known right privilege in California

2023That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. [¶] (2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [¶] (3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoti

2022“There can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent ‘an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 497 .) Courts must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.” (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 .) In certain circumstances, defendants may impliedly waive their rights to be present at trial by voluntarily absenting themselves.

2024J. waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ ”].) Although “the two terms on occasion have been used interchangeably” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880, fn. 1 (Sheena K.)), “they are quite different” (People v. Giles (2007) 40 Cal.4th 833, 849 ).

2010(E.g., In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880, fn. 1 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ]; People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 9 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 ]; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, fn. 6 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 853 P.2d 1093 ].) Under this approach, the term “waiver” refers to a party’s intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, while “forfeiture” is used to refer to the loss of a right resulting from the failure to *740 assert it in a timely fashion.

2011(People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 ] (Vargas).) “Waivers may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo. [Citation.]” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 ].) Waiver is defined “as ‘[a]n intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2011(People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 ] (Vargas).) “Waivers may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo. [Citation.]” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 ].) Waiver is defined “as ‘[a]n intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2022Indeed, “[a]ppellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 186 , italics added; see Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80 [reiterating that defendants may waive the right to appeal “as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement”].) The bargained-for requirement relates closely to the predicate that a valid waiver comprises the “intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” (Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.) The analysis in Panizzon is illustrative.

2022Indeed, “[a]ppellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 186 , italics added; see Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80 [reiterating that defendants may waive the right to appeal “as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement”].) The bargained-for requirement relates closely to the predicate that a valid waiver comprises the “intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” (Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.) The analysis in Panizzon is illustrative.

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2023That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. [¶] (2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [¶] (3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoti

2021That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. “(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. “(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoting Joh

2007(United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 508 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ], citing Freytag v. Commissioner (1991) 501 U.S. 868, 894-895, fn. 2 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 764 , 111 S.Ct. 2631 ] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [“[t]he two are really not the same.”].) “Waiver, the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’ [citation], is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur.

2007(United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 508 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ], citing Freytag v. Commissioner (1991) 501 U.S. 868, 894-895, fn. 2 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 764 , 111 S.Ct. 2631 ] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [“[t]he two are really not the same.”].) “Waiver, the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’ [citation], is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur.

1971Moreover, with respect to the question of waiver based on the asserted failure of that attorney "to make timely on-the-spot objection pointing out the claimed unfairness," the record is devoid of any evidence that the lineup was conducted under such circumstances that the attorney was afforded a meaningful opportunity to make any objection. *188 A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ( People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 669-670 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ].) The conclusion that there was a waiver of the constitutional right here

1971Moreover, with respect to the question of waiver based on the asserted failure of that attorney "to make timely on-the-spot objection pointing out the claimed unfairness," the record is devoid of any evidence that the lineup was conducted under such circumstances that the attorney was afforded a meaningful opportunity to make any objection. *188 A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ( People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 669-670 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ].) The conclusion that there was a waiver of the constitutional right here

1968(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 490 fn. 14 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 985 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; In re Berry, 43 Cal.2d 838, 846 [ 279 P.2d 18 ].) ' “ [A] finding of waiver is not lightly to be made” ’ (People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430, 434 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]) and ‘It has been pointed out that “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of fundamental constitutional rights and that we “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” A waiver is ordinaril

1968(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 490 fn. 14 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 985 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; In re Berry, 43 Cal.2d 838, 846 [ 279 P.2d 18 ].) ' “ [A] finding of waiver is not lightly to be made” ’ (People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430, 434 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]) and ‘It has been pointed out that “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of fundamental constitutional rights and that we “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” A waiver is ordinaril

2019First, California law defines waiver as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ( Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729 , 745, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 .) Under this definition, waiver is based on intent. ( Ibid. ) The intent to waive may be expressed in words, either oral or written, or implied by a party's conduct. ( Ibid. ) Here, Smith has not expressly relinquished his right of access to the courts.

2019First, California law defines waiver as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ( Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729 , 745, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 .) Under this definition, waiver is based on intent. ( Ibid. ) The intent to waive may be expressed in words, either oral or written, or implied by a party's conduct. ( Ibid. ) Here, Smith has not expressly relinquished his right of access to the courts.

2024We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.) “It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which de

2024We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.) “It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which de

2024(See In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 415 [minor has a “constitutional right to the benefit of his completed plea bargain”]; V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455 , 1465–1466 [same], disapproved on other grounds as stated in Greg F., at p. 415; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 864 [“there can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ [Citation.] No less should a court presume from mere silence that [a] defendant is waiving 3 implementation of the consideration that induced him to waive hi

1998This is consistent with the general principle of constitutional law that violations of fundamental constitutional rights will not be *114 deemed waived by virtue of mere silence. (“Of course, there can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 864 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 654 P.2d 211 ].)) We are unable to meaningfully distinguish our case factually from Sandoval .

2020(Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoting Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 ; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 (Panizzon)). “ ‘[T]he valid waiver of a right presupposes an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the very right being waived. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1662 (Vargas), quoting Jones v. Brown (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 513, 519 .) 2 People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). 4 A general waiver of the right to appeal does not preclude an appeal from an unforeseen error that occurs after the waiver is entered because

2013Given the negotiated disposition we are waiving suitability findings.” While defense counsel did, indeed, state defendant was “waiving” a DEJ suitability hearing, counsel was laboring under the same erroneous view of the law the court shared—that because defendant was pleading to a lesser offense than alleged in the petition, he was ineligible for DEJ. “[A] waiver is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 85 , quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ,3 italics added; see also City of Ukiah v. Fones (1

1984Appellant’s mere acquiescence in his trial counsel’s handling of the case does not constitute “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 464 [ 82 L.Ed. at p. 1466 ].) In the present case, “there was not even minimal compliance with such constitutional requisites for a valid waiver of the right to counsel . ...” (In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 337 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) Appellant was deprived of his fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, and there was no valid waiver of same.

1984Appellant’s mere acquiescence in his trial counsel’s handling of the case does not constitute “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 464 [ 82 L.Ed. at p. 1466 ].) In the present case, “there was not even minimal compliance with such constitutional requisites for a valid waiver of the right to counsel . ...” (In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 337 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) Appellant was deprived of his fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, and there was no valid waiver of same.

2024As the Court of Appeal has recognized, the purpose of the RJA is not only to remedy the effects of racial bias on individual criminal defendants but to eliminate the impact of such bias “on our system of justice as a whole” because “[d]iscrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice.” (Simmons, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 , 809 [The intent of the Legislature was “to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system.”]; Bonds, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 [The Legisla

2024As the Court of Appeal has recognized, the purpose of the RJA is not only to remedy the effects of racial bias on individual criminal defendants but to eliminate the impact of such bias “on our system of justice as a whole” because “[d]iscrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice.” (Simmons, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 , 809 [The intent of the Legislature was “to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system.”]; Bonds, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 [The Legisla

2024As the Court of Appeal has recognized, the purpose of the RJA is not only to remedy the effects of racial bias on individual criminal defendants but to eliminate the impact of such bias “on our system of justice as a whole” because “[d]iscrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice.” (Simmons, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 , 809 [The intent of the Legislature was “to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system.”]; Bonds, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 [The Legisla

2024As the Court of Appeal has recognized, the purpose of the RJA is not only to remedy the effects of racial bias on individual criminal defendants but to eliminate the impact of such bias “on our system of justice as a whole” because “[d]iscrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice.” (Simmons, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 , 809 [The intent of the Legislature was “to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system.”]; Bonds, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 [The Legisla

2024We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.) “It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which de

2024We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.) “It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which de

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2024(Alcocer v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 951, 957-958 .) However, we express serious reservation with the proposition that the trial court’s concerns regarding the potential for an RJA claim may be adequately addressed by waiver. “ ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 435 .) However, “a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court. . . . ‘Although a defendant may waive rig

2026If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” (Id. at pp. 474-475.) Later, in Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , the United States Supreme Court clarified that, “ ‘an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.’ ” (Id. at p. 485.) “[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter wh

2024We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, fn. omitted.) “It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which de

2023That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. [¶] (2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [¶] (3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoti

2021That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. “(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. “(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16 , quoting Joh

2022“Under California law, a waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1506 (Smith); see City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins.

2014(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 .) “[A] waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . [Citation.] Waiver is a question of fact.” (Smith v. Selma Community Hosp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1506 .) The testimony provided by Halvas, plaintiff’s own divorce attorney, and the documentary evidence from his divorce all tended to demonstrate that plaintiff waived his claim to his unpaid salary in order to avoid any community claim to it by his wife.

2020Waiver requires “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ ” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 525 ), and the circumstances here show a person who sought in various ways to press his timely trial right and was finally compelled to seek the removal of his appointed counsel in December 2018 when his demands fell on deaf ears.

2013The proposed rule, in effect, presumed a waiver of the constitutional right and was diametrically opposed to the court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights: a waiver requires “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ [Citation.]” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 525 .) Although the court rejected “the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right” (id. at p. 528, fn. omitted), it held the “assertion of or failure to assert [the] right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an in

2025“Of course, there can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ [Citation.] No less should a court presume from mere silence that defendant is waiving implementation of the consideration that induced him to waive his constitutional rights.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, . . . when the trial court fails to give a section 1192.5 admonition, the defendant’s failure to object at sentencing does not waive his claim on appeal.” (People v. Silva (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 578, 589 , quoting People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 102

2024(In re Jermaine B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634, 640 ; see also People v. Silva (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 578, 589 (Silva).) However, section 1192.5 requires the trial court to inform a defendant prior to accepting the plea that its approval is not binding and may be withdrawn, and “in that case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea if the defendant desires to do so.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (c).) “If a defendant, who has been admonished concerning the right to withdraw the plea, does not object to punishment in excess of the bargain, the defendant relinquishes the right to withdraw the pl

2024(See generally People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267 , 272 [waiver “is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege”; “ ‘ “[T]he valid waiver of a right presupposes an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the very right being waived” ’ ”].) Estoppel is not the same as waiver, though the terms are sometimes used “indiscriminately.” (DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 59 .) Estoppel may apply to prevent a defendant from “ ‘trifl[ing] with the courts.’ ” (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2

2022Indeed, “[a]ppellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 186 , italics added; see Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80 [reiterating that defendants may waive the right to appeal “as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement”].) The bargained-for requirement relates closely to the predicate that a valid waiver comprises the “intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” (Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.) The analysis in Panizzon is illustrative.