known right privilege in Minnesota

2024“Waiver ‘is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends . . . upon the particular facts and 39 circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1990)).

2024“Waiver ‘is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends . . . upon the particular facts and 39 circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1990)).

2026“Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends … upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 617 (Minn. 2004) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d at 94 (explaining that confrontation rights can be waived).

2024“Waiver ‘is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends . . . upon the particular facts and 39 circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1990)).

2012We have consistently recognized that a criminal defendant may waive constitutional rights, even those deemed “fundamental.” See State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 617 (Minn.2004); see also State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn.1996) (“[I]t has long been settled law that courts will hon- or a defendant’s lawful, ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938))).

2005At the same time, we have allowed criminal defendants to waive many rights stating that “it has long been settled law that courts will honor a defendant’s lawful, ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn.1996) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2014Seagate’s argument, by contrast, raises a question of waiver: whether Mao’s and Western Digital’s actions during the arbitration, coupled with their failure to object, constituted the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

2014Seagate’s argument, by contrast, raises a question of waiver: whether Mao’s and Western Digital’s actions during the arbitration, coupled with their failure to object, constituted the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

2012The rights that we have allowed defendants to waive are rights personal to the defendant and include the waiver of the right to trial entirely by pleading guilty, see State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 , 904 n. 6 (Minn.1983); Miranda rights, see State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003); the right to counsel, Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613 ; the right to a jury trial, State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Minn.1995); and the right to be present at trial, Brown v. State, 682 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn.2004).

2005The rights that we have allowed defendants to waive are rights personal to the defendant and include a waiver of Miranda rights, see State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003); the right to counsel, State v. Blom,, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn.2004); the right to a jury trial, State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (1995), Minn. R.Crim.

2012The rights that we have allowed defendants to waive are rights personal to the defendant and include the waiver of the right to trial entirely by pleading guilty, see State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 , 904 n. 6 (Minn.1983); Miranda rights, see State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003); the right to counsel, Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613 ; the right to a jury trial, State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Minn.1995); and the right to be present at trial, Brown v. State, 682 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn.2004).

2005The rights that we have allowed defendants to waive are rights personal to the defendant and include a waiver of Miranda rights, see State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003); the right to counsel, State v. Blom,, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn.2004); the right to a jury trial, State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (1995), Minn. R.Crim.

1985Although the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination are based upon different policies and differ as to when each right attaches, the validity of each waiver of counsel should be judged by the same standard — “whether under the facts of the case there was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent abandonment or relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763-64 (Minn.1984) (citing Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879, 881 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 556 , 78 L.Ed.2d 728 (1983)).

1984That standard is whether under the facts of the case there was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent abandonment or *764 relinquishment of a known right or privilege. 706 F.2d at 881 .

2017“A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.... ” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at 709 (quotation omitted).

2015If a suspect has been properly warned under Miranda, the rights to counsel and to remain silent can be waived if done “knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 5 1628; see also Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 417 ; State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 1997); State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 1978) (“Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (quotation omitted).

2015If a suspect has been properly warned under Miranda, the rights to counsel and to remain silent can be waived if done “knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 5 1628; see also Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 417 ; State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 1997); State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 1978) (“Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (quotation omitted).

2015If a suspect has been properly warned under Miranda, the rights to counsel and to remain silent can be waived if done “knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 5 1628; see also Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 417 ; State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 1997); State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 1978) (“Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (quotation omitted).

2013In order for a waiver to be valid, the record must show that the defendant’s waiver of a constitutional right was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn.2009).

2012The rights that we have allowed defendants to waive are rights personal to the defendant and include the waiver of the right to trial entirely by pleading guilty, see State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 , 904 n. 6 (Minn.1983); Miranda rights, see State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003); the right to counsel, Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613 ; the right to a jury trial, State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Minn.1995); and the right to be present at trial, Brown v. State, 682 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn.2004).

2004Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Minn.App.1990).

2004In Ballweber , the appellant' pleaded guilty to escape and the district court imposed a stayed 15-month sentence. 457 N.W.2d at 216 .

1997Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (“The right at issue is the right to be present, and the question becomes whether that right was effectively waived by [defendant’s] voluntary absence.”) “A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends * * * upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case * * State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990).

1997Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (“The right at issue is the right to be present, and the question becomes whether that right was effectively waived by [defendant’s] voluntary absence.”) “A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends * * * upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case * * State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990).

1990Thomas v. Rigg, 255 Minn. 227, 236 , 96 N.W.2d 252, 258 (1959) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

1990Thomas v. Rigg, 255 Minn. 227, 236 , 96 N.W.2d 252, 258 (1959) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

1985Although the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination are based upon different policies and differ as to when each right attaches, the validity of each waiver of counsel should be judged by the same standard — “whether under the facts of the case there was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent abandonment or relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763-64 (Minn.1984) (citing Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879, 881 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 556 , 78 L.Ed.2d 728 (1983)).