8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2010Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶20 , 650 N.W.2d at 30 . [¶ 25.] A valid waiver requires a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edw ards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 2010Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶20 , 650 N.W.2d at 30 . [¶ 25.] A valid waiver requires a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edw ards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Ronald E. Schwensowgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., U.S. v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 660 (7th Cir. 1998) (valid waiver because court did not find defendant impaired by effects of withdrawal from alcohol or anti-depressant drug at time of interview). [2] As the United States Supreme Court explained in Edwards v. Arizona, waivers of Fifth Amendment rights after Miranda warnings have been given "must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the backgr | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2002In contrast, in Michigan v. Mosley, the Supreme Court made clear that a suspect who invokes the right to silence in response to police questioning may again be subject to police-initiated interrogation so long as the police "scrupulously honor[ ]" the suspect's choice. 423 U.S. 96, 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321 (1975). 2002In contrast, in Michigan v. Mosley, the Supreme Court made clear that a suspect who invokes the right to silence in response to police questioning may again be subject to police-initiated interrogation so long as the police "scrupulously honor[ ]" the suspect's choice. 423 U.S. 96, 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2016We acknowledge that for a “waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional-relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 2016We acknowledge that for a “waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional-relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 6 | 1979–2016 |
McCarthy v. United States
green
2 sentences2016We acknowledge that for a “waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional-relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 2016We acknowledge that for a “waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional-relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 2 | 1969–2016 |
State v. Tuttle
green
2 sentences2010Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶20 , 650 N.W.2d at 30 . [¶ 25.] A valid waiver requires a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edw ards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 2010Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶20 , 650 N.W.2d at 30 . [¶ 25.] A valid waiver requires a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edw ards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Cottier
green
2 sentences2010“To establish that a defendant validly waived his Miranda rights ‘the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them.’” Cottier, 2008 SD 79, ¶ 18 , 755 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 9 , 650 N.W.2d at 26 ). 2010“To establish that a defendant validly waived his Miranda rights ‘the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them.’” Cottier, 2008 SD 79, ¶ 18 , 755 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 9 , 650 N.W.2d at 26 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence1979Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Pierce v. Cardwell, supra; People v. Harris, supra. The standard to be used by a court in determining whether or not an accused has effectively waived his right to counsel is found in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 ; 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated: It has been pointed out that ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an inten *600 tional relinquishment or aba | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Joe Vern Pierce v. Harold J. Cardwell, Superintendent Arizona State Prison
green
1 sentence1979Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Pierce v. Cardwell, supra; People v. Harris, supra. The standard to be used by a court in determining whether or not an accused has effectively waived his right to counsel is found in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 ; 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated: It has been pointed out that ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an inten *600 tional relinquishment or aba | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Sewell
green
2 sentences1969In State v. Sewell, 69 S.D. 494 , 12 N.W.2d 198 , the defendant appealed from a judgment imposing the death sentence upon his plea of guilty of the crime of murder. 1969In State v. Sewell, 69 S.D. 494 , 12 N.W.2d 198 , the defendant appealed from a judgment imposing the death sentence upon his plea of guilty of the crime of murder. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.