known right privilege (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
← Connecticut issues

known right privilege in Connecticut

109 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2025 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (19)

CaseFollowedCited
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen
scotus · 1938 · cited in 51 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1972–2016
2 sentences

2016Jur. 2d, supra, § 35, p. 501; see also Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ("a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of abandonment of a known right or privilege"); cf. State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 483 , 10 A.3d 942 .

2016Jur. 2d, supra, § 35, p. 501; see also Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ("a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of abandonment of a known right or privilege"); cf. State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 483 , 10 A.3d 942 .

751
State v. Haffordgreen
conn · 2000 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2001–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

34
Gonzales-Lemus v. Californiagreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

33
Escarino-Carrillo v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

33
Johnson v. McCaughtrygreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L.

33
State v. Bellamygreen
conn · 2016 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 437 , 147 A.3d 655 (2016) (‘‘[a]n unpreserved constitutional claim that has not been waived under Kitchens may be afforded Golding review’’). ‘‘[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege. . . .

2023See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 437 , 147 A.3d 655 (2016) (‘‘[a]n unpreserved constitutional claim that has not been waived under Kitchens may be afforded Golding review’’). ‘‘[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege. . . .

33
State v. Ramosgreen
conn · 1986 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–1996
2 sentences

1996Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 603 , 519 A.2d 9 (1986) (“waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1996Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 603 , 519 A.2d 9 (1986) (“waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

25
William Stubbs v. H. J. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facilitygreen
ca2 · 1976 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
22
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen
scotus · 1973 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1986–2015
2 sentences

2010The court in Schneckloth also rejected the respondent's contention that, because "`consent' is a waiver of a person's rights under the [f]ourth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments," to establish waiver, the state must be required to "demonstrate `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id., at 235 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 .

2010The court further explained that "it would be next to impossible to apply to a consent search the standard of `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id.

13
Worth Construction Co. v. Department of Public Worksgreen
connappct · 2012 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2019–2025
2 sentences

2025See Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. New Lon- don, supra, 265 Conn. 432 . ‘‘It is well established that [w]aiver is a question of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth Con- struction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 139 Conn. App. 65, 68 , 54 A.3d 627 (2012). ‘‘[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . [T]o determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the petitioner of the right claimed to be waived. . . .

2019"It is well established that waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works , 139 Conn. App. 65 , 70, 54 A.3d 627 (2012). "[T]o determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the [plaintiff] of the right claimed to be waived. ...

12
State v. Kitchensgreen
conn · 2011 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2016–2017
2 sentences

2016The court in Kitchens repeatedly explained, as we do in the present case, that waiver involves the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 469 , 10 A.3d 942 ; accord id., at 474, 10 A.3d 942 ; and that, "among the rights that may be waived by the action of counsel in a criminal proceeding is the right of a defendant to proper jury instructions." Id., at 467.

2016The court in Kitchens repeatedly explained, as we do in the present case, that waiver involves the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 469 , 10 A.3d 942 ; accord id., at 474, 10 A.3d 942 ; and that, "among the rights that may be waived by the action of counsel in a criminal proceeding is the right of a defendant to proper jury instructions." Id., at 467.

12
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.green
conn · 2009 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2012–2015
2 sentences

2012It well established that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); accord Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 57 , 970 A.2d 656 , cert. denied sub nom.

2012It well established that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); accord Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 57 , 970 A.2d 656 , cert. denied sub nom.

12
Fay v. Noiared
scotus · 1963 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1972–1987
12
Blue v. Robinsongreen
conn · 1977 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1980–1981
12
State v. Fabricatoregreen
conn · 2007 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Barlow v. Lopesgreen
conn · 1986 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
11
State v. Gethersgreen
conn · 1984 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
State v. Wilsongreen
conn · 1986 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green
conn · 1972 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (61)

CaseCitedYears
Talton v. Warden green
conn · 1976
2 sentences

1998In Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334 , our Supreme Court stated: A waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ; Talton v. Warden, 171 Conn. 378 , 385 , 370 A.2d 965 ; and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is clearly established that such is the case.

1998In Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334 , our Supreme Court stated: A waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ; Talton v. Warden, 171 Conn. 378 , 385 , 370 A.2d 965 ; and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is clearly established that such is the case.

81978–1998
City of New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME green
conn · 1996
2 sentences

2016This shall specifically include but not be limited to the Robert F. Hendren Trust dated February 23, 1973 which may have a value of ONE MILLION ($1,000,000.00) Dollars or more. [The defendant] shall waive any claims over the same.’’ The plaintiff argues that the defendant can- not now seek a modification of periodic alimony under the guise of an increase in the value of an asset against which he waived his right to ownership. ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME

2016This shall specifically include but not be limited to the Robert F. Hendren Trust dated February 23, 1973 which may have a value of ONE MILLION ($1,000,000.00) Dollars or more. [The defendant] shall waive any claims over the same.’’ The plaintiff argues that the defendant can- not now seek a modification of periodic alimony under the guise of an increase in the value of an asset against which he waived his right to ownership. ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME

71997–2016
Staton v. Warden green
conn · 1978
2 sentences

2000A waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" (citations omitted); and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is established that such is the case, Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334-5 (citation omitted).

1999A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" (citations omitted); and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is established that such is the case (citation omitted), Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334-5 .

71983–2000
McCarthy v. United States green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

2016For a waiver of such rights ‘‘to be valid under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCar- thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L.

2016For a waiver of such rights ‘‘to be valid under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCar- thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L.

42000–2016
Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

2022Waiver, in this context, is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege by the peti- tioner personally and depended on his considered choice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 131 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993).

2022Waiver, in this context, is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege by the peti- tioner personally and depended on his considered choice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 131 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993).

32017–2022
Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel green
conn · 1995
2 sentences

2002"Waiver is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel , 235 Conn. 559 , 569 , 668 A.2d 367 (1995). `In general, federal and state constitutional and statutory rights can be waived.'" New Haven v. Local 884 , Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 237 Conn. 378 , 385 , 677 A.2d 1350 (1996).

2002"Waiver is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel , 235 Conn. 559 , 569 , 668 A.2d 367 (1995). `In general, federal and state constitutional and statutory rights can be waived.'" New Haven v. Local 884 , Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 237 Conn. 378 , 385 , 677 A.2d 1350 (1996).

31996–2002
North Carolina v. Butler red
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2000Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.

2000Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.

31982–2000
State v. Wilson green
conn · 1981
2 sentences

1985Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord, North Carolina v. Butler, [supra]; State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981).” State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 666-67 , 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S. Ct. 3570 , 77 L.

1985Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord, North Carolina v. Butler, [supra]; State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981).” State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 666-67 , 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S. Ct. 3570 , 77 L.

31982–2000
In re Manuel R. green
conn · 1988
2 sentences

1994"A valid waiver is defined . . . as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Citation omitted.) In re Manuel R. , 207 Conn. 725 , 736 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988).

1994"A valid waiver is defined . . . as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Citation omitted.) In re Manuel R. , 207 Conn. 725 , 736 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988).

31991–1994
D'Amico v. Manson green
conn · 1984
2 sentences

1988Waiver has been defined as the “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 147 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 579 , 456 A.2d 1187 (1983); see also Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972).

1988Waiver has been defined as the “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 147 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 579 , 456 A.2d 1187 (1983); see also Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972).

31988–1991
Brookhart v. Janis green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2020For a waiver to be effec- tive, ‘‘it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245 , 16 L.

2020For a waiver to be effec- tive, ‘‘it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245 , 16 L.

22020–2025
State v. Robinson green
conn · 1996
2 sentences

2024Ed. 2d 89 (2000); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 245 , 676 A.2d 384 (1996) (defendant can be deemed to have waived right ‘‘by failing to assert that right only if he or she has had access to sufficient informa- tion to support . . . claim’’).

2024Ed. 2d 89 (2000); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 245 , 676 A.2d 384 (1996) (defendant can be deemed to have waived right ‘‘by failing to assert that right only if he or she has had access to sufficient informa- tion to support . . . claim’’).

22024–2024
Old Kent Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Ford green
conn · 2004
2 sentences

2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004).

2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea

22021–2023
Gagne v. Vaccaro green
conn · 2004
2 sentences

2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004).

2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea

22021–2023
Gagne v. Vaccaro green
connappct · 2003
2 sentences

2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004).

2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004).

22021–2023
C. R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. City of Bridgeport green
conn · 2007
2 sentences

2013“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 87 .

2013“Waiver does not have to be express, but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied. . . . [W]aiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

22009–2013
Boykin v. Alabama green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

2000For an accused to validly waive any of these rights under the Due Process Clause, the waiver must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Boykin , 395 U.S. at 243 n. 3 (quoting McCarthy v. United States , 394 U.S. 459 , 466 (1969) and Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 (1938)).

1990As stated in State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590 , 598 (1988) the defendant's representations that his attorney's incorrect advice had influenced his guilty pleas raises a question of whether the guilty pleas conform to the requirement of Practice Book Section 711 and the standard set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7 , 404 A.2d 871 (1978).

21990–2000
Jessey Kenneth McKinney v. United States green
ca5 · 1968
2 sentences

1998McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 , 59 (5th Cir.).

1997McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 , 59 (5th Cir.).

21997–1998
Vena v. Warden green
conn · 1966
2 sentences

1991If a CT Page 1784 habeas corpus applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate bypassing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits — though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other m

1991If a CT Page 1784 habeas corpus applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate bypassing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits — though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other m

21981–1991
A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals green
conn · 1983
21988–1990
State v. Shockley green
conn · 1982
21989–1990
State v. Acquin green
conn · 1982
21983–1985
United States v. Lionel Ortiz green
cadc · 1996
12022–2022
In re Lee green
scotus · 2013
12021–2021
GlaxoSmithKline v. Human Med. Plans, Inc. green
scotus · 2013
12021–2021
Kachalsky v. Cacace green
scotus · 2013
12021–2021
State v. Golding green
conn · 1989
12020–2020
Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ. green
conn · 2012
12020–2020
State v. McClain green
conn · 2017
12020–2020
Apple Salon v. Commissioner of Public Health green
connappct · 2011
12019–2019
State v. Torres green
connappct · 2017
12018–2018
In re Luis N. green
conn · 2017
12018–2018
Diaz v. Comm'r of Corr. green
conn · 2017
12018–2018
Zappone v. United States green
scotus · 2018
12018–2018
Rafalko v. University of New Haven green
connappct · 2011
12017–2017
Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc. green
conn · 2004
12017–2017
AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Department of Public Health green
conn · 2005
12015–2015
Jo-Ann Stores, Inc. v. Property Operating Co. green
connappct · 2005
12015–2015
Town of Stratford v. A. Secondino & Son, Inc. green
connappct · 2012
12015–2015
People v. Shelley green
calctapp · 1984
12015–2015

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (13) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (12) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21 (11) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 (8) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-35 (7) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470 (7) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-134 (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-86e (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 128 (1965–2026) CO 127 (1977–2026) TX 121 (1968–2024) CT 109 (1972–2025) MD 103 (1963–2026) CA 86 (1962–2026) OR 83 (1968–2026) PA 77 (1964–2025) OH 55 (1969–2026) VA 51 (1966–2026) MO 50 (1973–2024) WA 49 (1963–2026) GA 47 (1968–2022) TN 47 (1970–2026) NY 43 (1964–2025) FL 41 (1963–2026) DC 39 (1974–2024) MI 39 (1970–2021) IN 35 (1967–2023) WI 34 (1971–2026) MN 34 (1957–2026) AZ 34 (1965–2025) IA 33 (1969–2025) NJ 32 (1951–2026) MS 29 (1977–2021) NC 24 (1959–2026) RI 23 (1965–2026) NM 22 (1982–2016) KS 20 (1969–2024) ND 18 (1984–2025) WY 18 (1975–2023) LA 17 (1978–2016) ME 17 (1967–2018) AL 16 (1974–2010) AK 15 (1970–2023) MT 14 (1963–2025) OK 12 (1945–2002) DE 12 (1977–2025) NE 12 (1966–2025) WV 9 (1978–2019) KY 9 (1975–2024) MA 9 (1977–2018) SD 8 (1969–2016) ID 8 (1966–2023) AR 7 (1981–2010) VT 7 (1983–2017) NH 6 (1979–2018) VI 6 (1979–2026) UT 5 (1993–2021) HI 5 (1976–2018) SC 4 (1977–2008) NV 2 (1992–2008) PR 2 (1939–1981) GU 2 (1979–1979)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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