known right privilege in Virginia

2020Our Supreme Court has “defined laches as ‘the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.’” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 (1996) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Estate, 243 Va. 53, 58 (1992)).

2020Our Supreme Court has “defined laches as ‘the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.’” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 (1996) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Estate, 243 Va. 53, 58 (1992)).

2025Laches is an affirmative defense against equitable claims that arises when the plaintiff has failed “to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 (1996); see Smith v. Woodlawn Constr.

2023“Laches is a defense against equitable claims where the plaintiff fails ‘to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.’” May, 297 Va. at 18 (quoting Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 (1996)).

2023Instead, “[f]or this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2018As we stated, “[w]aiver involves an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2025The initiation of further communication constitutes a valid waiver of an accused’s right to counsel and right to remain silent only when such waiver is “not only . . . voluntary, but . . . also constitute[s] a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case [upon the totality of the circumstances].” Id. at 482 .

2022A waiver is “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 611 (1988) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)).

2004Laches is “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1996) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992)); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 47, 353 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1987).

1999We have defined laches as “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 47 , 353 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1987).

1997Waiver involves an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 74 , 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 389, 396 , 363 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1987).

1997Waiver involves an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 74 , 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 389, 396 , 363 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1987).

1997Waiver involves an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 74 , 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 389, 396 , 363 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1987).

1997Waiver involves an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 74 , 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 389, 396 , 363 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1987).

2008We recognize that "[w]aiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105 , 111, 472 S.E.2d 277 , 280 (1996).

2008We recognize that "[w]aiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105 , 111, 472 S.E.2d 277 , 280 (1996).

2014“Laches is the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Berglund Chevrolet, Inc. v. Landrum, 43 Va. App. 742, 755 , 601 S.E.2d 693, 699 (2004).

2014“Laches is the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Berglund Chevrolet, Inc. v. Landrum, 43 Va. App. 742, 755 , 601 S.E.2d 693, 699 (2004).

2022A waiver “not only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[,] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Travis v. Finley, 36 Va. App. 189, 199 (2001) (quoting Brady v. United -9- States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).

2001“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (footnote omitted).

2022A waiver is “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 611 (1988) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)).

2002See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611 , 371 S.E.2d at 556 . "[T]he Commonwealth must demonstrate that the waiver 'not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . .'" Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611 , 371 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting Edwards - 5 - v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)).

2017This Court has defined the equitable doctrine of laches as: “ ‘the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.’ ” Bazzle v. Bazzle, 37 Va.App. 737, 747 , 561 S.E.2d 50, 55 (2002) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992)).

2017This Court has defined the equitable doctrine of laches as: “ ‘the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.’ ” Bazzle v. Bazzle, 37 Va.App. 737, 747 , 561 S.E.2d 50, 55 (2002) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992)).

2017The doctrine has no fixed guidelines—“ ‘no rigid rule can be laid down as to what delay will constitute laches; every suit must depend upon its own circumstances.’ ” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1996) (quoting Puckett v. Jessee, 195 Va. 919, 930 , 81 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1954)).

2017The doctrine has no fixed guidelines—“ ‘no rigid rule can be laid down as to what delay will constitute laches; every suit must depend upon its own circumstances.’ ” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1996) (quoting Puckett v. Jessee, 195 Va. 919, 930 , 81 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1954)).

2002"The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); see also Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611 , 371 S.E.2d at 556 ("Courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977))).

1990In each case, this depends "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

2004Laches is “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1996) (quoting Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992)); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 47, 353 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1987).

1999We have defined laches as “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Est., 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1992); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 47 , 353 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1987).

2001Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 811 , 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)) (further citations omitted).

2001Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 811 , 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)) (further citations omitted).

2025When considering the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether an accused’s statement was voluntary, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). “[V]oluntariness is a question of law, subject to independent appellate review.” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204 , 225 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 195 (2010)).

2025Co., 235 Va. 424, 430 (1988).

2025When considering the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether an accused’s statement was voluntary, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). “[V]oluntariness is a question of law, subject to independent appellate review.” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204 , 225 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 195 (2010)).

2023Instead, “[f]or this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2022A waiver “not only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[,] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Travis v. Finley, 36 Va. App. 189, 199 (2001) (quoting Brady v. United -9- States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).

2011Laches is “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782 (1996); see also 1924 Leonard Road, L.L.C. v. Van Roekel, 272 Va. 543, 559 , 636 S.E.2d 378 (2006).

2011Laches is “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Stewart v. Lady, 251 Va. 106, 114 , 465 S.E.2d 782 (1996); see also 1924 Leonard Road, L.L.C. v. Van Roekel, 272 Va. 543, 559 , 636 S.E.2d 378 (2006).

2005To meet this test, the evidence must establish the accused had “‘a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).

2002"The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); see also Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611 , 371 S.E.2d at 556 ("Courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977))).