known right privilege in Georgia

2018A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." *625 Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

2018A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." *625 Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

1998A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. *330 The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 196 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981).

1998A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. *330 The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 196 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981).

2020In making that determination with respect to an accused who has invoked his rights, “a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Edwards, 451 U. S. at 484 (II). [W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,

2020In making that determination with respect to an accused who has invoked his rights, “a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Edwards, 451 U. S. at 484 (II). [W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,

1981Before waiver of confrontation rights can be found, the state must meet the "appropriately heavy burden" set forth in *251 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461) (1938) — it must establish "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236-237 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973); see also United States v. Tortora, 464 F2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Morotta, 518 F2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975).

1981Before waiver of confrontation rights can be found, the state must meet the “appropriately heavy burden” set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461) (1938) — it must establish “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236-237 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973); see also United States v. Tortora, 464 F2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Morotta, 518 F2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975).

2016“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Taylor, 239 Ga. at 503 , and the determination of whether there has been a valid waiver depends on the circumstances of each case.

1992Faretta v. California, supra. Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501 ( 238 SE2d 52 ) (1977), applied the Johnson v. Zerbst standard that ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2011See id. (citing cases dating back to Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir.1973)). [6] At the time Bruce v. Estelle was decided, however, "procedural default" in federal habeas corpus was treated as the equivalent of deliberate "waiver." See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-439 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (holding that "the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an *346 applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies" and emphasizing that "[t]he classic definition of wai

2011See id. (citing cases dating back to Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1973)). 6 At the time Bruce v. Estelle was decided, however, “procedural default” in federal habeas corpus was treated as the equivalent of deliberate “waiver.” See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438-439 (83 SC 822, 9 LE2d 837) (1963) (holding that “the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies” and emphasizing that “[t]he classic definition of waiver ... — ‘an

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2022“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her defense, that right is personal to the defendant, and the decision whether to testify is made by the defendant after consultation with counsel.”10 “Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make.”11 Counsel’s advice “is crucial because in the absence of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, there

2013Likewise, Florida courts define “waiver” as “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, or conduct that warrants an inference of the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hale v. Dept. of Revenue, 973 So.2d 518, 522 (Fla. App. 2007).

2011“A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 236 Ga. App. 645, 648 (2) ( 512 SE2d 913 ) (1999).

2011“A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 236 Ga. App. 645, 648 (2) ( 512 SE2d 913 ) (1999).

2011See id. (citing cases dating back to Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir.1973)). [6] At the time Bruce v. Estelle was decided, however, "procedural default" in federal habeas corpus was treated as the equivalent of deliberate "waiver." See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-439 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (holding that "the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an *346 applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies" and emphasizing that "[t]he classic definition of wai

2011See id. (citing cases dating back to Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1973)). 6 At the time Bruce v. Estelle was decided, however, “procedural default” in federal habeas corpus was treated as the equivalent of deliberate “waiver.” See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438-439 (83 SC 822, 9 LE2d 837) (1963) (holding that “the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies” and emphasizing that “[t]he classic definition of waiver ... — ‘an

2011See id. (citing cases dating back to Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir.1973)). [6] At the time Bruce v. Estelle was decided, however, "procedural default" in federal habeas corpus was treated as the equivalent of deliberate "waiver." See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-439 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (holding that "the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an *346 applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies" and emphasizing that "[t]he classic definition of wai

2006Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (90 SC 1463, 25 LE2d 747) (1970).

1999(Citations and punctuation omitted.) White v. State, 168 Ga. App. 794, 795 ( 310 SE2d 540 ) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717, n. 3 ( 482 SE2d 330 ) (1997).

1999(Citations and punctuation omitted.) White v. State, 168 Ga. App. 794, 795 ( 310 SE2d 540 ) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717, n. 3 ( 482 SE2d 330 ) (1997).

1999“One cannot acquiesce in a wrong while ignorant that it has been committed.” Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 709 ( 30 SE2d 627 ) (1944).

1999“One cannot acquiesce in a wrong while ignorant that it has been committed.” Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 709 ( 30 SE2d 627 ) (1944).

1999(Citations and punctuation omitted.) White v. State, 168 Ga. App. 794, 795 ( 310 SE2d 540 ) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717, n. 3 ( 482 SE2d 330 ) (1997).

1999(Citations and punctuation omitted.) White v. State, 168 Ga. App. 794, 795 ( 310 SE2d 540 ) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717, n. 3 ( 482 SE2d 330 ) (1997).

1999A waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Williams v. State, 183 Ga. App. 373, 374 (1) ( 358 SE2d 914 ) (1987).

1999A waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Williams v. State, 183 Ga. App. 373, 374 (1) ( 358 SE2d 914 ) (1987).

1994See also Callaway v. State, supra. Cf. Mock v. State, 163 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 293 SE2d 525 ) (1982). "[T]he standard for waiver requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, and the `"constitutional right of the accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel.

1994See also Callaway v. State, supra. Cf. Mock v. State, 163 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 293 SE2d 525 ) (1982). "[T]he standard for waiver requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, and the `"constitutional right of the accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel.

1993Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 220 (1) ( 401 SE2d 43 ) (1990) (physical precedent only but cited in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), in connection with waiver of counsel.

1993Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 220 (1) ( 401 SE2d 43 ) (1990) (physical precedent only but cited in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), in connection with waiver of counsel.

1993Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 220 (1) ( 401 SE2d 43 ) (1990) (physical precedent only but cited in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), in connection with waiver of counsel.

1993Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 220 (1) ( 401 SE2d 43 ) (1990) (physical precedent only but cited in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), in connection with waiver of counsel.

1987The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra at 464.’ ” McCook v. State, 178 Ga. App. 276 ( 342 SE2d 757 ) (1986); see also Lazenby v. State, 181 Ga. App. 854 (1) ( 354 SE2d 196 ) (1987); Bradley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 865 (1) ( 219 SE2d 451 ) (1975).

1987The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra at 464.’ ” McCook v. State, 178 Ga. App. 276 ( 342 SE2d 757 ) (1986); see also Lazenby v. State, 181 Ga. App. 854 (1) ( 354 SE2d 196 ) (1987); Bradley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 865 (1) ( 219 SE2d 451 ) (1975).

1985The determination whether an accused has intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege, such as a Miranda right to counsel, is determined by reference to “ ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 [58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461]; [cits].” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374-375 (99 SC 1755, 60 LE2d 286) (1979).