known right privilege in Louisiana

2002We turn next to the issue of whether the waiver was "knowing and intelligent." With regard to proving that a knowing and intelligent and voluntary waiver of counsel has been made, the court in State v. Carter, supra, made the following pronouncement: To show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, the State must prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." In other words, a defendant may waive his right to counsel "if he knows *1046 what he is doing and the choice is made with eyes open." A statement or confession is voluntary only if it

2001Carter, 664 So.2d at 385 .

1986Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

1985The Supreme Court in Edwards held that a waiver of the right to counsel must not only be voluntary, [B]ut must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 101 S.Ct. at 1884 . (citations omitted) In Edwards , the defendant asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent.

2009Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)(test of voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment does not rely on a waiver of a known right or privilege, e.g., the right to refuse consent, but takes into account the totality of all of the circumstances in determining whether the consent was a product of an individual’s “ 'free and unconstrained choice,' ” or of police duress and coercion.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 , 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)).

2009Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)(test of voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment does not rely on a waiver of a known right or privilege, e.g., the right to refuse consent, but takes into account the totality of all of the circumstances in determining whether the consent was a product of an individual’s “ 'free and unconstrained choice,' ” or of police duress and coercion.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 , 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)).

2009Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)(test of voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment does not rely on a waiver of a known right or privilege, e.g., the right to refuse consent, but takes into account the totality of all of the circumstances in determining whether the consent was a product of an individual’s “ 'free and unconstrained choice,' ” or of police duress and coercion.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 , 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)).

2009Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)(test of voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment does not rely on a waiver of a known right or privilege, e.g., the right to refuse consent, but takes into account the totality of all of the circumstances in determining whether the consent was a product of an individual’s “ 'free and unconstrained choice,' ” or of police duress and coercion.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 , 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)).

1989In Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973), the Supreme Court found that the defendant, who left the trial after it had commenced, had waived his right of presence at trial and said: "Petitioner, however, insists that his mere voluntary absence from his trial cannot be construed as an effective waiver, *1356 that is, `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' ... unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court not only that he had a right to be present but also that the trial would con

1989In Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973), the Supreme Court found that the defendant, who left the trial after it had commenced, had waived his right of presence at trial and said: "Petitioner, however, insists that his mere voluntary absence from his trial cannot be construed as an effective waiver, *1356 that is, `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' ... unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court not only that he had a right to be present but also that the trial would con

1983A defendant may waive his sixth amendment right to legal representation when the government interrogates him after the commencement of adversarial proceedings, but "it is incumbent upon the [prosecution] to prove an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 at 1075 , rehearing denied, 688 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.1982), quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 at 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 at 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).

1983The validity of a waiver is determined by carefully scrutinizing "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused." Jordan, supra at 1074 quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

1983A defendant may waive his sixth amendment right to legal representation when the government interrogates him after the commencement of adversarial proceedings, but "it is incumbent upon the [prosecution] to prove an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 at 1075 , rehearing denied, 688 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.1982), quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 at 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 at 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).

1981In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-626 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189-2190 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court stated: "[waiver is] `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1461 ] (1938).

1981In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-626 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189-2190 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court stated: "[waiver is] `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1461 ] (1938).