known right privilege in Washington

49 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp.green delch · 1978 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp., 394 A.2d 226, 229 (Del. 2000Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp., 394 A.2d 226, 229 (Del.Ch.1978) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938)); see also Marcial Ucin, S.A. v. S.S.	2	2
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen scotus · 1938 · cited in 29 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1963–2020 2 sentences 2015The lead opinion for Frawley set forth the general rule for waiver, and then noted how waiver differs in different constitutional circumstances: A "waiver" is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. 2015The lead opinion for Frawley set forth the general rule for waiver, and then noted how waiver differs in different constitutional circumstances: A "waiver" is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.	1	29
State v. Bone-Clubgreen wash · 1995 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶23 “In order to protect the accused’s constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific find ings justifying the closure order.” Easterling, 157 Wn.2d at 175 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 (“Lacking a trial court record showing any consideration of Defendan	1	2
State v. Brightmangreen wash · 2005 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶23 “In order to protect the accused’s constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific find ings justifying the closure order.” Easterling, 157 Wn.2d at 175 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 (“Lacking a trial court record showing any consideration of Defendan	1	2
State v. Frawleygreen wash · 2014 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015State v. *226 Frawley, 181 Wn.2d at 461 (2014).	1	1
State v. Thanggreen wash · 2002 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 648 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) (“[w]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right”); State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996); State v. Kelly, 60 Wn.	1	1
State v. Thanggreen wash · 2002 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 648 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) (“[w]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right”); State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996); State v. Kelly, 60 Wn.	1	1
Henry M. Griffith v. B. J. Rhay, as Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washingtongreen ca9 · 1960 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (28)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Riley green washctapp · 1978 2 sentences 2020App. 87, 95 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Riley, 19 Wn. 2010App. at 417 . ¶11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of “waiver” as “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” State v. Riley, 19 Wn.	5	2010–2020
State v. Sweet green wash · 1978 2 sentences 2007And a “[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege.” State v. Sweet, 90 Wn.2d 282, 286 , 581 P.2d 579 (1978). 2007And a “[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege.” State v. Sweet, 90 Wn.2d 282, 286 , 581 P.2d 579 (1978).	5	2007–2013
State v. Harris green washctapp · 2010 2 sentences 2020App. 87, 95 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Riley, 19 Wn. 2020App. 87, 95 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Riley, 19 Wn.	4	2012–2020
State v. Harris green washctapp · 2010 2 sentences 2020Waiver is “‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” State v. Harris, 154 Wn. 2020Waiver is “‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” State v. Harris, 154 Wn.	4	2012–2020
Brewer v. Williams green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 2020It is the State’s burden to establish an “intentional 4 No. 80641 -6-1/5 relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S. Ct. 1232 , 51 L. 2020It is the State’s burden to establish an “intentional 4 No. 80641 -6-1/5 relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S. Ct. 1232 , 51 L.	3	2012–2025
Edwards v. Arizona green scotus · 1981 2 sentences 2014Ed. 2d 1461 (1938), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L. 2014Ed. 2d 1461 (1938), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L.	3	1982–2014
State v. Thomas green wash · 1996 2 sentences 2014A defendant can waive a fundamental constitutional right if he or she "'intentionally] relinquishes] or abandonfs] a known right or privilege.'" State v. Thomas. 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. 2003Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 648 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) (“[w]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right”); State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996); State v. Kelly, 60 Wn.	2	2003–2014
State v. Thomas green wash · 1996 2 sentences 2014A defendant can waive a fundamental constitutional right if he or she "'intentionally] relinquishes] or abandonfs] a known right or privilege.'" State v. Thomas. 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. 2003Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 648 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) (“[w]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right”); State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996); State v. Kelly, 60 Wn.	2	2003–2014
State v. Easterling green wash · 2006 2 sentences 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶23 “In order to protect the accused’s constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific find ings justifying the closure order.” Easterling, 157 Wn.2d at 175 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 (“Lacking a trial court record showing any consideration of Defendan	2	2007–2007
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1999However, it has long been settled law that courts will honor a defendant’s lawful, “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Currently, we allow defendants to waive a variety of their rights, including their Miranda rights [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. 1999However, it has long been settled law that courts will honor a defendant’s lawful, “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Currently, we allow defendants to waive a variety of their rights, including their Miranda rights [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.	2	1999–1999
Quesnell v. State green wash · 1974 1 sentence 2026Id. at 239-40 .	1	2026–2026
State v. Stone green washctapp · 2012 2 sentences 2025The State has the burden of establishing an “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” State v. Stone, 165 Wn. 2025App. 796, 815 , 268 P.3d 226 (2012) -5- No. 86985-0-I/6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S. Ct. 1232 , 51 L.	1	2025–2025
Verbeek Properties v. Greenco Environ green washctapp · 2010 1 sentence 2020App. 82, 86 , 246 P.3d 205 (2010). “[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Schuster v. Prestige Senior Mgmt., LLC, 193 Wn.	1	2020–2020
Gordon Schuster v. Prestige Senior Management LLC green washctapp · 2016 2 sentences 2020App. 82, 86 , 246 P.3d 205 (2010). “[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Schuster v. Prestige Senior Mgmt., LLC, 193 Wn. 2020App. 616, 631 , 5 No. 78998-8-I/6 376 P.3d 412 (2016).	1	2020–2020
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green scotus · 1973 2 sentences 2016Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. 2016Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L.	1	2016–2016
State v. Rodriguez green washctapp · 1992 1 sentence 2012App. 409, 417 , 828 P.2d 636 (1992)] reinforce the definition of ‘waiver’ as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” State v. Harris, 154 Wn.	1	2012–2012
State v. Bone-Club green wash · 1995 1 sentence 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho	1	2007–2007
State v. Brightman green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho	1	2007–2007
State v. Easterling green wash · 2006 1 sentence 2007Here, Mr. Frawley was never presented with an opportunity to waive his right to have the public present at the individual voir dire, therefore he cannot have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. ¶ 23 "In order to protect the accused's constitutional public trial right, a trial court may not close a courtroom without, first, applying and weighing five requirements as set forth in Bone-Club and, second, entering specific findings justifying the closure order." Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 175 , 137 P.3d 825 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261 , 906 P.2d 325 ("Lacking a trial court record sho	1	2007–2007
State v. Kelly green washctapp · 1991 2 sentences 2003Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 648 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) (“[w]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right”); State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558 , 910 P.2d 475 (1996); State v. Kelly, 60 Wn. 2003App. 921, 929 , 808 P.2d 1150 (1991).	1	2003–2003
State v. Edwards green wash · 1980 2 sentences 1994"Waiver . . . requires intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Edwards, 93 Wn.2d 162, 168 , 606 P.2d 1224 (1980). 1994"Waiver . . . requires intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Edwards, 93 Wn.2d 162, 168 , 606 P.2d 1224 (1980).	1	1994–1994
Public Utility District No. 1 v. Washington Public Power Supply System green wash · 1986 2 sentences 1994Waiver is a voluntary act, PUD 1 v. WPPSS, 104 Wn.2d 353, 365 , 705 P.2d 1195 , 713 P.2d 1109 (1985), but conduct supporting an inference of relinquishment by choice can imply waiver. 1994Waiver is a voluntary act, PUD 1 v. WPPSS, 104 Wn.2d 353, 365 , 705 P.2d 1195 , 713 P.2d 1109 (1985), but conduct supporting an inference of relinquishment by choice can imply waiver.	1	1994–1994
Von Moltke v. Gillies green scotus · 1948	1	1984–1984
Faretta v. California green scotus · 1975 2 sentences 1984NOTES [1] Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975) adopted the definition of "waiver" as stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938): "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." [2] Imus cites the procedures for waiver of counsel set forth in Justice Black's plurality opinion in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 , 92 L.Ed. 309 , 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948). 1984NOTES [1] Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975) adopted the definition of "waiver" as stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938): "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." [2] Imus cites the procedures for waiver of counsel set forth in Justice Black's plurality opinion in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 , 92 L.Ed. 309 , 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948).	1	1984–1984
Burks v. United States green scotus · 1978	1	1981–1981
In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Smith green wash · 1975	1	1977–1977
Cavitt v. Estelle green scotus · 1976	1	1977–1977
In RE GENSBURG v. Smith neutral wash · 1950	1	1963–1963

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.040 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 128 (1965–2026) CO 127 (1977–2026) TX 121 (1968–2024) CT 109 (1972–2025) MD 103 (1963–2026) CA 86 (1962–2026) OR 83 (1968–2026) PA 77 (1964–2025) OH 55 (1969–2026) VA 51 (1966–2026) MO 50 (1973–2024) WA 49 (1963–2026) GA 47 (1968–2022) TN 47 (1970–2026) NY 43 (1964–2025) FL 41 (1963–2026) DC 39 (1974–2024) MI 39 (1970–2021) IN 35 (1967–2023) WI 34 (1971–2026) MN 34 (1957–2026) AZ 34 (1965–2025) IA 33 (1969–2025) NJ 32 (1951–2026) MS 29 (1977–2021) NC 24 (1959–2026) RI 23 (1965–2026) NM 22 (1982–2016) KS 20 (1969–2024) ND 18 (1984–2025) WY 18 (1975–2023) LA 17 (1978–2016) ME 17 (1967–2018) AL 16 (1974–2010) AK 15 (1970–2023) MT 14 (1963–2025) OK 12 (1945–2002) DE 12 (1977–2025) NE 12 (1966–2025) WV 9 (1978–2019) KY 9 (1975–2024) MA 9 (1977–2018) SD 8 (1969–2016) ID 8 (1966–2023) AR 7 (1981–2010) VT 7 (1983–2017) NH 6 (1979–2018) VI 6 (1979–2026) UT 5 (1993–2021) HI 5 (1976–2018) SC 4 (1977–2008) NV 2 (1992–2008) PR 2 (1939–1981) GU 2 (1979–1979)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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