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23 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). 1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). | 10 | 17 |
Thornley v. Mullengreen2 sentences1981“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Amado, 424 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)); Thornley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 511 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975). 1981“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Amado, 424 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)); Thornley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 511 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975). | 3 | 3 |
Marrapese v. Rhode Islandgreen2 sentences2004Marrapese v. State, 500 F. Supp. 1207 , 1212 (D.R.I. 1980). 1994Marrapese v. State, 500 F.Supp. 1207, 1212 (D.R.I.1980). | 2 | 4 |
Aetna Insurance v. Kennedy Ex Rel. Bogashgreen2 sentences1981Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 812 , 81 L.Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937)); see United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C.Cir.1979). 1981Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 812 , 81 L.Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937)); see United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C.Cir.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Singletary v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1981See Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1071 (D.C.App.1978). 1979See Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064 , 1071 (D.C. 1978). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. James Robert Dorsey, United States of America v. Faye Margaret Crawford A/K/A Faye Margaret Powellgreen2 sentences1981Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 812 , 81 L.Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937)); see United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C.Cir.1979). 1981Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 812 , 81 L.Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937)); see United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Connecticut v. Barrettgreen1 sentence2026In making this determination, courts must examine the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Barrett, 479 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). - 30 - Mr. Carreiro about his affection for the complainant as an opportunity to encourage Mr. Carreiro to say more. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Griffingreen1 sentence1992See also State v. Griffin, 567 A.2d 796, 799-800 (R.I.1989) (a waiver must amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege); cf. State v. Kennedy, 586 A.2d 1089, 1091-92 (R.I.1991) (criminal defendant has an unequivocal right to proceed pro se regardless of whether defendant could better defend himself with an attorney). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kennedygreen1 sentence1992See also State v. Griffin, 567 A.2d 796, 799-800 (R.I.1989) (a waiver must amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege); cf. State v. Kennedy, 586 A.2d 1089, 1091-92 (R.I.1991) (criminal defendant has an unequivocal right to proceed pro se regardless of whether defendant could better defend himself with an attorney). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Borgesgreen1 sentence1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollandgreen1 sentence1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). 1989It is clear, however, that “a defendant’s voluntary absence from a trial serves to operate as a waiver of the constitutional right to be present.” State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Borges, 519 A.2d 574, 578 (R.I.1986). 5 This waiver must amount to ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brown, 121 R.I. at 426 , 399 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Langloisgreen2 sentences1973Harris v. Langlois, supra. The controlling standard in determining whether there has been a valid waiver, is, as -enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), whether there has been “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Cole v. Langlois, 99 R.I. 138, 142 , 206 A.2d 216, 218 (1965). 1973Harris v. Langlois, supra. The controlling standard in determining whether there has been a valid waiver, is, as -enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), whether there has been “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Cole v. Langlois, 99 R.I. 138, 142 , 206 A.2d 216, 218 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fay v. Noia
red
2 sentences1975Although certain constitutional rights may be waived under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); *511 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), in order to have a valid waiver, there must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 . 1975Although certain constitutional rights may be waived under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); *511 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), in order to have a valid waiver, there must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 . | 3 | 1965–1975 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1981Recently, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that once an accused has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation * * * until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1981Recently, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that once an accused has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation * * * until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Amado
green
1 sentence1981“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Amado, 424 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)); Thornley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 511 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hummell v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1981Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ; Hummell v. Superior Court, 100 R.I. at 58 , 211 A.2d at 274 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, supra). 1981Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ; Hummell v. Superior Court, 100 R.I. at 58 , 211 A.2d at 274 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, supra). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1975Although certain constitutional rights may be waived under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); *511 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), in order to have a valid waiver, there must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 . 1975Although certain constitutional rights may be waived under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); *511 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), in order to have a valid waiver, there must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Moore v. Michigan
green
2 sentences1965In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , waiver has been defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." In Moore v. State of Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 , 78 S.Ct. 191 , 2 L.Ed.2d 167 , the issue was whether there had been a valid waiver of the petitioner's right to counsel. 1965In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , waiver has been defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." In Moore v. State of Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 , 78 S.Ct. 191 , 2 L.Ed.2d 167 , the issue was whether there had been a valid waiver of the petitioner's right to counsel. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.