known right privilege in Massachusetts

2017Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (jury trial)], and always requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege"); rule 38(d), supra ("A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties").

1992Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 [1937] [jury trial]), and always requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.

1981It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of abandonment of a known right or privilege; a matter which depends in each case “upon the particular, facts and cir-; cumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

1979Specifically, the defendant notes that it is "incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

2005See also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 374 Mass. 426, 433 (1978).

2001See also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 374 Mass. 426, 433 (1978).

1992See Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 Mass. 707, 709 (1949).” Spence v. Reeder, 382 Mass. 398, 411-412 (1981).

1981See Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 Mass. 707 , 709 *412 (1949).

1981See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979).

1979Specifically, the defendant notes that it is "incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

2005“Waivers of counsel must be a voluntary ... a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (citations omitted).

2001“Waivers of counsel must be a voluntary ... a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 482 .

2018See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 501 U.S. 868 , 894 n.2, 111 S.Ct. 2631 , 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (waiver is "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," which is more exacting than forfeiture and "merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur").

2018See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 501 U.S. 868 , 894 n.2, 111 S.Ct. 2631 , 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (waiver is "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," which is more exacting than forfeiture and "merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur").

1992See Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 Mass. 707, 709 (1949).” Spence v. Reeder, 382 Mass. 398, 411-412 (1981).

1981See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979).

1981See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979).

1981Irhe Court specifically noted !that the right to cpunsel was a ¿rime example of those .rights requiring the special protection! pf the know-..' ing and intelligent waiver standard, id., at 241 , J but held that “(t)he considerations that informed the Court’s hplding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present cáse/’412 U.S., at 246.

1981Irhe Court specifically noted !that the right to cpunsel was a ¿rime example of those .rights requiring the special protection! pf the know-..' ing and intelligent waiver standard, id., at 241 , J but held that “(t)he considerations that informed the Court’s hplding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present cáse/’412 U.S., at 246.

1981See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979).

1977It is clear from reading the entire transcript that the defendant was not denied the right or reasonable opportunity to cross-examine Wallace and Evans. *811 We have held in numerous cases that “the scope of cross-examination, including to what extent the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness may be tested, rests largely in the sound discretion of the judge, not subject to revision unless prejudice is shown to a party by reason of too narrow restriction or too great breadth of inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 731 (1976), quoting from Commonwealth v. Smith, 329 Mass. 47

1977It is clear from reading the entire transcript that the defendant was not denied the right or reasonable opportunity to cross-examine Wallace and Evans. *811 We have held in numerous cases that “the scope of cross-examination, including to what extent the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness may be tested, rests largely in the sound discretion of the judge, not subject to revision unless prejudice is shown to a party by reason of too narrow restriction or too great breadth of inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 731 (1976), quoting from Commonwealth v. Smith, 329 Mass. 47

1977Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), defined a waiver as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In view of the importance of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court has insisted that waiver of that right “is not lightly to be inferred.” Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949).