known right privilege in Maryland

2026Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c). 9 The “intelligent and knowing” standard in CP § 7-106(b) is the same as that articulated in Zerbst, which referred to “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 .

2023A waiver of the right to counsel is not valid unless it is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

1994In other words, “there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

1994In other words, “there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

2010Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether “ ‘there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Powell, 394 Md. at 639 , 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003)).

2010Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether “ ‘there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Powell, 394 Md. at 639 , 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003)).

2009A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2055 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 871 (1973) (“The Constitution requires that every effort be made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the Framers thought indispensable to a fair trial.”); Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76 , 945 A.2d 638 (2008) (holding that waiver of the fundamental right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent); Sm

2009A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2055 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 871 (1973) (“The Constitution requires that every effort be made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the Framers thought indispensable to a fair trial.”); Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76 , 945 A.2d 638 (2008) (holding that waiver of the fundamental right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent); Sm

1997Noting that "the legislative purpose of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, as amended by Ch. 442 of the Acts of 1965, was to adopt the concept of "waiver' as set forth by the Supreme Court" in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,439 , 83 S.Ct. 822,849 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837,869 (1963), Curtis, 284 Md. at 142 , 395 A.2d at 470 , we then outlined the Supreme Court's seminal explanation of that concept in Johnson v. Zerbst , in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated: "`A waiver is ordinarily an intellig

1997Noting that "the legislative purpose of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, as amended by Ch. 442 of the Acts of 1965, was to adopt the concept of "waiver' as set forth by the Supreme Court" in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,439 , 83 S.Ct. 822,849 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837,869 (1963), Curtis, 284 Md. at 142 , 395 A.2d at 470 , we then outlined the Supreme Court's seminal explanation of that concept in Johnson v. Zerbst , in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated: "`A waiver is ordinarily an intellig

1978The Supreme Court recently reiterated these rigorous standards in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977): "The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law — that it was incumbent upon the State to prove `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.,at 464.

1978The Supreme Court recently reiterated these rigorous standards in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977): "The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law — that it was incumbent upon the State to prove `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.,at 464.

2026It is settled that ordinarily for a waiver of one’s rights under the confrontation clause “to be effective, it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).

1986In the context of the right of confrontation the Supreme Court has said that “for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 [, 1466 (1938) ].” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1247 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314, 317 (1966).

2015In that case, the Supreme Court declared that “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (employing that waiver standard).

2015In that case, the Supreme Court declared that “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (employing that waiver standard).

1991“To satisfy constitutional due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 234 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] (1969).

1991“To satisfy constitutional due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 234 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] (1969).

2006This determination is fact and circumstance specific, Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31 , 590 A.2d at 551 , citing State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182 , 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990); Stewart, 319 Md. at 90 , 570 A.2d at 1233-34 ; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 , and dual-faceted, requiring that the waiver be both “knowing” and “voluntary.” For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, it must have been, for the possessor of the right, “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).

2006This determination is fact and circumstance specific, Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31 , 590 A.2d at 551 , citing State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182 , 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990); Stewart, 319 Md. at 90 , 570 A.2d at 1233-34 ; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 , and dual-faceted, requiring that the waiver be both “knowing” and “voluntary.” For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, it must have been, for the possessor of the right, “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).

2010In order for there to be a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial, however, the “ ‘trial judge must be satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Walker v. State, 406 Md. 369, 378 , 958 A.2d 915 (2008) (quoting Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388 , 418-19 n. 41, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007)).

2010In order for there to be a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial, however, the “ ‘trial judge must be satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Walker v. State, 406 Md. 369, 378 , 958 A.2d 915 (2008) (quoting Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388 , 418-19 n. 41, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007)).

2010Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether “ ‘there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Powell, 394 Md. at 639 , 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003)).

2010Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether “ ‘there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Powell, 394 Md. at 639 , 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003)).

2008State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 , 870 A.2d 217, 223 (2005) (“A waiver of the right to counsel must ‘ordinarily’ be ‘an inten *291 tional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (quoting Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119 , 486 A.2d 163, 167 (1985))).

2008State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 , 870 A.2d 217, 223 (2005) (“A waiver of the right to counsel must ‘ordinarily’ be ‘an inten *291 tional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (quoting Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119 , 486 A.2d 163, 167 (1985))).

2008State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 , 870 A.2d 217, 223 (2005) (“A waiver of the right to counsel must ‘ordinarily’ be ‘an inten *291 tional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (quoting Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119 , 486 A.2d 163, 167 (1985))).

2008State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 , 870 A.2d 217, 223 (2005) (“A waiver of the right to counsel must ‘ordinarily’ be ‘an inten *291 tional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ” (quoting Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119 , 486 A.2d 163, 167 (1985))).

1977Ed. 1461 (1938), which recites that: “ ‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Part and parcel of this principle is usually the follow-up recitation from Camley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), which states that: “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Initially, it must be noticed that waiver is not a sing

1977Ed. 1461 (1938), which recites that: “ ‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Part and parcel of this principle is usually the follow-up recitation from Camley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), which states that: “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Initially, it must be noticed that waiver is not a sing

2014We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver 7 must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2014We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver 7 must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

2010See e.g., Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ) (“the trial judge must be satisfied that there has been ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ”); Martinez, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 (“court must be concerned that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion”); Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 232 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981) (the criminal defendant’s “ ‘guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1308 (the criminal

2010See e.g., Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ) (“the trial judge must be satisfied that there has been ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ”); Martinez, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 (“court must be concerned that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion”); Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 232 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981) (the criminal defendant’s “ ‘guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1308 (the criminal

2023As indicated, a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to a jury trial must be knowing and voluntary; it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Aguilera v. State, 193 Md.

2012Id. at 431 , 997 A.2d 888 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013“Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Boulden, 414 Md. at 295 , 995 A.2d at 274 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).

2013“Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Boulden, 414 Md. at 295 , 995 A.2d at 274 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).

2006Indeed, this Court has recognized the similarity between waiver of a jury trial and a guilty plea, noting "that a defendant who pleads guilty to a criminal charge waives his constitutional right to a jury trial, and . . . for the waiver to be valid under the due process clause it must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 289-90 , 424 A.2d 349, 361 (1981).

2006Indeed, this Court has recognized the similarity between waiver of a jury trial and a guilty plea, noting "that a defendant who pleads guilty to a criminal charge waives his constitutional right to a jury trial, and . . . for the waiver to be valid under the due process clause it must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 289-90 , 424 A.2d 349, 361 (1981).

2006Maryland Rule 4-215(b) governs the waiver of yet another fundamental right of a criminal defendant, the right to counsel, and also contains language similar to Rule 4-246(b). [5] As with a waiver of a jury trial, in determining the propriety of a waiver of counsel, this Court has noted that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights," and that "a waiver is . . . an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420

2006Maryland Rule 4-215(b) governs the waiver of yet another fundamental right of a criminal defendant, the right to counsel, and also contains language similar to Rule 4-246(b). [5] As with a waiver of a jury trial, in determining the propriety of a waiver of counsel, this Court has noted that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights," and that "a waiver is . . . an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420

2003VI,[ 7 ] applicable to the States through the *377 Fourteenth Amendment,[ 8 ] and by the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Arts. 5, 21 and 24.[ 9 ] However, this right may be waived, as when the defendant pleads guilty ... or elects to be tried by a judge. ‘To satisfy constitutional due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Epps v. State, 52 Md.App. 308, 311-12 , 450 A.2d 913, 915-16 (1982) (citations omitted) (footnotes added).

2003VI,[ 7 ] applicable to the States through the *377 Fourteenth Amendment,[ 8 ] and by the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Arts. 5, 21 and 24.[ 9 ] However, this right may be waived, as when the defendant pleads guilty ... or elects to be tried by a judge. ‘To satisfy constitutional due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Epps v. State, 52 Md.App. 308, 311-12 , 450 A.2d 913, 915-16 (1982) (citations omitted) (footnotes added).

2026See, e.g., Curtis, 284 Md. at 143 (citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962)). 16 postconviction proceeding.