also makes clear that only an expert is qualified to determine whether a protective vest meets the technical specifications of body armor within the meaning of former section 12370(a). *1077 The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine The void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the due process clause, which “requires . . . some level of definiteness in criminal statutes. [Citation.

2013(Id. at p. 649.) Finally, in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 , the Supreme Court rejected a void for vagueness challenge to the statute making it illegal for a person to drive with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10 percent or more.

1985The University's Standards (9a) Plaintiff contends the standard he was dismissed for violating was unconstitutionally vague in that the regulations upon which the University *347 relied in dismissing him were not sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice he could be dismissed for speech activity; the regulations were enforced in a discriminatory manner; and dismissing him pursuant to the regulations had a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights at the University. (10) The Supreme Court stated the void for vagueness doctrine in Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S

1985The University's Standards (9a) Plaintiff contends the standard he was dismissed for violating was unconstitutionally vague in that the regulations upon which the University *347 relied in dismissing him were not sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice he could be dismissed for speech activity; the regulations were enforced in a discriminatory manner; and dismissing him pursuant to the regulations had a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights at the University. (10) The Supreme Court stated the void for vagueness doctrine in Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S

2016(See also People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 395 [stating, citing Batchelder, that “[i]t is axiomatic the Legislature may criminalize the same conduct in different ways”].) In considering the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, Batchelder focused on the internal clarity of the challenged statute itself in terms of the conduct it proscribes and the standards for enforcement and ascertainment of guilt that it encompasses.

2013(See e.g., Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 278 [“It is unclear which standard the majority employs [in this case]”]; People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 199-200 (Heitzman); Caswell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 389-401.) In Caswell, where appellants challenged only the “facial validity” of a criminal statute, a two-pronged analysis was employed under the void-for-vagueness doctrine without reference to either standard of review.

2014This constitutional command requires 'a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law . . . .'" (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 199 (Heitzman), quoting In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 792 .) Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and void if it defines the offense (1) with insufficient definiteness to provide fair 8 notice to people of ordinary intelligence regarding the kind of conduct prohibited by the statute, and (2) in a manner that encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

2003I, § 7) require “a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law . . . .” (In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 792 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 364 , 350 P.2d 116 ].) “[A] penal statute [must] define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 ].) In Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 ], t

2022(Ervin, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328 ; People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403 [the constitutionality of a statute designed to protect the public from dangerous weapons must be sustained if possible].) A statute will not be held void for vagueness if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language, or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources.

2005(People v. Ervin, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328 ; People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d *1167 496] [the constitutionality of a statute designed to protect the public from dangerous weapons must be sustained if possible].) A statute will not be held void for vagueness if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language, or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources.

2020(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 635 ; Bradway, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309–311.) Johnson included this footnote regarding Bradway: “Because Bradway was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, rather than death, his constitutional challenge to the lying-in-wait special circumstance arose as a void-for-vagueness claim under the due process clause.

2020(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 635 ; Bradway, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309–311.) Johnson included this footnote regarding Bradway: “Because Bradway was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, rather than death, his constitutional challenge to the lying-in-wait special circumstance arose as a void-for-vagueness claim under the due process clause.

2014(Id. at p. 333.) In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 (Grubb), superseded by statute on other grounds in Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pages 329-331, our Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 12020 against a void-for-vagueness challenge.

2004“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ], italics added.) “A law is void for vagueness only if it ‘fails to provide adequate notice to those who must observe its strictures’ and ‘ “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries f

2025Infliction of Serious Physical Harm Mother argues on review that there is insufficient evidence C.A. suffered “serious physical injury.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) With respect to this issue, “the statute does not define what constitutes such harm, [but] it has withstood a void-for-vagueness challenge because the term has a sufficiently well-established meaning and is no less specific than the phrase ‘great bodily injury.’ [Citation.] ‘Although there may be an “I know it when I see it” component to this factual determination [of what constitutes “serious physical harm”], as with the term “great

2014Although the statute does not define what constitutes such harm, it has withstood a void-for-vagueness challenge because the term has a sufficiently well- established meaning and is no less specific than the phrase “great bodily injury.” (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 436-437 .) “Although there may be an ‘I know it when I see it’ component to this factual determination [of what constitutes ‘serious physical harm’], as with the term ‘great bodily injury’ we believe that parents of common intelligence can discern what injuries fall within its reach.” (Id. at p. 438.) We conclude th

2023The void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 .) “To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the pro

2023The void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 .) “To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the pro

2020(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 635 ; Bradway, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309–311.) Johnson included this footnote regarding Bradway: “Because Bradway was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, rather than death, his constitutional challenge to the lying-in-wait special circumstance arose as a void-for-vagueness claim under the due process clause.

2020(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 635 ; Bradway, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309–311.) Johnson included this footnote regarding Bradway: “Because Bradway was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, rather than death, his constitutional challenge to the lying-in-wait special circumstance arose as a void-for-vagueness claim under the due process clause.

2018Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333 , 339-340, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 , quoting Schweitzer v. Westminster Investment (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195 , 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) Finally, a facial void-for-vagueness challenge considers only the text of the measure itself, " 'not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.' " ( Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32 , 39, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 , quoting Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069 , 1084, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 .) The plaintiff cannot prevail

2018Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333 , 339-340, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 , quoting Schweitzer v. Westminster Investment (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195 , 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) Finally, a facial void-for-vagueness challenge considers only the text of the measure itself, " 'not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.' " ( Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32 , 39, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 53 P.3d 119 , quoting Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069 , 1084, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 .) The plaintiff cannot prevail

2010(Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ]; People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 897 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 904 ].) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ].) “ ‘ “The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intellig

2010(Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 903 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 ]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ]; People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 897 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 904 ].) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ].) “ ‘ “The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intellig

2017Probation conditions are subject to constitutional challenges on the grounds of vagueness. ‘“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ], quoting People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ].) ‘“Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the c

2017Probation conditions are subject to constitutional challenges on the grounds of vagueness. ‘“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ], quoting People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ].) ‘“Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the c

2016(People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172 (Mendez).) We agree with the Attorney General that the requirement that Esteban “be of good conduct” is not vague in this case.

2015Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” ’ (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) The doctrine invalidates a condition of probation ‘ “ ‘so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” ’ (Ibid.) By failing to clearly define the prohibited conduct, a vague condition of probation allows law enforcement and the cou