known right privilege in Colorado

2026Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (citation omitted).

2026Waiver and Preservation ¶ 27 We first address the People’s argument that Martin waived his contention that the trial court erred by declining to include a multiple assailants or apparent necessity instruction in the self- defense jury instructions and therefore Martin failed to preserve this contention. ¶ 28 According to the People, Martin waived his jury instruction contention because at trial he “requested the instructions without any argument on why they were appropriate” and “conceded that . . . [the trial court] was not ‘required’ to give [the instructions].” We disagree with the People t

2026See Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 11 (“The doctrine of invited error prevents a party from complaining on appeal of an error that he or she has invited or injected into the case.”); Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243 , 14 247 (Colo. 1984) (“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”).

2026A. Waiver ¶8 The Attorney General contends that Aragon waived this contention because the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court thoroughly reviewed the jury instructions, making edits and additions, and Aragon did not specifically ask for a definition for the word “harm” for second degree assault. ¶9 Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)).

2025We further noted the time-honored principle that "we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.'" Id. (quoting People v. Curtis , 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984)). ¶57 We next observed that the requirement of an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege distinguishes a waiver from a forfeiture, which, we noted, "is 'the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.'" Id. at ¶ 40, 416 P.3d at 902 (quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).

2025See Rediger, ¶ 40 (“The requirement of an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege . . . distinguishes a waiver from a forfeiture, which is ‘the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.’” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))).

2026Waiver and Preservation ¶ 27 We first address the People’s argument that Martin waived his contention that the trial court erred by declining to include a multiple assailants or apparent necessity instruction in the self- defense jury instructions and therefore Martin failed to preserve this contention. ¶ 28 According to the People, Martin waived his jury instruction contention because at trial he “requested the instructions without any argument on why they were appropriate” and “conceded that . . . [the trial court] was not ‘required’ to give [the instructions].” We disagree with the People t

2026And, unlike the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, which requires “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege,” Rediger, ¶ 39 (citation omitted), the waiver of a statutory right demands a less stringent showing, People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30 , ¶ 13 (“When the right at issue is a statutory right, waiver ‘must be voluntary, but need not be knowing and intelligent.’” (quoting Finney, ¶ 16)). ¶ 17 Moreover, while “[w]aiver can be demonstrated through explicit words or actions,” id., it can also be implied, “as when a party engages in conduct that manifests an intent t

2025We further noted the time-honored principle that " we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.' " Id. ( quoting People v. Curtis , 681 P.2d 504, 514 ( Colo. 1984 ) ) . ¶57 We next observed that the requirement of an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege distinguishes a waiver from a forfeiture, which, we noted, "is 'the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.' " Id. at ¶ 40 , 416 P.3d at 902 ( quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 ( 1993 ) ) .

2025We further noted the time-honored principle that "we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.'" Id. (quoting People v. Curtis , 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984)). ¶57 We next observed that the requirement of an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege distinguishes a waiver from a forfeiture, which, we noted, "is 'the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.'" Id. at ¶ 40, 416 P.3d at 902 (quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).

2026See Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 16 , 443 P.3d 1016, 1022 . ¶ 51 “Waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 , 416 P.3d 893, 902 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)).

2026See Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 16 , 443 P.3d 1016, 1022 . ¶ 51 “Waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 , 416 P.3d 893, 902 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)).

2011In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court defined the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

2011In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court defined the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

2005A waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Colo.l986)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)).

2005A waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Colo.1986)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)).

2015We have also acknowledged Olano’s definition of waiver as the “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’†Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2007) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 , in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); see also People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 498 (Colo. 2007) (holding that “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege†is required for a defendant to waive his Sixth Amendment right to sentencing by jury). ¶30      The majority correctly points out that not all constitutional right

2015We have also acknowledged Plano’s definition of waiver as the “ ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2007) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); see also People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 498 (Colo. 2007) (holding that “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege” is required for a defendant to waive his Sixth Amendment right to sentencing by jury). ¶ 30 The majority correctly points out that not all constitutional rights requir

2026See Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 11 (“The doctrine of invited error prevents a party from complaining on appeal of an error that he or she has invited or injected into the case.”); Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243 , 14 247 (Colo. 1984) (“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”).

2025Similarly, “[w]aiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege,’” but “a court must find some record evidence that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right, indulging ‘every reasonable presumption against waiver’ and examining the totality of the 31 circumstances surrounding a party’s conduct (or lack thereof).” Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 10 (citations omitted). ¶ 70 While Meridien requested a permissive inference as an alternative to its desired mandatory inference, raising an alternative argument does not meet the high bar for waiver or invited er

2025See Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 16 (waiver requires an “intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”); People v. 5 Zapata, 779 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1989) (the doctrine of invited error applies when a party has invited or injected the error into the case). ¶ 16 Under the circumstances here, we are not persuaded that Baldwin intentionally relinquished a known right or injected the alleged error into the case by raising only a limited objection to the court’s proposed response.

2024“Thus, while waiver requires ‘intent,’ forfeiture occurs ‘through neglect.’” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 20 Under the doctrine of invited error, “a party may not complain on appeal of an error that he has invited or injected int o the case; he must abide the consequences of his acts.” People v. Zapat a , 779 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1989).

2024This is because “[a] guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal charge,” and “[g]enerally . . . precludes review of issues that arose prior to the plea.” Neuhaus , ¶ 8. “[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal pro cess,’ after which a defendant may not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior t o the entry of the guilty plea.” Jennings , ¶ 8 (quoting Neuhaus , ¶ 8); Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). ¶ 36 B y pleading guilty, Cohen waived her rig

2024This is because “[a] guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal charge,” and “[g]enerally . . . precludes review of issues that arose prior to the plea.” Neuhaus , ¶ 8. “[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal pro cess,’ after which a defendant may not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior t o the entry of the guilty plea.” Jennings , ¶ 8 (quoting Neuhaus , ¶ 8); Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). ¶ 36 B y pleading guilty, Cohen waived her rig

2024This is because “[a] guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal charge,” and “[g]enerally . . . precludes review of issues that arose prior to the plea.” Neuhaus , ¶ 8. “[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal pro cess,’ after which a defendant may not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior t o the entry of the guilty plea.” Jennings , ¶ 8 (quoting Neuhaus , ¶ 8); Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). ¶ 36 B y pleading guilty, Cohen waived her rig

2024This is because “[a] guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal charge,” and “[g]enerally . . . precludes review of issues that arose prior to the plea.” Neuhaus , ¶ 8. “[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal pro cess,’ after which a defendant may not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior t o the entry of the guilty plea.” Jennings , ¶ 8 (quoting Neuhaus , ¶ 8); Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). ¶ 36 B y pleading guilty, Cohen waived her rig

2024Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue , 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)). ¶ 35 “[A] guilty plea waives fundamental Sixth Amendment rights, among others, unless the claim relates directly to the adequ acy of the guilty plea (i.e., whether it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent).” Jennings , ¶ 13.

2024Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue , 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)). ¶ 35 “[A] guilty plea waives fundamental Sixth Amendment rights, among others, unless the claim relates directly to the adequ acy of the guilty plea (i.e., whether it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent).” Jennings , ¶ 13.

1994Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 , 98 S.Ct. at 1178 ; Castro, 657 P.2d at 945-46 ; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (regarding intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege).

1994Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 , 98 S.Ct. at 1178 ; Castro, 657 P.2d at 945-46 ; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (regarding intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege).

2025Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21 . ¶ 22 “Waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)).

2025Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21 . ¶8 “Waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)). ¶9 “Defendants . . . affirmatively waive their right to public trial by not objecting to known [courtroom] closures.” Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 17 , cited with approval in People v. Hernandez, 2021 CO 45 , ¶ 35.

2019We concluded in Rediger that “a showing of waiver requires some evidence, beyond mere acquiescence, that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege.” People v. Smith, 2018 CO 33, ¶ 17 , 416 P.3d 886 , 890–91 (citing Rediger, ¶¶ 39–44, 416 P.3d at 902–03).

2019We concluded in Rediger that “a showing of waiver requires some evidence, beyond mere acquiescence, that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege.” People v. Smith, 2018 CO 33, ¶ 17 , 416 P.3d 886 , 890–91 (citing Rediger, ¶¶ 39–44, 416 P.3d at 902–03).

2025Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21 . ¶8 “Waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984)). ¶9 “Defendants . . . affirmatively waive their right to public trial by not objecting to known [courtroom] closures.” Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 17 , cited with approval in People v. Hernandez, 2021 CO 45 , ¶ 35.

2018In other words, waiver “specifically removes claims from the trial court’s consideration.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 209 P.3d at 1160 ). • Still, waiver requires “that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege.” People v. Smith, 2018 CO 33, ¶ 17 ; see People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 37 (Because “[d]efense counsel explicitly agreed that the specific evidence at issue was admissible . . . , Kessler, through his counsel, intentionally waived the particular point raised on appeal.”). • And despite this high bar, “even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether

2012Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' " See also People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 , 498 (Colo.2007) (noting that the general standard for the waiver of a constitutional right is "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege"); People v. Rodriguez, 209 P.3d 1151 , 1160 (Colo.App.2008) (noting the distinction between waivers and forfeitures), aff'd, 238 P.3d 1283 (Colo.2010) ; cf. People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 , 93 (Colo.1989) (noting that an implied waiver of counsel

1993See People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 93 (Colo.1989); King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Colo.1986) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), to the effect that a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").

2025See People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”) (emphases and citation omitted); see also People v. Manzanares, 2020 COA 140M , ¶ 16 (concluding that the defendant had waived a claim when defense counsel “agreed to the trial court’s curative procedure and requested nothing further”). ¶ 19 Insofar as Curtis contends that the district court’s second exchange with the foreperson — which went beyond the procedure that the court and counsel discussed — was improper, we will review that contention for plain error. ¶ 20 “An error is

2025People v. Smith, 2024 CO 3 , ¶ 18; see also, e.g., People v. Ortega, 266 P.3d 424, 428 (Colo. App. 2011) (“We also deem abandoned any additional contentions which Ortega raised in his postconviction motion and which have not been pursued on appeal.”); People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55 , ¶ 9 n.3 (“We deem abandoned, and won’t address, the seven claims that defendant raised in his Rule 35(c) motion but didn’t discuss on appeal.”). ¶ 17 Forfeiture, in turn, is “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right” but this does not extinguish appellate review — forfeited errors may be reviewed “under

2025See People v. Gross, 2012 CO 60M, ¶ 12 . ¶ 59 Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” Rediger, ¶ 39 (emphases and citation omitted).

2025See Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA 178, ¶ 52 (noting that the existence of an oral contract is a factual question). 13 intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege and involves conduct clearly manifesting the intent not to assert the benefit); see also Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. App. 1986) (“Stipulations are a form of judicial admission which are binding on the party who makes them and may constitute the basis for a judgment.”).