9 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Parson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022Furthermore, because the waiver is of constitutional dimensions, “[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 792 (Ky. 2004)). 2021Record at 86 (emphasis added). “[T]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Hazard Coal, 325 S.W.3d at 297 (quoting Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 792 (Ky. 2004)). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2024The standard for finding a waiver of a defendant’s right to be present should be evaluated as any other constitutional right which requires “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 2008NOTES [1] See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. | 1 | 3 |
Boyd v. Duttongreen1 sentence2024These important rights “may be waived only by a voluntary and knowing action.” Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Edward C. Kuhl v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977The ‘known right or privilege’, in such a case as this, is the right or privilege of presenting the contention to the court and getting a ruling on it.” Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20, at 25-26 (9th Cir. 1966) 1977The `known right or privilege', in such a case as this, is the right or privilege of presenting the contention to the court and getting a ruling on it." Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20, at 25-26 (9th Cir. 1966) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight
green
2 sentences2022Furthermore, because the waiver is of constitutional dimensions, “[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 792 (Ky. 2004)). 2021Record at 86 (emphasis added). “[T]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Hazard Coal, 325 S.W.3d at 297 (quoting Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 792 (Ky. 2004)). | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2012In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 [ 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court defined waiver of the right to counsel in a criminal ease “as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” and held that “courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and they should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” (Citations omitted). 2012In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 [ 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court defined waiver of the right to counsel in a criminal ease “as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” and held that “courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and they should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” (Citations omitted). | 2 | 1977–2012 |
D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Frick Co.
green
1 sentence2012As recited in Overmyer, the standard applicable to this case requires the waiver to be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made,” and that it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Fay v. Noia
red
2 sentences1977If he decides not to do so, his decision is still ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ (Fay v. Noia, 1963, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S.Ct. 822, 849 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 ). 1977If he decides not to do so, his decision is still ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ (Fay v. Noia, 1963, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S.Ct. 822, 849 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.