109 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2016Jur. 2d, supra, § 35, p. 501; see also Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ("a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of abandonment of a known right or privilege"); cf. State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 483 , 10 A.3d 942 . 2016Jur. 2d, supra, § 35, p. 501; see also Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ("a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of abandonment of a known right or privilege"); cf. State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 483 , 10 A.3d 942 . | 7 | 51 |
State v. Haffordgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. 2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 3 | 4 |
Gonzales-Lemus v. Californiagreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. 2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 3 | 3 |
Escarino-Carrillo v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. 2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. McCaughtrygreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. 2024See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 295 , 746 A.2d 150 (‘‘[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Bellamygreen2 sentences2023See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 437 , 147 A.3d 655 (2016) (‘‘[a]n unpreserved constitutional claim that has not been waived under Kitchens may be afforded Golding review’’). ‘‘[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege. . . . 2023See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 437 , 147 A.3d 655 (2016) (‘‘[a]n unpreserved constitutional claim that has not been waived under Kitchens may be afforded Golding review’’). ‘‘[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege. . . . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Ramosgreen2 sentences1996Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 603 , 519 A.2d 9 (1986) (“waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 1996Ed. 1461 (1938) (“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”); State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 603 , 519 A.2d 9 (1986) (“waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 2 | 5 |
| William Stubbs v. H. J. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facilitygreen | 2 | 2 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2010The court in Schneckloth also rejected the respondent's contention that, because "`consent' is a waiver of a person's rights under the [f]ourth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments," to establish waiver, the state must be required to "demonstrate `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id., at 235 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 . 2010The court further explained that "it would be next to impossible to apply to a consent search the standard of `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. | 1 | 3 |
Worth Construction Co. v. Department of Public Worksgreen2 sentences2025See Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. New Lon- don, supra, 265 Conn. 432 . ‘‘It is well established that [w]aiver is a question of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth Con- struction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 139 Conn. App. 65, 68 , 54 A.3d 627 (2012). ‘‘[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . [T]o determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the petitioner of the right claimed to be waived. . . . 2019"It is well established that waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works , 139 Conn. App. 65 , 70, 54 A.3d 627 (2012). "[T]o determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the [plaintiff] of the right claimed to be waived. ... | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kitchensgreen2 sentences2016The court in Kitchens repeatedly explained, as we do in the present case, that waiver involves the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 469 , 10 A.3d 942 ; accord id., at 474, 10 A.3d 942 ; and that, "among the rights that may be waived by the action of counsel in a criminal proceeding is the right of a defendant to proper jury instructions." Id., at 467. 2016The court in Kitchens repeatedly explained, as we do in the present case, that waiver involves the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 469 , 10 A.3d 942 ; accord id., at 474, 10 A.3d 942 ; and that, "among the rights that may be waived by the action of counsel in a criminal proceeding is the right of a defendant to proper jury instructions." Id., at 467. | 1 | 2 |
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.green2 sentences2012It well established that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); accord Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 57 , 970 A.2d 656 , cert. denied sub nom. 2012It well established that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); accord Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 57 , 970 A.2d 656 , cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2 |
| Fay v. Noiared | 1 | 2 |
| Blue v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Fabricatoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barlow v. Lopesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gethersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Talton v. Warden
green
2 sentences1998In Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334 , our Supreme Court stated: A waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ; Talton v. Warden, 171 Conn. 378 , 385 , 370 A.2d 965 ; and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is clearly established that such is the case. 1998In Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334 , our Supreme Court stated: A waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ; Talton v. Warden, 171 Conn. 378 , 385 , 370 A.2d 965 ; and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is clearly established that such is the case. | 8 | 1978–1998 |
City of New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME
green
2 sentences2016This shall specifically include but not be limited to the Robert F. Hendren Trust dated February 23, 1973 which may have a value of ONE MILLION ($1,000,000.00) Dollars or more. [The defendant] shall waive any claims over the same.’’ The plaintiff argues that the defendant can- not now seek a modification of periodic alimony under the guise of an increase in the value of an asset against which he waived his right to ownership. ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME 2016This shall specifically include but not be limited to the Robert F. Hendren Trust dated February 23, 1973 which may have a value of ONE MILLION ($1,000,000.00) Dollars or more. [The defendant] shall waive any claims over the same.’’ The plaintiff argues that the defendant can- not now seek a modification of periodic alimony under the guise of an increase in the value of an asset against which he waived his right to ownership. ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME | 7 | 1997–2016 |
Staton v. Warden
green
2 sentences2000A waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" (citations omitted); and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is established that such is the case, Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334-5 (citation omitted). 1999A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" (citations omitted); and the right of appeal should not be considered as having been waived or abandoned except where it is established that such is the case (citation omitted), Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 334-5 . | 7 | 1983–2000 |
McCarthy v. United States
green
2 sentences2016For a waiver of such rights ‘‘to be valid under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCar- thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L. 2016For a waiver of such rights ‘‘to be valid under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCar- thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L. | 4 | 2000–2016 |
Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2022Waiver, in this context, is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege by the peti- tioner personally and depended on his considered choice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 131 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993). 2022Waiver, in this context, is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege by the peti- tioner personally and depended on his considered choice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 131 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993). | 3 | 2017–2022 |
Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel
green
2 sentences2002"Waiver is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel , 235 Conn. 559 , 569 , 668 A.2d 367 (1995). `In general, federal and state constitutional and statutory rights can be waived.'" New Haven v. Local 884 , Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 237 Conn. 378 , 385 , 677 A.2d 1350 (1996). 2002"Waiver is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel , 235 Conn. 559 , 569 , 668 A.2d 367 (1995). `In general, federal and state constitutional and statutory rights can be waived.'" New Haven v. Local 884 , Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 237 Conn. 378 , 385 , 677 A.2d 1350 (1996). | 3 | 1996–2002 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2000Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. 2000Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. | 3 | 1982–2000 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1985Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord, North Carolina v. Butler, [supra]; State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981).” State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 666-67 , 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S. Ct. 3570 , 77 L. 1985Ed. 1461 (1938): ‘A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Accord, North Carolina v. Butler, [supra]; State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981).” State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 666-67 , 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S. Ct. 3570 , 77 L. | 3 | 1982–2000 |
In re Manuel R.
green
2 sentences1994"A valid waiver is defined . . . as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Citation omitted.) In re Manuel R. , 207 Conn. 725 , 736 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988). 1994"A valid waiver is defined . . . as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Citation omitted.) In re Manuel R. , 207 Conn. 725 , 736 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988). | 3 | 1991–1994 |
D'Amico v. Manson
green
2 sentences1988Waiver has been defined as the “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 147 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 579 , 456 A.2d 1187 (1983); see also Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972). 1988Waiver has been defined as the “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” D’Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 147 , 476 A.2d 543 (1984); A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 579 , 456 A.2d 1187 (1983); see also Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972). | 3 | 1988–1991 |
Brookhart v. Janis
green
2 sentences2020For a waiver to be effec- tive, ‘‘it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245 , 16 L. 2020For a waiver to be effec- tive, ‘‘it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245 , 16 L. | 2 | 2020–2025 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 89 (2000); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 245 , 676 A.2d 384 (1996) (defendant can be deemed to have waived right ‘‘by failing to assert that right only if he or she has had access to sufficient informa- tion to support . . . claim’’). 2024Ed. 2d 89 (2000); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 245 , 676 A.2d 384 (1996) (defendant can be deemed to have waived right ‘‘by failing to assert that right only if he or she has had access to sufficient informa- tion to support . . . claim’’). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Old Kent Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Ford
green
2 sentences2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Gagne v. Vaccaro
green
2 sentences2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Gagne v. Vaccaro
green
2 sentences2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). 2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). | 2 | 2021–2023 |
C. R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences2013“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 87 . 2013“Waiver does not have to be express, but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied. . . . [W]aiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. | 2 | 2009–2013 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2000For an accused to validly waive any of these rights under the Due Process Clause, the waiver must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Boykin , 395 U.S. at 243 n. 3 (quoting McCarthy v. United States , 394 U.S. 459 , 466 (1969) and Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 (1938)). 1990As stated in State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590 , 598 (1988) the defendant's representations that his attorney's incorrect advice had influenced his guilty pleas raises a question of whether the guilty pleas conform to the requirement of Practice Book Section 711 and the standard set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7 , 404 A.2d 871 (1978). | 2 | 1990–2000 |
Jessey Kenneth McKinney v. United States
green
2 sentences1998McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 , 59 (5th Cir.). 1997McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 , 59 (5th Cir.). | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Vena v. Warden
green
2 sentences1991If a CT Page 1784 habeas corpus applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate bypassing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits — though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other m 1991If a CT Page 1784 habeas corpus applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate bypassing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits — though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other m | 2 | 1981–1991 |
| A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 2 | 1988–1990 |
| State v. Shockley green | 2 | 1989–1990 |
| State v. Acquin green | 2 | 1983–1985 |
| United States v. Lionel Ortiz green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In re Lee green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| GlaxoSmithKline v. Human Med. Plans, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Kachalsky v. Cacace green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Golding green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. McClain green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Apple Salon v. Commissioner of Public Health green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Torres green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re Luis N. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Diaz v. Comm'r of Corr. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Zappone v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Rafalko v. University of New Haven green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Department of Public Health green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jo-Ann Stores, Inc. v. Property Operating Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Town of Stratford v. A. Secondino & Son, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Shelley green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.