16 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2010For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 2007This advice is crucial because there can be no effective waiver of a fundamental constitutional right unless there is an `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added). | 2 | 12 |
North Carolina v. Butlerred2 sentences1997The Court then went on to state: "[A]lthough we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler , [ 441 U.S. 369 , 372-376 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1756-1759 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that 1997The Court then went on to state: "[A]lthough we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler , [ 441 U.S. 369 , 372-376 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1756-1759 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Thomas Patrick Smithgreen1 sentence1985It must clearly appear "that the accused deliberately and understandingly chose to forgo the assistance of counsel at such interrogation." United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 , 88 S.Ct. 491 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 486 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
R. Glen FENSTERMACHER, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA NATIONAL BANK and Carson Investment Companygreen1 sentence1983Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321 at 101 (1971) ("it is clear that the test of waiver that is applied to other constitutional rights, that there must have been `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' is not applicable to the right to trial by jury"), Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia National Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 338 (3rd Cir. 1974) (where plaintiff sought final equitable relief and acquiesced in consolidated hearing on preliminary injunction and the merits, he effectively waived jury trial though time for demand had not passed). | 1 | 1 |
Southland Reship, Inc. v. S. Leslie Flegel, Individually and D/B/A Periodical Sales of Americagreen1 sentence1983Southland Reship, Inc., v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-45 (5th Cir.1976) (after timely demand, party waived right to jury demand on liability issue by acquiescing in consolidated nonjury hearing with later jury trial limited to damages issue). | 1 | 1 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1997Holding that Edwards had not effectively waived his right to counsel, the Court, citing a number of cases, including Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), noted that "[i]t is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " 451 U.S. at 482 , 10 1997Holding that Edwards had not effectively waived his right to counsel, the Court, citing a number of cases, including Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), noted that "[i]t is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " 451 U.S. at 482 , 10 | 6 | 1983–1997 |
Teske v. State
green
1 sentence1997In Teske v. State, 507 So.2d 569 (Ala. Crim.App.1987), this court held: "`It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1989While the Sixth Amendment guarantees that an accused in a criminal prosecution has the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), this right and its at, tendant benefits may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary and constitutes a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1989While the Sixth Amendment guarantees that an accused in a criminal prosecution has the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), this right and its at, tendant benefits may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary and constitutes a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Peter R. Fitzpatrick v. Louie L. Wainwright
green
1 sentence1989See also, North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-75 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1757-58 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright 800 F.2d 1057 , 1063 (11th Cir. 1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Curry v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1986Curry v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.3d at 228 , 141 Cal.Rptr. at 888-89 . 1986Curry v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.3d at 228 , 141 Cal.Rptr. at 888-89 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Nelson v. State
green
1 sentence1985Brewer v. Williams ; Miranda v. Arizona ; Fike v. State, 447 So.2d 850 (Ala. Crim.App.1984); Nelson v. State, 398 So.2d 421 (Ala.Crim.App.1981); Thompson v. State. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Adams v. Cameron
green
1 sentence1985It must clearly appear "that the accused deliberately and understandingly chose to forgo the assistance of counsel at such interrogation." United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 , 88 S.Ct. 491 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 486 (1967). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Fike v. State
green
1 sentence1985Brewer v. Williams ; Miranda v. Arizona ; Fike v. State, 447 So.2d 850 (Ala. Crim.App.1984); Nelson v. State, 398 So.2d 421 (Ala.Crim.App.1981); Thompson v. State. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Fare v. Michael C.
green
2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Brewer v. Williams
green
2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1983See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369 , 374-375 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 724-725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 2571-2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Howard v. State
green
2 sentences1974Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.” (Emphasis ours.) To the same effect see Howard v. State, 280 Ala. 430 , 194 So.2d 834 . 1974Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.” (Emphasis ours.) To the same effect see Howard v. State, 280 Ala. 430 , 194 So.2d 834 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.