known right privilege in Illinois

2026Waiver is defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36 .

2025See People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100 , ¶¶ 36- 37 (“[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” whereas “[f]orfeiture is defined as the failure to make the timely assertion of the right.”).

2014For a waiver to be effective " 'it must be clearly established that there was an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." ' " Id. (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2014For a waiver to be effective “ ‘it must be clearly established that there was an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2026Waiver “is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 20 .

2024See People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 20 (Waiver “ ‘is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’ ” while forfeiture is “ ‘the failure to make the timely assertion of [a] right.’ ” (quoting People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36 )). -5- rulings on summary judgment and on the constitutionality of a statute.

2024“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. ¶ 68 “Before a defendant’s confession can be admitted at trial, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his or her privilege against self- incrimination and his or her right to counsel.” In re J.M., 2014 IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 24 (citing In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 327 (1995)). “[A] defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent,

2020He signed the form, waiving his rights, and proceeded to speak with Detective Hendricks and Lieutenant - 14 - Moore. ¶ 33 “In order to be valid, a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent, which means it must reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In re J.M., 2014 IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 24 , 8 N.E.3d 1213 (citing Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 514 , 810 N.E.2d at 486 ).

2025A knowing and intelligent waiver is one that reflects “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 327-28 .

2024“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. ¶ 68 “Before a defendant’s confession can be admitted at trial, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his or her privilege against self- incrimination and his or her right to counsel.” In re J.M., 2014 IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 24 (citing In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 327 (1995)). “[A] defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent,

2022The federal authority Spiegel relies on similarly states, “There is a presumption - 11 - 1-20-1142 against the waiver of constitutional rights, [citation], and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4 . ¶ 20 Also pertinent here is: “A waiver is permanent and cannot be withdrawn [(citation)], unless the waiving party unequivocally shows that the waiver was unknowing, involuntary, or unintentional.

2014For a waiver to be effective " 'it must be clearly established that there was an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." ' " Id. (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2022Courts must “ ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel.” Burton, 184 Ill. 2d at 23 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). ¶ 20 Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel, “a reviewing court must determine whether there was an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Vanderweff, 57 Ill.

1991App. 3d at 49-50 , 372 N.E.2d at 1019 .) Clearly, the Vanderwerff court was discussing inquiries the trial court should make when determining whether a defendant is making “an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” These inquiries concerned waiver-, they had nothing to do with inquiring into the defendant’s ability to conduct his own defense, as the courts in Kavinsky, Graves, and Siler stated.

2019Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 211 (2003).

2019Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 211 (2003).

2025See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 21 (constitutional claims may be waived); Petey’s Two Real Estate, LLC v. Goedert, 2024 IL App (1st) 220960, ¶ 35 (“waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). ¶ 78 Moreover, even if PepsiCo’s equal protection claim had not been waived, we would find that no constitutional violation occurred.

2025See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 21 (constitutional claims may be waived); Petey’s Two Real Estate, LLC v. Goedert, 2024 IL App (1st) 220960, ¶ 35 (“waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). ¶ 77 Moreover, even if PepsiCo’s equal protection claim had not been waived, we would find that no constitutional violation occurred.

2025See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 21 (constitutional claims may be waived); Petey’s Two Real Estate, LLC v. Goedert, 2024 IL App (1st) 220960, ¶ 35 (“waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). ¶ 78 Moreover, even if PepsiCo’s equal protection claim had not been waived, we would find that no constitutional violation occurred.

2025See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 21 (constitutional claims may be waived); Petey’s Two Real Estate, LLC v. Goedert, 2024 IL App (1st) 220960, ¶ 35 (“waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). ¶ 77 Moreover, even if PepsiCo’s equal protection claim had not been waived, we would find that no constitutional violation occurred.

2024OSAD’s action is evidence of waiver, which is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. ¶ 23 “The well-established rule is that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal.” People v. Hood, 210 Ill.

2024OSAD’s action is evidence of waiver, which is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. ¶ 32 “The well-established rule is that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal.” People v. Hood, 210 Ill.

2021People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 228 (1994). ¶ 43 Rights, however, can be waived. “[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36 .

2019People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 228 (1994). ¶ 43 Rights, however, can be waived. “[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36 .

2014Our supreme court has explained -6- No. 1-11-3534 " ' "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." ' " Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d at 403 (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 19 We hold defendant has shown error occurred in this case.

2014Our supreme court has explained: “ ‘ “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d at 403 (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 19 We hold defendant has shown error occurred in this case.

2014Our supreme court has explained -6- No. 1-11-3534 " ' "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." ' " Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d at 403 (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 19 We hold defendant has shown error occurred in this case.

2014Our supreme court has explained: “ ‘ “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d at 403 (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 19 We hold defendant has shown error occurred in this case.

2022Courts must “ ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel.” Burton, 184 Ill. 2d at 23 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). ¶ 20 Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel, “a reviewing court must determine whether there was an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Vanderweff, 57 Ill.

1991The question of waiver is a matter of Federal constitutional law, and thereunder the State must prove “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404 , 51 L.

2020A defendant may competently waive counsel if such an election is voluntary and constitutes “ ‘a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91 (1982) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)).

1996In People v. Baker (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91 , 440 N.E.2d 856, 859 , the supreme court addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to appear pro se and wrote the following: "[A] defendant may competently waive counsel if such an election is voluntary and constitutes 'a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 68 L.

2020A defendant may competently waive counsel if such an election is voluntary and constitutes “ ‘a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91 (1982) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)).

1996In People v. Baker (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91 , 440 N.E.2d 856, 859 , the supreme court addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to appear pro se and wrote the following: "[A] defendant may competently waive counsel if such an election is voluntary and constitutes 'a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 68 L.

1980L.J. 1 , 95 (1978).) In order to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel, however, the State must prove "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" ( Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 439 , 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 ; see also People v. Medina (1978), 71 Ill.2d 254, 263 ; People v. Washington (1977), 68 Ill.2d 186, 194 , cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 981 , 56 L.Ed.2d 72 , 98 S.Ct. 1631 ; People v. Turner (1973), 56 Ill.2d 201, 205

1974(People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 500 (1968) and cases cited therein.) The cmcial test as to whether defendant’s rights were knowingly waived was recently addressed by the supreme court in People v. Turner, 56 Ill.2d 201, 205-06 (1973), wherein the court, quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938), stated: “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

1975The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ This court has long recognized that the mental capacity of a defendant must be taken into consideration in determining whether his actions were voluntary (People v. Klyczek, 307 Ill. 150, 155 ) and while mental deficiency, of itself, does not render a confession involuntary (People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489 ) it is a factor which must be considered in

1974(People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 500 (1968) and cases cited therein.) The cmcial test as to whether defendant’s rights were knowingly waived was recently addressed by the supreme court in People v. Turner, 56 Ill.2d 201, 205-06 (1973), wherein the court, quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938), stated: “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2024“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. ¶ 68 “Before a defendant’s confession can be admitted at trial, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his or her privilege against self- incrimination and his or her right to counsel.” In re J.M., 2014 IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 24 (citing In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 327 (1995)). “[A] defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent,

2020He signed the form, waiving his rights, and proceeded to speak with Detective Hendricks and Lieutenant - 14 - Moore. ¶ 33 “In order to be valid, a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent, which means it must reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In re J.M., 2014 IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 24 , 8 N.E.3d 1213 (citing Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 514 , 810 N.E.2d at 486 ).

2009See People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 514 , 810 N.E.2d 472, 486 (2003), citing People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 , 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000) (“Waivers *** must be knowing and intelligent acts in the sense that they are done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); see also Redmon, 127 Ill.

2009See People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 514 , 810 N.E.2d 472, 486 (2003), citing People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 , 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000) (“Waivers *** must be knowing and intelligent acts in the sense that they are done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); see also Redmon, 127 Ill.